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vABSTRACT 
Following the Second World War, the United States assumed the mantle of world 
leadership from Great Britain and faced two concurrent pressures on the world order: 
communism and anti-colonialism. Confronted with the responsibility of containing the 
global menace, President Harry Truman promised U.S. military advice and assistance to 
free nations fighting against oppression.  
An analysis of the U.S. advisory missions in Greece, Korea, and the Philippines 
shows a pattern of perceived success that overshadowed the operational and strategic 
environments in which these missions took place. This pattern contributed to a misguided 
belief that advisors would be sufficient to fix South Vietnam’s fundamental flaws. 
Unable to persuade South Vietnam to implement changes that would make it more 
effective, but unwilling to walk away, Washington stayed the advisory course in Vietnam 
when all signs were pointing toward its inability to affect the internal situation’s most 
critical elements. In Vietnam, the United States discovered that the model it had 
previously tested—and perhaps thought perfected—failed in the face of the most 
motivated anti-colonialist communist foe it faced during the Cold War. This paper 
challenges the contemporary mythology of America’s early advisory efforts and the true 
efficacy of advisors in general. 
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Following the Second World War, two major influences resulted in a dramatic 
reshaping of the international order that affected governments on every continent: the 
struggle between communism and democracy and the dismantling of the pre-war colonial 
world. Frequently, these two phenomena occurred simultaneously. Colonialism tended to 
reinforce or create internal elitism resulting in a disenfranchised population that was more 
sympathetic to communism and its idealistic promise of equality. The global upheaval of 
The Second World War weakened the colonial powers’ grip on their subjects, resulting in 
a dramatic shift in the world order that also saw the United States replace Britain as the 
world’s police. 
In addition to this new role, the United States faced myriad international crises 
that conflicted with domestic pressure to reduce defense spending. President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s death left a U.S. foreign policy vacuum that President Harry Truman 
struggled to fill. Truman relied heavily on Roosevelt’s national security team and 
inherited an adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union that had existed before the war 
and had only been set aside in order to fight it. His most influential advisors insisted that 
the Soviets were bent on world domination and that a deterrent response was necessary.1 
Initially, the deterrent thought to be most appropriate was economic assistance to prevent 
the conditions that contributed to increased communist influence. As the communists 
became more politically and militarily aggressive, however, Truman and his advisors 
realized that military assistance would be necessary, as economic improvement could not 
be realized in the face of insurgency.2 The United States employed military advisors to 
provide technical, training, planning, and operational advice to avoid committing 
expensive and potentially escalatory combat formations. 
                                                 
1 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security 
Policy during the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 60–61. This dissertation uses the 
less common “advisor” (rather than “adviser”) for consistency’s sake, since the former is the standard 
military spelling. 
2 Howard Jones, “A New Kind of War”: America’s Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in 
Greece (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 6. 
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This dissertation examines the expansion of U.S. military advisory programs in 
the early Cold War from 1945 to 1964, focusing on U.S. efforts in Greece, Korea, the 
Philippines, and Vietnam. It seeks to answer the following question: How do the major 
U.S. military advisory efforts from 1945 to 1964 inform the potential and limitations of 
military advising as a foreign policy tool? These four advisory efforts began within the 
same five-year period. The first three ended rather quickly while the Vietnam War 
dragged on until 1975, with direct U.S. involvement there ending in 1973. Many of the 
same descriptions could apply to these cases; they were all politically and socially 
complex, and three of them were largely the result of a long history of colonial 
occupation. Even though each case was unique, it was not unprecedented and was readily 
comparable to the others. Finally, they were all viewed by at least one of the main Cold 
War adversaries as a battleground of competing ideologies. This perception meant that 
the Cold War international framework provided the background for U.S., Chinese, or 
Soviet involvement. 
U.S. foreign policy before the Second World War had normally eschewed 
significant foreign commitments—its intervention against Spain in the War of 1898 and 
the First World War were exceptions that, in the eyes of many contemporaries, proved 
the wisdom of the rule. This paradigm shifted rapidly after 1945, giving rise to a foreign 
policy that promised worldwide military and economic support for the ostensible goal of 
preventing global communist expansion. Military advisory efforts in Greece, Korea, and 
the Philippines reflected this new and compelling priority. These efforts produced mixed 
but generally positive results and contributed to favorable outcomes. The belief in 
government and military circles was that advisors were effective in containing 
communism and thus contributed to the realization of basic U.S. policy goals. 
Subsequently, the United States devoted even greater resources, effort, and personnel, 
including some who had served in the previous advisory missions, to assist the Republic 
of Vietnam (RVN). Yet, this effort failed to avoid serious military escalation and 
ultimately ended in absolute disaster. The reasons behind this defeat divide scholars even 
today, and the Vietnam experience continues to echo in debates preceding nearly every 
foreign intervention. 
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A. ADVISOR OVERVIEW 
Military advisors are officers and enlisted personnel deployed in a host nation to 
assist leaders from the tactical level up to the civilian head of the country. They are 
typically organized under military assistance advisory groups, defined in Joint 
Publication (JP) 1–02 as “a joint Service group . . . which primarily administers the U.S. 
military assistance planning and programming in the host country.”3 This dissertation 
focuses on the activities of advisory groups present in foreign countries and the evolution 
of the advisory program as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. The focus is not on the 
interaction between senior military advisors, such as the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 
and their civilian counterparts, although those relationships determine the environment in 
which more grass-roots military advising took place. 
In addition to providing advice and assistance to their hosts, military advisors 
collect information and intelligence on the disposition and capability of the units they are 
advising. While this additional function may seem obvious, it is not the focus of most 
advisory checklists, guidance, or handbooks. This intelligence collection presents a host 
of analytical challenges that should not be neglected in judging advisory efforts. The first 
challenge is to evaluate the accuracy of the initial assessments. Advisors might believe 
their units have made significant progress, only to discover that they cannot execute in 
the field. Advisors might also feel compelled to report progress since failure reflects on 
their own performance evaluations. The second challenge is to account for the effect of 
compiling and filtering advisory reports by those who receive them. Although the reports 
themselves may provide a complete picture of the host nation army’s situation, there is 
always the risk of losing fidelity or key points as they move further up the information 
chain. Finally, there is the challenge of evaluating decisions made based on advisor 
reports, or despite them. In Vietnam, for example, one wonders if any amount of negative 
reporting would have changed the U.S. position toward the South Vietnamese 
government. Since President John F. Kennedy had declared in his inaugural address that 
Americans were willing to “pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support 
                                                 
3 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JP 
1-02) (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), 170.  
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any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty,” it is 
reasonable to expect that Washington would meet setbacks with greater commitment.4 
The United States has a long history of employing military advisors to foreign 
governments. In the 1800s, advisors frequently trained foreign armies on the technical 
aspects of U.S. materiel to promote arms sales. During The Second World War, U.S. 
advisors supported resistance groups fighting the Axis powers. In the postwar 
environment, advisory efforts assisted friendly governments against their own 
homegrown insurgencies. These insurgencies came to be associated with a global Soviet-
backed communist ideological struggle as outlined in George Kennan’s famous article, 
“The Sources of Soviet Conduct.”5 
In 1947, the Truman administration solidified its anti-communist position, and in 
a 12 March speech to Congress, President Truman vowed to “support free peoples who 
are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”6 His 
words referred specifically to the Greek Civil War, which pitted nationalist forces of the 
pre-war government against the Greek Communist Party (KKE) that had gained strength 
while resisting the Nazi occupation. With U.S. advisory support led by General James 
Van Fleet and millions in aid, the nationalist Greeks fought and defeated the insurgency 
between February 1948 and August 1949. By all appearances, advice and materiel 
support seemed to be viable mechanisms for containing communism at a much lower cost 
than committing large formations of U.S. forces.7 
The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 codified the broad Military 
Assistance Program (MAP) and gave the president enormous leeway to assist other 
                                                 
4 John F. Kennedy, “Inaugural Address,” Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The 
American Presidency Project, University of California Santa Barbara, January 20, 1961, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8032. 
5 George Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25, no. 4 (July 1, 1947): 572, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20030065. 
6 Harry S. Truman, “Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine,” 
Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, National Archives and Records Administration, March 12, 1947, 
http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=2189&st=&st1=. 
7 The Greek experience was oft-referred to in subsequent advisory efforts as a success in the attempt to 
contain communist expansion. Jones, New Kind of War, 232-34. 
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nations in “promot[ing] the foreign policy and provid[ing] for the defense and welfare of 
the United States by furnishing military assistance to foreign nations.”8 During his 
administration, President Dwight Eisenhower established a committee to study the 
military assistance program’s applicability and effectiveness. Led by retired General 
William H. Draper Jr., it concluded in 1959 that military assistance was necessary “to 
preserve and strengthen the capacity of other free world nations to resist communist 
pressures and participate in the common defense.”9 Ironically, the report’s timing 
corresponded with a significant escalation of the insurgency in South Vietnam.  
Military advisors offer policymakers a seemingly inexpensive, low-risk means to 
achieve foreign policy in which the application of military force, or the development of 
military capability, is part of the picture, but not the whole picture. As such, they inhabit 
the space between the helping hand of typical international humanitarian aid and the 
mailed fist of armed intervention. In ideal cases, they effectively limit U.S. involvement 
in potential conflict areas. In the worst case, they risk over-militarizing the situation, 
provide overly optimistic assessments, or deliver advice to their host country counterparts 
that may make things worse. This study examines what advisory efforts did and did not 
accomplish across a variety of situations. 
Following the successful conclusion of the Greek Civil War in 1949, for example, 
newspapers implied that U.S. assistance to Greece had produced a Russian defeat.10 In a 
review of U.S. aid to Greece, however, historian Howard Jones takes a more moderate 
position, arguing that “One observation seems certain: American military aid alone had 
not brought victory [over the Communists].”11 He asserts that many other factors led to 
the Greek Communists’ defeat, perhaps most importantly their own mistakes in how they 
                                                 
8 Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, HR 5895, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (1949), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2213859.  
9 William H. Draper, Jr. et al., Composite Report of the President’s Committee to Study the United 
States Military Assistance Program, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1959), 26. 
10 Paul F. Braim, The Will to Win: The Life of General James A. Van Fleet (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2001), 221. 
11 Jones, “New Kind of War,” 223. 
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prosecuted their war effort.12 Jones does note, however, that Washington’s commitment 
to Greece may have influenced Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin’s attitude toward the 
prospect of exporting revolution there.13 Unwilling to confront the United States directly, 
Stalin removed support to Greek Communists and pressured Yugoslavia to do the same. 
Exactly how much weight the advisory mission carried in influencing Stalin’s judgment 
and in assisting the Greek national forces is debatable, but it certainly was not negligible. 
The true extent of the U.S. commitment to Korea was less apparent. When the 
United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG) began its 
training of the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA), it found that it had inherited a mission 
akin to building the American Army at the outset of the American Revolution.14 A 
skeleton advisory effort achieved modest results but was hampered by indecision and 
paltry funding from Washington. The U.S. military withdrawal from South Korea 
followed shortly afterward by the outbreak of war to reunite the peninsula by force, 
inevitably cast doubt on the value of the advisor mission and the policy that produced it. 
Only the unprecedented U.S. response to the North’s invasion staved off disaster. Based 
on President Kim Il Sung’s aggressiveness, a better-resourced advisory mission from the 
beginning might have mitigated the initial North Korean onslaught but probably would 
not have deterred it entirely. Some of the circumstances in Korea were similar to those in 
Vietnam. Like Vietnam, Korea was divided arbitrarily and was a nation governing itself 
for the first time in many decades. Furthermore, like Vietnam, its government began 
under a divisive nationalist leader assuming power as the nation transitioned to 
independence. 
The Hukbalahap (Huk) Rebellion in the Philippines was an outlier among 
advisory missions during the Cold War because the Soviet influence there was relatively 
insignificant. Largely due to geography, the Huk Communists were on isolated islands 
without a sympathetic communist neighbor. Nevertheless, the Philippines case is a classic 
                                                 
12 Jones, “New Kind of War,” 223. 
13 Ibid., 224. 
14 Robert K. Sawyer and Walter G. Hermes, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War 
(Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1988), 69. 
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example of a disenfranchised communist-leaning population that chose rebellion and 
insurgency to achieve its political goals. U.S. advisory efforts were largely credited for 
the ultimate Philippine victory, and the celebrated U.S. advisor, Colonel Edward 
Lansdale, emerged from the event to carry his brand of advisory success to Vietnam. 
Vietnam endures as the ultimate case study of a U.S. policy and strategy 
mismatch.15 This dissertation does not intend to examine the reasons behind America’s 
commitment to Vietnam, but rather the advisors’ inability to build an army that could 
defend the country against either an insurgent threat or conventional invasion. The 
reasons for this failure are many, and this dissertation examines the four cases to draw 
some conclusions about why some were more successful than others. If leadership is a 
critical element, then Vietnam presents a conundrum. In the summer of 1960, Military 
Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam commander, General Samuel Williams, received 
confidential evaluations of many of the most important Vietnamese military officers. The 
majority received significant praise from their U.S. advisor counterparts.16 Yet, these 
were the same officers who failed to combat the growing insurgency, eventually 
overthrew the nation’s president, clashed with each other, and ultimately lost to the North 
Vietnamese Army. The ultimate goal of this dissertation is a better understanding of the 
evolution of the advisory program and process from 1945 to 1964 and the significance of 
the advisory efforts in shaping the outcome of the conflicts in Greece, Korea, the 
Philippines, and Vietnam. 
This dissertation postulates three basic truths as reflected in all four cases. First, 
the ability of advisors to alter the character or culture of the recipient force was limited. 
No matter how much the advisors wanted to instill their counterparts with a willingness 
to fight and die for the purpose of victory, it was up to the leaders of the recipient 
nation’s civilian and military leaders to accomplish this task. Second, recipients became 
                                                 
15 David Kaiser begins his study of the origins of the Vietnam War by declaring it “the greatest policy 
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1. 
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dependent on resources that advisors provided. Reducing or abandoning those resources 
due to U.S. fiscal constraints risked the recipient nation’s stability and ability to fight. 
Third, the idea that military advisors offer a cheap, low-risk, limited-intervention 
alternative to full-scale intervention may occur under ideal conditions but is a hopeful 
fantasy in more complex environments that risks serious miscalculations in the real-world 
environments in which advisors operate. Despite continuous pressure to reduce the 
amount of funding to them, all four situations required significant resources and 
commitment but still did not always deliver the results desired. 
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
As this dissertation follows the chronology of the four conflicts, the conclusion 
contrasts the results of the advisory efforts in Greece, Korea, and the Philippines with the 
one in Vietnam. Accordingly, three prominent themes emerge that will be explored in 
detail. These themes ultimately cast doubt on T. E. Lawrence’s famous advice to those 
who would study his exploits: 
Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it 
tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help 
them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions 
of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it 
is.17 
Advisory manuals often refer to Lawrence’s “Twenty Seven Articles” when promoting 
best practices. Ironically, Lawrence carefully prefaced his articles with the warning that 
they were specific to the Bedouin tribesmen with whom he lived and fought, and that 
they should not be blindly applied to other environments or situations.18 
The first notable theme is the identification of leadership problems in the different 
armies. Frequently advisors pressured their superiors to replace senior officers with many 
years of service and sometimes with extensive political connections. Replacing foreign 
military leaders was a sensitive issue in all four cases. In Greece, for example, General 
                                                 
17 Thomas E. Lawrence, “Twenty Seven Articles,” T. E. Lawrence Studies, Castle Hill Press, August 
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18 Ibid. 
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Van Fleet was an imposing diplomatic and military figure who possessed an excellent 
rapport with Greek leaders, yet he faced resistance when he identified poor commanders 
who needed to be relieved. In contrast, President Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam maintained 
an iron grip over the placement of his commanders, valuing loyalty above all else. 
Diem’s attitude was not surprising because of the numerous coup plots against his 
government but made removing detrimental leadership even more politicized than in the 
other cases. 
The second recurring theme centers on the issues of advisor selection, 
preparation, and tour length. The after-action reports from nearly every advisory effort 
include criticism of these factors. A common complaint was that advisory duty was 
understood to be more difficult than service with regular military units, yet advisory duty 
was not career enhancing. Therefore, advisors frequently went to their positions 
unwillingly. Until the early 1960s, advisors underwent little, if any, preparation in 
advising. The most that one could expect as an advisor in Korea, for example, was a copy 
of the “Ten Commandments for KMAG advisors,” which was a one-and-a-half page list 
of best advisory practices.19 Additionally, advisors faced language and cultural 
challenges that typically were solved only by the efforts of host nation soldiers who 
learned English. It was rare for U.S. advisors to communicate with their counterparts in 
their native language other than through interpreters. 
The final recurring theme is dependency on U.S. equipment, expertise, resources, 
and technology. Throughout his time in Greece, General Van Fleet noted this 
dependency, which also characterized the other three cases. Van Fleet generally rebuffed 
Greek requests for more equipment, such as airplanes and artillery. He claimed that the 
Greeks had all they needed to fight; what they lacked was aggressiveness and good 
leadership.20 Likewise, as commander of the Eighth Army in Korea, Van Fleet responded 
to President Syngman Rhee’s pleas to increase the size of the ROKA with a blunt 
rebuttal: “Until competent leadership is secured and it demonstrates its worth, there 
                                                 
19 Robert D. Ramsey, Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El 
Salvador (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 143–44. 
20 Lawrence S. Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, 1943–1949 (New York: Columbia 
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should be no further talk of the U.S. furnishing arms and equipment for additional 
forces.”21 This theme carried forward to Vietnam, during which Vietnamese commanders 
and units often became dependent on their advisors’ planning and liaison abilities.22 
Dependency was detrimental to the development of an independently capable host nation 
force and was an almost insurmountable problem for advisors. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The volume of literature on these subjects is vast, yet few studies have tied 
together operational level advisors across this span of time. This literature review begins 
with readings on the origins of the Cold War, followed by readings on the individual 
cases. Given the enormity of the potentially relevant literature, the discussion is not 
intended to be comprehensive, but simply to highlight key issues that bear upon the 
research presented in the chapters that follow. It must be noted, however, that the case 
study of the Philippines is an exception to the general rule of scholarly abundance. Both 
primary and secondary sources relating to that conflict are sparse. 
1. Cold War 
The Cold War provides the overarching historical context for these four cases. 
Literature on the origins of the Cold War is extensive but generally falls into one of three 
schools of thought. Chronologically, these are the orthodox, revisionist, and post-
revisionist views. In From Trust to Terror, historian, former government official, and 
purveyor of the orthodox view, Herbert Feis, presents the post–1945 split between the 
wartime allies as rooted in conflicting ideological accounts of the war.23 Feis argues that 
the West celebrated capitalism’s ability to manufacture more than the fascist Germans 
                                                 
21 “The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State,” telegram, May 6, 1951, U.S. 
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, vol. 7, pt. 1, Korea and China 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983), 419, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/ 
FRUS.FRUS1951v07p1 (hereafter U.S. Department of State cited as DOS, Foreign Relations of the United 
States cited as FRUS, and Government Printing Office cited as GPO). 
22 Cao Van Vien et al., The U.S. Adviser, Indochina Monographs (Washington, DC: Center of Military 
History, 1980), 58–61. 
23 Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945–1950 (New York: Norton, 
1970). 
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and simultaneously supply the Soviets, while free men and women fought valiantly for 
the rights of others to enjoy the same liberties.24 In contrast, the Soviets, still bitter from 
bearing the brunt of the fighting against the German Army, saw the bravery of their 
people as proof of communism’s superiority.25 Feis’s orthodox view generally blames the 
Soviets for their belligerent actions and rhetoric as they expanded their geographic 
control to prevent a repeat of what they had just suffered.26 Thus, the orthodox viewpoint 
saw the aggressive response of the West as justified based on the real and present threat 
posed by the Soviet Union and its communist allies. 
The revisionist perspective emerged in the 1960s and coincided with the 
expanding war in Vietnam. Revisionists were more critical of U.S. behavior than those of 
the orthodox school and blamed this behavior for creating an unnecessary conflict. In 
Another Such Victory, Arnold Offner, a prominent revisionist, summarizes his central 
theme in this comment: “Throughout his presidency, Truman remained a parochial 
nationalist who lacked the leadership to move the U.S. away from conflict and toward 
détente.”27 Offner points to numerous confrontations throughout the Truman 
administration during which the United States could have taken steps to reduce tensions 
with the Soviet Union—yet chose not to—instead establishing an adversarial relationship 
that lasted for nearly fifty years.28 Offner’s narrative describes Truman as a simple, 
naïve, unworldly country boy who blustered his way through foreign policy due to his 
consistent “parochial nationalism” during his two terms.29 
Another revisionist, Melvyn Leffler, concurs with the argument that the Truman 
administration was responsible for much of the antagonism of the Soviet Union, but 
Leffler is not as critical of Truman’s personality. In Preponderance of Power, Leffler 
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presents Washington’s policy as pragmatic and focused on maintaining predominant 
power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.30 Leffler characterized this strategy’s goals as creating 
“a world environment hospitable to U.S. interests and values . . . [and to establish] a 
configuration of power and a military posture so that if war erupted, the United States 
would prevail.”31 The Truman Doctrine and containment reflected this preponderance of 
power that shaped the U.S. response to communist aggression in Greece, Korea, the 
Philippines, and Vietnam. 
Finally, the post-revisionists swung partly back toward the orthodox school, as 
they were more willing to recognize that Soviet motives were unclear and that a cautious 
U.S. response was justified in this environment. In this approach, post-revisionists were 
more balanced at placing the decisions made in the context of the international 
environment, state actions, and leadership personalities of the time-period. This school of 
thought is more sympathetic to the realization that the world had catastrophically 
underestimated the danger posed by Germany and Japan prior to the Second World War. 
The natural response was to take steps to prevent a future similar situation. This 
conclusion meant meeting force with force, presuming aggressive intentions when signals 
were unclear, and maintaining larger standing armies than was typical for a postwar 
period. Scholars in this school include John Lewis Gaddis. In his words, “the American 
interest was not to dominate other power centers, but to see that no one else did either.”32 
The truth about Soviet intentions and ideology will never be known without the 
full release of Soviet records. Clearly, the United States and other democratic countries 
were deeply concerned about the spread of communism long before Truman, and this 
apprehension likely colored his judgment. Additionally, Roosevelt’s death shortly after 
his fourth inauguration thrust Truman into the foreign policy decision-making process 
after less than three months as Vice President. Truman’s tendency to take the position 
most advantageous for the United States when the motivations of Joseph Stalin were 
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32 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 63. 
 13
unclear seemed to create conditions that escalated tensions. Offner presents Truman as 
intimating frequently “that the Soviets had broken every agreement made at Yalta and 
Potsdam.”33 Yet, as Offner points out, Soviet misbehavior often centered on Truman’s 
push to reestablish West Germany as an independent state.34 Additionally, Truman 
ignored his own provocative actions that further intensified Moscow’s distrust of 
Washington’s intentions. 
In hindsight, Stalin’s behavior was understandable considering the disagreement 
between the East and West on the partition of Germany and the wholesale destruction of 
much of Russia. Likewise, it was reasonable that the Western powers were vigilant 
toward anyone displaying expansionist and bellicose behavior, having so recently 
concluded the war against Hitler. Additionally, since one of the hallmarks of U.S. foreign 
policy is its continuing emphasis on free global markets, Leffler’s hypothesis on the Cold 
War’s origins seems more appropriate than blaming it entirely on either side. Regardless 
of fault, however, the result was a simmering belligerent relationship that would be tested 
on proxy battlefields for the next forty years. 
2. Military Advising and Counterinsurgency 
Historian Douglas Porch’s Counterinsurgency addresses the contemporary myth 
that counterinsurgency (COIN) as a set of doctrinal tactics was responsible for turning 
defeat into victory in Iraq under General David Petraeus. Porch’s book informs the 
framework of this dissertation in that it presents a question, albeit about a mislabeled 
strategy rather than the means on which this study focuses, to determine its efficacy and 
evolution. Porch ultimately debunks the supposition that COIN is a replacement for “a 
viable policy and strategy”; rather, COIN is simply the “lineal descendant” of “colonial 
warfare” and relies “on coercion rather than persuasion.”35 
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In Arming the Free World, Chester Pach lays out the broader evolution of military 
assistance from its inception to its codification in national strategy with the Mutual 
Defense Assistance Act of 1949. He contends that military assistance began in a 
haphazard fashion often with poorly or even undefined objectives and resulted in 
“America’s arming of almost the entire ‘free world’” throughout the history of these 
programs.36 He concludes that this mindset persisted and by the end of the 1940s had 
installed a global commitment with no clear end.37 
Many Army field manuals (FMs) and other official publications address military 
advising from a tactical perspective and read as a list of best practices. These include 
Security Force Assistance (FM 3–07.1), which could be considered the primary current 
military handbook on advising. Its chapter on advising states that the advisor’s major 
objective is “inspiring and influencing a counterpart to effective action” primarily by 
gaining “their counterparts’ trust and confidence.”38 The field manual then lays out 
advisors’ ideal personality traits and considerations, which read as a graduate course in 
warfare executed by a select group of perfect soldier-statesmen. Reality was far different. 
The prevailing mindset among the higher leadership at the time was that any good soldier 
could advise effectively. Advisors at the lower levels, however, faced duty that was 
frustrating, lonely, and detrimental to one’s career. Robert Ramsey’s excellent study of 
advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador highlights a common theme in critiques of 
advisory efforts. He notes many studies and after action reports stating that advisors 
would be more effective with better training, longer tours, or both.39 What these studies 
ignore, however, is a critique of the conditions under which the advisors were expected to 
succeed. There is a tendency to prescribe better language skills and more cultural training 
as solutions to challenges advisors face, rather than conduct a realistic appraisal of 
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advisors’ abilities to accomplish U.S. foreign policy goals. This dissertation hopes to 
clarify the conditions that led to the success or failure of advisors across the four cases.  
Andrew J. Birtle’s U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations 
Doctrine 1942–1976 traces the Army’s counterinsurgency evolution as it addressed the 
many challenges of the small wars in which the United States engaged after The Second 
World War, culminating with Vietnam. He follows the evolution of counterinsurgency 
doctrine and practice and the nexus of civil and military programs and stabilization 
operations including the advisory groups in Greece, Korea, the Philippines, and 
Vietnam.40 Although similar in content, this dissertation focuses on how Washington 
viewed advisors and the contributions advisors made to the conflicts in which they were 
involved, rather than their role in the establishment of counterinsurgency doctrine. 
3. Greek Civil War 
As Truman’s administration grappled with its response to the perceived Soviet 
maneuvers to expand its global power, Washington ultimately settled on a policy of 
containment. Fearing a deeper communist conspiracy and a strategic threat against the 
Bosporus Strait, Truman made his famous 1947 address to Congress promulgating what 
became known as the Truman Doctrine, which included a promise of military aid to 
governments threatened by communist subversion. Greece was one such government. In 
A New Kind of War, Howard Jones traces the events leading up to this new paradigm and 
its immediate impact on Greece and the debate surrounding the establishment and 
implementation of the Truman Doctrine there. He observes that Truman omitted 
mentioning the Soviet Union in his speech, a decision made with an eye toward avoiding 
escalation, but one that did not obscure that he had established a global commitment.41 
Scholars differ over the decisive factors that led to the Greek nationalist victory. 
Their arguments span from focusing on the U.S. contribution almost entirely to laying 
blame squarely at the Communists’ feet. In The Greek Civil War, Edgar O’Ballance 
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attributes Greek nationalist success to the improved performance of the GNA, reduction 
in support from the communist bloc, and Yugoslavia closing its border to the 
insurgents.42 Lawrence Wittner’s American Intervention in Greece is another excellent 
comprehensive examination of the factors contributing to the Greek nationalist victory. 
He downplays the U.S. contribution, noting that the decisive factors to the Communists’ 
defeat depended on breaks in the internal and external communist ranks.43 Charles R. 
Shrader’s The Withered Vine examines the war from the Communists’ perspective, 
focusing primarily on their decisions and relationships with other communist states at the 
onset of the Cold War. He argues that the Communists lost because of “inadequate 
logistics” based on their decision to fight a conventional war against a numerically and 
technologically superior enemy without the external support they required to win.44 
This initial aid effort in Greece was significant because it set the stage for 
subsequent advisory missions. In The Will to Win, a biography of General James Van 
Fleet, the commander of the military aid and advisory program in Greece, Paul Braim 
argues that Van Fleet and American aid were critical to the Greek victory over 
communist forces. He writes, “That the U.S. aid program had been vital to that [Greece’s] 
victory was also recognized worldwide. Allies of the United States also appreciated that 
the United States would stand behind friendly nations threatened by Stalin’s 
aggression.”45 Offner concurs, stating that “the president [Truman] and his associates 
always held that U.S. aid saved Greece, and perhaps Europe, from both communism and 
Soviet domination.”46 The main problem with this assessment is that it assumes that 
Stalin saw Greece as a critical battleground for communist expansion. In reality, Stalin 
was quick to abandon the Greek Communists based on their poor prospects for success 
and the likelihood of drawing the United States deeper into Balkan affairs. The prevailing 
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mindset in U.S. circles about Washington’s contribution to the favorable outcome in 
Greece remained the same, however.47 
William Harris further promotes the U.S.-centric Greek victory narrative in his 
thesis, Instilling Aggressiveness. Both Braim and Harris claim that the Greek National 
Army (GNA) was at a low point of morale and effectiveness and that the U.S. advisors 
managed to reverse this situation and thus propel it to victory over the Communists. 
Quite bluntly, Harris states, “The advisors’ ceaseless training, mentorship, direction, and 
influence led to the aggressive Greek operations that destroyed the communist threat.”48 
In contrast, Christopher Woodhouse, in The Struggle for Greece, downplays the 
U.S. role. He points out that most of the military equipment ordered by the United States 
did not arrive until hostilities ended.49 Furthermore, he directly contradicts the notion that 
U.S. advice was critical to effecting change in Greek Army organization and tactics. He 
writes, “It was the Greek high command itself which eventually, at the eleventh hour, 
achieved its own regeneration; and the new tactics which came near to complete success 
in 1948 were devised by Greek initiative.”50 Woodhouse had extensive personal 
experience of the Greek Civil War, first as a soldier assisting the Greek resistance, then 
as a diplomat, and finally as a historian of the events. Although he may have been biased, 
his observations call into question the prevalent mindset of the Americans at the time. 
Since this review focuses on U.S. military advisory efforts, it is important to understand 
how U.S. leaders perceived the effectiveness of U.S. efforts in Greece. Many in Truman’s 
administration believed that U.S. efforts were largely responsible for nationalist victory 
in Greece. This belief inevitably informed future policy. 
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4. Korean Conflict 
Concurrently, Korea faced its own confrontation with communism following the 
Second World War, although its situation differed significantly from that of Greece. 
Korea emerged from years of foreign domination and was arbitrarily split at the 38th 
Parallel by the United States and the Soviet Union. U.S. forces occupied Korea as the 
Japanese withdrew and native Koreans established their new government. With the 
nationalists Kim Il Sung in the north and Syngman Rhee in the south, the stage was set 
for a conflict over reunification of the peninsula. Despite the Soviet-supported buildup in 
the North and a moderate insurgency that totaled 7,235 deaths of government forces and 
30,000 guerrillas and noncombatants, the United States withdrew its forces except for the 
KMAG.51 Millett’s history of the Korean War provides excellent overall context and 
includes important information about the advisory effort, particularly during the period 
before the North Korean invasion. 
From 1946 to 1950, U.S. advisors assisted the South Koreans in building a 
professional, well-trained army. Major Robert K. Sawyer’s KMAG In Peace and War 
serves as the U.S. Army’s official history of the KMAG effort. Sawyer’s study details a 
Korean Army in a readiness crisis when U.S. advisors began providing assistance.52 
Sawyer argues that U.S. advisors were critical to the creation and professionalization of 
the Republic of Korea Army. This conclusion contrasts with his description of the early 
advisory period, during which the Korean advisory effort was severely understaffed with 
individual advisors often overseeing training for multiple units spread out across the 
country.53 
Another KMAG history, Bryan R. Gibby’s Will to Win, complements Sawyer’s 
book by expanding on the post-invasion KMAG efforts to reconstruct a Korean army 
capable of holding its own against North Korean and Chinese attacks once the front 
stabilized in 1951 until the cease fire was signed in 1953. In Gibby’s words, “the KMAG 
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partnership infused the ROKA with the motivation to fight and win.”54 Throughout the 
course of his narrative, however, he describes an advisory relationship unlike all others, 
particularly when U.S. forces arrived to defend South Korea. With this situation, the 
advisory effort had far more control over ROKA forces than any advisors before or since. 
This factor made a huge difference in the outcome of that conflict. Gibby’s history is the 
most comprehensive and contemporary account of KMAG’s contribution to the ROKA 
from inception to 1953. 
In contrast to Sawyer, Allan Millett argues that KMAG failed to provide adequate 
warning of the severe inequality in arms that the ROKA possessed vis-à-vis the north. 
This lapse resulted in a defense plan, as Millett describes, based more on “matters of 
hope, not strategy.”55 Millett notes that Brigadier General William L. Roberts, the 
KMAG commander from August 1948 to June 1950, provided upbeat verbal assessments 
of the ROKA to his superiors that belied KMAG’s written assessments.56 These latter 
assessments stated that the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) was rapidly increasing 
its offensive capability and soon could overpower the ROKA.57 Had Roberts been more 
direct in personal meetings with senior U.S. personnel, the ROKA and U.S. military 
might have been able to rectify some of the imbalance. By June 1950, however, it was 
too late to overcome this disparity before the NKPA invasion. The ROKA had to survive 
with the planning, training, and weapons it already had. 
5. Philippine Hukbalahap Insurrection 
Much like the Greek Civil War, the Hukbalahap, or Huk, Insurrection was an 
internal class struggle that existed before The Second World War, resulting from the 
gross inequality between rural peasants and wealthy landowners. Postwar independence 
and an independent Filipino government that promised to continue past policies simply 
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provided the catalyst that accelerated this inequality conflict. In his autobiography, In the 
Midst of Wars, legendary Cold War military advisor and Air Force Colonel Edward 
Lansdale describes his role as the advisor to Ramon Magsaysay, the Philippine Minister 
of Defense.58 As Lansdale recounts, he contributed to the successful counterinsurgency 
by providing suggestions to Magsaysay, specifically in the area of psychological 
operations, and helping to coordinate the various aid programs in conjunction with the 
U.S. Department of State mission.59 Additionally, he served as a neutral sounding board 
for Magsaysay’s ideas. Ultimately, his influence and friendship with Magsaysay were 
important and probably outweighed his influence on the structure and day-to-day 
operations of the Philippine army. 
Two personalities from the Huk side shed light on the enemy perspective: Luis 
Taruc and William Pomeroy. Taruc was a Socialist in the 1930s but became a 
Communist following years of indoctrination and fighting in support of the cause. He was 
also a senior Huk military leader, was elected to the Philippine Congress after the Second 
World War, and was one of the last Huk leaders to surrender. Naturally, his memoirs risk 
being terribly one-sided, which is apparent as he largely overlooks Huk atrocities while 
accusing the government of disproportionate responses.60 He readily admits, however, 
that he was lulled into the false belief that the leaders of the Communist Party of the 
Philippines (CPP), who ran the Huk Rebellion, had the best interests of the Filipinos in 
mind when they advocated full-scale rebellion.61 He saw his objective, which was greater 
democratic representation for the interests of the vast majority of Filipinos, superseded by 
the whims of the Party leaders in true Orwellian fashion.62 He blames much of the 
movement’s failure to find greater appeal among the masses on this shift in party 
ideology. The other Huk personality was William Pomeroy, a U.S. Army deserter turned 
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Huk. Unlike Taruc, his narrative, The Forest, reads as that of a dedicated communist with 
little reflection on the abuses that his side committed during the struggle.63 His is more a 
tale of one-sided honorable struggle against an insidious and evil foe, but it is 
nevertheless useful for understanding the highs and lows of the Huk side of the 
campaign. 
On the Philippine government side, Colonel Napoleon Valeriano, a successful 
Philippine battalion combat team (BCT) commander and U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel 
Charles Bohannan, one of Lansdale’s team members, collaborated in their book Counter-
Guerrilla Operations.64 Their study is broken down by subjects such as “Know Thine 
Enemy” and “The Mission,” then uses examples from the Huk Rebellion and the 
government’s response to illustrate the points. In general, their method follows the 
narrative that the Philippine government failed to subdue the Huks due to inadequate 
organization of its forces, abuse of the population it was supposed to protect, and 
uninspired leadership.65 Once it corrected these grave shortcomings, the Rebellion turned 
around in the government’s favor. 
Benedict Kerkvliet’s The Huk Rebellion is perhaps the most scholarly work that 
allowed enough time to pass that the subject could be viewed more objectively. Writing 
in 1977, he focuses on the origins of the Huk Rebellion but very little on the conduct of 
the campaign that ended it. He argues that the Huks finally quit fighting due to “general 
weariness,” government economic reforms, and improved Philippine Army 
performance.66 In contrast to nearly every other author of this period, he downplays the 
role of the hardcore communists in the movement, preferring to argue that the Rebellion 
was a spontaneous reaction to rapidly changing economic conditions.67 With this 
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assessment, he establishes a strong position that fails to appreciate the significant anti-
communist U.S. reaction that began during the Second World War when the Huks began 
displaying hostile behavior toward U.S. personnel and their Filipino guerrilla forces 
despite ostensibly fighting for the same cause. This behavior simply continued into the 
postwar period. 
The official U.S. military history of the insurrection is outlined in the Lawrence 
M. Greenberg’s The Hukbalahap Insurrection. Greenberg assesses that, by 1950, the 
Philippine government was losing the war against the Huks.68 His study credits U.S. aid 
and Magsaysay’s personal efforts for leading to the eventual Philippine government 
victory.69 A careful reading of both Lansdale’s and Greenberg’s accounts leaves the 
reader with the impression that Magsaysay’s charisma was the critical factor leading to 
Philippine Army reform and winning the average Filipino’s support while U.S. aid and 
advice played a supporting role. Thus, greater U.S. support to a lesser personality would 
not have achieved similar results. 
In U.S. circles, however, Edward Lansdale garnered significant credit for 
preventing a Huk victory. While he was probably one of the most effective advisors of 
this time, his true impact likely was less than believed. Nevertheless, Washington 
decision makers, such as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, appeared to think 
Lansdale could accomplish similar results in Vietnam, which had just negotiated a 
settlement to its war with the French.70 There, Lansdale met Ngo Dinh Diem, a 
Vietnamese nationalist, who had his own strong convictions about what his country 
needed to be successful. 
6. Vietnam Conflict 
Of the four conflicts, Vietnam presents the most interesting and rich advisory 
puzzle. The United States was in Vietnam and was committed to its defense. The 
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advisors’ role in Vietnam could be broken down into five phases. The first, from 1950 to 
1954, primarily consisted of overseeing the delivery of military equipment to support 
France’s war against the Viet Minh (VM) led by the legendary Ho Chi Minh. The second, 
from 1954 to 1961, consisted of fewer than one thousand advisors supporting President 
Ngo Dinh Diem’s effort to build a nationalist army, consolidate power, and defend 
against increased North Vietnamese efforts to destabilize and overthrow the South. This 
second period was marked by a period of relative calm from 1955 to 1959 that was 
similar to Korea ten years earlier. As guerrilla attacks resumed, the U.S.-trained South 
Vietnamese security forces struggled to combat them. 
President John F. Kennedy’s reassessment of Vietnam led to the third phase, 1961 
to 1965, that saw an increase in the number of advisors and the amount of materiel 
support to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) in its escalating campaign to 
defeat the Viet Cong (VC). President Lyndon B. Johnson ushered in the fourth phase, 
1965 to 1969, in which the United States assumed the primary role of combatting the VC 
while relegating village security operations to the ARVN. Finally, President Richard 
Nixon’s administration oversaw the fifth phase, 1969 to 1973, which was characterized 
by the Vietnamization of the war as U.S. forces withdrew completely. This dissertation 
focuses primarily on the first three phases since the introduction of large numbers of U.S. 
troops in 1965 meant that one of the main goals of advisors, minimizing the number of 
U.S. forces needed to achieve foreign policy goals, was not realized. 
In Edward Miller’s Misalliance and Ellen J. Hammer’s A Death in November, the 
authors focus specifically on Diem and his attempts to implement his ideas of 
Vietnamese nationalism. Miller dispels the contemporary myth that Diem was a U.S. 
appointed puppet who failed because he would not listen to his American benefactors. As 
Miller argues, Diem was a fierce nationalist and anti-communist whose ideas for nation 
building were similar to those of the United States, but he frequently differed in his 
methods of execution.71 Miller also holds the U.S. administration accountable for not 
being able to agree on its own methods of nation building, thus making the Vietnam 
                                                 
71 Edward Garvey Miller, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South 
Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 15-16. 
 24
effort more difficult.72 He concludes that the alliance with Diem “was unmade in the 
same place and manner in which it was created: within the crucible of South Vietnam’s 
revolutionary politics.”73 Hammer laments the shortsighted U.S. decision to overthrow 
Diem as it led to years of political instability and an “American presence [that] corroded 
the social fabric, and corruption was all-pervasive.”74 These factors never permitted the 
South Vietnamese government to establish the same level of fanatical support that its 
northern counterparts enjoyed. The insight into the relationship between Diem and his 
U.S. military advisors that both authors provide is particularly noteworthy because it 
shows the difficulties advisors face in addressing fundamental grievances through the 
recognized government. 
Rufus Phillips was one of Lansdale’s early lieutenants, and his time spent focused 
on Vietnam was rivaled only by that of Lansdale and John Paul Vann. He maintains two 
themes in his memoir, Why Vietnam Matters. First, he criticizes the Washington decision-
making that was made “in a vacuum” and “doomed the enterprise to failure.”75 Although 
Phillips refers mostly to decisions made by the Kennedy administration and later, these 
politicians were not radically different from their predecessors. Phillips’s second main 
theme revolves around the “right” types of advisors, such as Edward Lansdale, who 
understood what Vietnam needed from the United States. He laments the final days of the 
Diem presidency when Lansdale might have been able to salvage the deteriorating U.S. 
support to Diem, implying that his presence might have changed the entire outcome of 
the conflict.76 Even in retrospect, this assessment seems overly optimistic, but based on 
Phillips’s experience in Vietnam, it has merit and reinforces the notion that advisory duty 
is not something for which every military member is well suited. 
In Trapped by Success, David Anderson examines the U.S. relationship with 
Diem and U.S. policy toward Vietnam during the Eisenhower era. His main argument is 
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that “ignorance and confidence bred an illusion of success that trapped Eisenhower and 
subsequent U.S. presidents in a frustrating and futile effort to define and defend U.S. 
interests.”77 Anderson addresses the irony in Eisenhower’s decision not to assist the 
French at Dien Bien Phu. Eisenhower made this decision despite believing, like Truman, 
in the need to contain communism everywhere. Subsequently, the Eisenhower 
administration halfheartedly supported Diem’s government with large amounts of aid but 
never with the conviction that reflected the importance it placed on Vietnam in public and 
private discourse. As Anderson chronicles, Diem experienced a small degree of success 
in creating a stable nation, but the administration convinced itself that the success was 
nothing short of a miracle.78 Anderson concludes that the United States built this miracle 
on sand and “fostered dependence, not independence, in South Vietnam.”79 Following 
Diem’s assassination in 1963, the state that Eisenhower supported for most of his 
administration could only be preserved with an unsustainable U.S. military 
commitment.80 This reality further trapped the United States into yet another decade of 
sacrifice. Although Anderson focuses on Eisenhower’s mistaken assessment of the 
situation in Vietnam, advisors at lower levels also suffered from similar misconceptions 
and misguided efforts. 
John Paul Vann, the subject of Neil Sheehan’s book A Bright Shining Lie, 
experienced the consequences of well-intentioned aggrandizement firsthand while 
working with his Vietnamese counterpart, Colonel Huynh Van Cao. Vann believed he 
could transform Cao into an aggressive commander by building his reputation through 
battlefield successes.81 Vann was the catalyst behind these successes, which ultimately 
backfired. Vann never transferred his aggressive spirit to Cao, but the battlefield 
successes buoyed Cao’s credibility to the extent that he did not need to take more risks. 
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Moreover, at times Cao countermanded Vann’s attempts to achieve even greater tactical 
successes while blaming these events on subordinates.82 Vann finally realized that 
President Diem had ordered his commanders to avoid casualties.83 As Sheehan points 
out, however, what Vann failed to recognize was the political reality of Vietnam and the 
Diem regime.84 The ARVN represented the primary tool for the regime’s political 
survival, and the insurgency was a real and dangerous threat. Therefore, the ARVN’s 
existence could not be placed at risk through overly aggressive battlefield maneuvers. At 
least this scenario is how the Diem regime appeared to see it, which was 
incomprehensible to Vann.85 
Vann’s story served as a vehicle around which to tell the larger Vietnam story. In 
this vein, it shared characteristics with first-person accounts such as Daniel Fitzgibbon’s 
To Bear Any Burden. As a Special Forces officer in Vietnam living with and fighting 
alongside a Vietnamese Special Forces (VNSF) team that in turn commanded a Civilian 
Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) battalion, Fitzgibbon witnessed the various hurdles in 
Vietnamese and American bureaucracies. For example, one of the battalion’s companies 
consisted of Montagnards, who were considered a lesser ethnic class in Vietnamese 
society. The VNSF team leader feared treating them the same as his Vietnamese 
companies lest he be reported to his superiors and presumably punished.86 Likewise, 
Fitzgibbon faced his own frustrations dealing with his higher headquarters. He was 
routinely chastised, for example, when the irregular Vietnamese forces he advised were 
not as operationally active as standard U.S. Army maneuver units.87 This criticism 
illustrated one of the challenges for advisors, particularly when the scope of U.S. 
involvement in a nation expanded beyond a small advisory role. Since advisors typically 
worked in small teams and often ended up coming from different units formed in an ad 
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hoc fashion, they were frequently ignored in logistics planning and even harassed by the 
regular line formations for any number of reasons. These factors often made it more 
difficult for advisors to accomplish their missions. 
Finally, Ronald Spector’s U.S. Army in Vietnam, Advice and Support: The Early 
Years 1941–1960 is perhaps the most important work on the topic of military advisors in 
Vietnam through 1960. Spector chronicles the difficulties faced by the Military 
Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) under the French when its only mission was 
delivery of materiel to French forces.88 Subsequently, the Eisenhower administration was 
unwilling to expand the advisory mission to a more appropriate number needed to train 
the ARVN adequately. Although citing the Geneva Accords as justification for the 
limitations, the administration willingly ignored other provisions and even surreptitiously 
increased the advisory mission. Spector’s arguments are in line with Anderson’s in that 
there was a policy and strategy mismatch under Eisenhower that, once realized, was not 
easily rectified.89 In his conclusion, Spector attributes the advisors’ failure to achieve 
U.S. foreign policy goals of a strong anti-communist Republic of Vietnam government to 
over-politicization of the military, short tours that limited the advisors’ effectiveness, a 
failure to recognize the communist insurgency as the primary danger, and the 
intractability of Diem.90  
The influence that advisors had across these four case studies was greater than 
one would expect from their small numbers. This influence gave them enormous 
potential if the right person was serving; contrarily, any damage had the potential to be 
enormous and irreversible if the wrong person was selected or too many conflicting 
viewpoints were involved in a situation. Additionally, the longer an advisory mission 
continued, the less likely it was to succeed. This observation was even more true if the 
purpose of an advisory mission was to prop up a nation’s security forces to handle their 
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own security requirements. This last point seems blatantly obvious, but it did not prevent 
Washington from beginning and ending its support to Vietnam with advisors. 
D. OVERVIEW 
This dissertation consists of a comparative, qualitative analysis of the four cases. 
It draws for inspiration on Douglas Porch’s recent analysis of counterinsurgency, William 
H. Mott’s case study analysis of military assistance, and Alexander George and Andrew 
Bennett’s book on case study methodology.91 Porch’s work provides a contemporary 
example of historical case study analysis on a similar topic.92 Mott’s book aids in the 
development of a framework relating specifically to military advisors.93 Finally, George 
and Bennett’s work establishes guidelines for developing the set of common questions to 
apply to all of the cases.94 The sources available varied per case. This dissertation relied 
on secondary sources for a broad perspective on the different cases but drew from 
primary sources on specific aspects to compare the historical record with advisor first-
hand reports. 
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II. U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS IN GREECE: THE BIRTH OF 
CONTAINMENT 
In 1947, the United States intervened in the Greek Civil War on the side of Greek 
nationalists under King George II against the Greek Communists under Nicholas 
Zachariades to prevent Greece’s falling under the Soviet umbrella. U.S. leaders did not 
take this decision lightly. The perceived enormity of the communist threat led some to 
call for large U.S. combat units to intervene. Despite this pressure, the Truman 
administration settled on a program consisting of economic and military aid and advice to 
improve the conditions in Greece and bolster its armed forces to defeat the communist 
guerrillas. A combination of British and U.S. economic and military assistance, training, 
and advice contributed to the Greek National Army’s eventual victory under General 
Alexander Papagos over the Greek Communists. Contemporary accounts of the U.S. 
advisors in Greece laud their actions to transform the GNA from a dispirited force into an 
effective fighting machine in a short time and to ensure an important early victory for the 
West over communist expansion.1 This self-congratulating narrative overstates the 
advisors’ real contribution, however. Greek nationalists won because their U.S.-funded 
army outnumbered the Communists by a large margin, and the Communists made serious 
strategic, operational, and tactical mistakes. Despite eighteen months of concentrated 
effort, the advisory program made little progress instilling the GNA with an aggressive 
combat spirit or training regimen. 
Throughout the advisors’ time in Greece, they faced many challenges in addition 
to the Greek Communists. These challenges stemmed from the Greek political and 
military establishment that the advisors were invited to assist. First, U.S. personnel 
needed to establish rapport and credibility to begin a constructive dialogue to reverse 
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Greek misfortunes. The first senior U.S. military advisor, Major General William 
Livesay, did not perform effectively in this role and was replaced. Second, the advisors 
sought to overcome entrenched cultures in institutions such as the GNA. This challenge 
proved insurmountable at many levels and on many topics of basic military principles. 
Third, the advisors faced a GNA that became increasingly dependent on U.S. largesse for 
its existence, operational capability, and tactical style. The technology thought to give the 
GNA an edge over its enemy often meant that the GNA would not fight without it nor 
cease requesting more. Finally, the advisors worked to establish a sense of urgency and 
pride in their counterparts to motivate them to solve their own problem quickly. Advisors 
met with some success on this issue, but motivation was a matter for Greek leadership to 
address. 
A. FROM BRITISH OCCUPATION TO THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE 
To trace the path to U.S. involvement in Greece, one must start with Britain. 
Although not strictly part of the British Empire, Greece had long been part of Britain’s 
strategic calculus since the Greek War of Independence due to its position in the eastern 
Mediterranean. Despite an unsavory dictatorial government in Greece as The Second 
World War opened, Great Britain stood by its ally and fought to defend against the 
German invasion that resulted in three years of occupation, economic devastation, and 
famine that claimed as many as 250,000 lives.2 From 1941 to 1944, London supported 
Greek resistance groups to disrupt the Axis occupation, cut supply lines to North Africa, 
and divert reinforcements from other fronts.3 Although these activities were only 
moderately successful, Greek Communists nevertheless became a powerful political 
entity and a threat to the Greek government in exile and British postwar plans since they 
controlled the largest resistance group. The phenomenon of increased communist power 
due to wartime resistance efforts was common in many Axis-occupied states. In October 
1944, Prime Minister Winston Churchill made his famous “percentages agreement” with 
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Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin that determined the share of postwar influence the great 
powers would have in the individual Balkan states. This agreement guaranteed the West a 
90 percent share of influence in Greece’s affairs.4 Following the German withdrawal 
from Greece, British forces assumed responsibility for maintaining order among the same 
resistance groups they had supported during the war and for reestablishing the 
constitutional monarchy. The communist resistance group, EAM, chose this opportunity 
to launch an armed revolt that the British crushed.5 The communist resistance did not 
fade away, however. 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the mantle of world leadership shifted 
decisively from Great Britain to the United States. Great Britain responded to this shift 
with a policy of retrenchment, including its position in Greece. Despite Greece’s 
economic and political struggles, London maintained a particular regard for Greece’s 
position in its strategic landscape. Conversely, Washington debated internally its new 
leadership role, desiring that London would maintain much of its capability. This 
difference in views caused some consternation between the United States and Britain in 
Greece. The British hoped to extricate themselves from any responsibility there to 
concentrate on other pieces of their crumbling empire, while the Americans expected to 
supply some money and materiel, but little else. A deteriorating political and military 
situation in Greece, Britain’s 1947 ultimatum, and a Greek Army largely dependent on 
outside support for its very existence ultimately forced America’s hand.6 
Reflecting the tenuous economic and military situation in Greece, the British laid 
out their position in a 21 February 1947 message to the U.S. Department of State. The 
message predicted that Greece would realize “widespread starvation and consequent 
political disturbance during the present year [1947]” without outside support.7 The 
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British called for U.S. assistance to support the 100,000-man Greek army and stated that 
the GNA was ready to conduct an “all-out assault on the bandits in the Spring.”8 This 
statement implied that the Communists were on the verge of defeat.9 This assessment was 
optimistic. 
By early 1947, U.S. reports from Greece were increasingly dire. Journalist Mark 
F. Ethridge, serving as the U.S. delegate to the United Nations (UN) Commission 
examining the Greek border disputes, reported that the “[Greek] army morale [was] at 
lowest possible” with “two detachments going over to the guerrillas in last three days.”10 
Although Washington was reluctant to be forced into a situation it did not choose, its 
assumption that the Soviets were bent on world domination left it little choice. Secretary 
Marshall’s statement to the UN on 26 June 1947 clearly articulated the U.S. opinion that 
the Soviet Union was responsible for fostering communist revolution in Greece to 
reinforce Soviet dominance of the Balkan Peninsula.11 
Despite these fears—however justifiable in 1947—Stalin generally respected the 
percentages agreement with respect to Greece. Although he supported an established 
communist party that could bide its time while awaiting events to unfold, the entry of the 
United States into the conflict and his disagreements with Tito rendered serious Soviet 
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involvement a moot point.12 Since Stalin feared a direct confrontation with the United 
States so close to home, he was willing to abandon the questionable Greek Communist 
movement to its fate.13 Washington policymakers nevertheless extrapolated the internal 
Greek threat to the larger international picture and postulated future threats to Iran, Italy, 
Turkey, and France, who were undergoing either external Soviet threat or seeds of 
conflict with their own communist movements. The fear was that communist success in 
Greece would motivate communist organizations elsewhere. This mindset would 
continue for decades. 
The Truman Doctrine, embodied in President Truman’s address to Congress on 
12 March 1947 and codified in Public Law 75 of 22 May 1947, provided the president 
with the authority to offer up to $400 million in aid to Greece and military personnel to 
serve “in an advisory capacity only.”14 This last stipulation inspired much hand wringing 
as the military situation in Greece waxed and waned. Some, like career diplomat George 
Kennan, believed that economic means were the primary tool against communist 
expansion, and that they were probably sufficient to solve the problems in Greece.15 
Congressional and State Department hawks, however, called for American combat units 
to address the Greek problem. 
Cooler heads prevailed, however, as Secretary of State Marshall, the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concluded that U.S. forces beyond an 
advisory element were unnecessary.16 Additionally, the objective of advice and 
assistance was to multiply the number of anti-communist forces around the world, rather 
than require the commitment of U.S. forces. By limiting itself exclusively to an advisory 
mission, however, Washington transferred virtually all control over the outcome of the 
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conflict to the Greek government and armed forces. The White House made this decision 
primarily due to fear of escalation. The unintended consequence was that the desired 
result—the elimination of communists in Greece—proved elusive since it relied on 
coercing the Greeks into taking aggressive action that they were not inclined to take. 
B. BELLIGERENTS 
The two parties to the conflict were the Greek Communist Party, or KKE, and the 
Greek nationalists.17 Since the KKE’s establishment in 1918, these two entities had 
bitterly opposed each other with the Communists biding their time, despite being 
frequently targeted by right-wing groups. The Second World War and its aftermath 
delivered the conditions the Communists required to renew their struggle to overthrow 
the existing government.  
1. Greek Communists 
The KKE was founded on 4 November 1918 on strict Marxist principles of urban-
based revolution. The Russian Revolution heavily influenced the KKE’s early leadership, 
which viewed the subsequently established Soviet Union as its ideological leader. In 
1931, Stalin appointed Nikos Zachariades to head the KKE, and under his leadership, it 
grew in membership and political power.18 The result was that King George II, newly 
restored to the monarchy in 1935, perceived the Communists to be an imminent threat to 
Greece. The king subsequently dissolved parliament, appointed General Ioannis Metaxas 
as prime minister, and granted him dictatorial powers to secure the state against 
communism. Metaxas ably neutralized the communist threat but alienated many who 
were previously government supporters. The communists who escaped persecution were, 
as Christopher Woodhouse describes, “tough, disciplined, secretive, [and] hardened by 
harsh experience.”19 From the KKE’s remnants emerged the strongest and largest 
resistance group during the German occupation, the National Liberation Front (EAM). 
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From 1942 to 1944, the British supported EAM and other resistance groups against the 
Nazis, but the results were unimpressive. As the largest group, EAM used its superior 
position to intimidate non-Communists and posture itself for postwar dominance. 
Ultimately, this meant that the guerrillas spent at least as much time fighting each other 
as they did the Germans.20 With the unpopular Greek government in exile in Cairo, it was 
left to those who remained behind to fight it out for postwar spoils. 
The Communists had failed to win the right to rule among the wartime resistance 
groups. The Communists failed again—fighting in vain against the British—in the 
turmoil that followed the German withdrawal.21 Following King George’s return to the 
throne in 1946, the remaining Communists formed the Democratic Army (DA) under 
longtime Communist and respected resistance leader General Markos Vafiades. 
Meanwhile, Zachariades resumed his position as the organization’s most influential 
political leader. Under these personalities, the Communists made their third, and 
ultimately final, attempt to usurp the Greek government by force. The KKE had four 
factors in its favor: political disunity among Greek nationalists, support from other 
communist states, a poor Greek economy, and a dilapidated GNA that Greece could not 
field without foreign assistance.22 
2. Greek Nationalists 
King George II’s return to the throne was short lived, as he died on 1 April 1947. 
George’s death turned out to be favorable for the nationalists since his younger brother 
Paul I—a far more personable figure—succeeded him.23 Complicating the political 
situation, however, was that the Greek Parliament had been in constant upheaval since 
the German departure. U.S. and British diplomats helped mediate a coalition government 
that remained intact, although barely, throughout the civil war. These fortunate incidents 
                                                 
20 Doris M. Condit, Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece during World War II (Washington, DC: 
American University, 1961), 74–6. 
21 O’Ballance, Greek Civil War, 95. 
22 Robert W. Selton, "Communist Errors in the Anti-Bandit War," Military Review 45 (September 
1965): 77. 
23 O’Ballance, Greek Civil War, 137. 
 36
at least provided the impression of inclusion, democratic processes, and stability, which 
were factors unknown in Greek politics of the day. 
Greek nationalist goals centered on ridding the country of the armed communist 
menace and, ideally, of all communist influence. To this end, the advisory effort was 
closely aligned with these goals. Political infighting nevertheless continued between 
government factions throughout the war, and the Greeks consistently complained of 
insufficient U.S. aid while emphasizing their own sacrifices in the great power struggle 
between the western democracies and the eastern communist states.24 The nature of the 
conflict helps explain this attitude. Although the conflict was a national crisis that 
consumed enormous resources, it lacked the life and death struggle that might have 
forced the Greeks to unite themselves more completely. To this end, the advisors—whose 
mission it was to prevent a worsening situation—were incapable of unifying the political 
factions in a lasting way. 
Early indications of nationalist chances for victory were disappointing. In July 
1946, a Communist attack on an army camp in Macedonia resulted in seven GNA 
soldiers killed and 25 captured.25 In October, fighting expanded throughout northern 
Greece and into the Peloponnese, with at least 60 killed and 53 wounded.26 In November, 
under pressure from the rebels, the Greek gendarmerie abandoned 55 outposts in northern 
Greece, which left over 800 square miles of territory bordering Albania and Yugoslavia 
out of government control.27 By December 1946, DA forces began operating in battalion 
and regiment sized formations when only six months before they had operated in merely 
platoon size.28 The tide was shifting in the DA’s favor. The GNA facing them was, as 
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historian Howard Jones describes it, “poorly led, ill-trained, undisciplined, inadequately 
provisioned, low in morale, and reluctant to take the offensive.”29 
Although Greeks traced their warfighting roots back to antiquity, even the 
relatively young GNA had seen better times. Under the leadership of General Alexander 
Papagos, it had valiantly punished an attempted Italian invasion that subsequently 
necessitated Germany’s invasion in 1941.30 During the occupation, it became a mix of 
resistance fighters, collaborators, and survivors. Following the war, however, the GNA 
fell prey to the multiple factions vying for Greece in the ensuing power struggle. By late 
1946, the GNA consisted of approximately 115,000 soldiers and another 35,000 
gendarmerie.31 Many units were assigned to static defense duties throughout the country, 
however, which made them easy prey for larger DA units, while handicapping their 
ability to conduct offensive operations. 
A bright note for the GNA throughout the war was its chain of command 
architecture and force structure. Although its senior leadership faced political interference 
and meddling, the GNA was not diluted by the creation of large numbers of specialized 
units reporting to parallel chains of command. It did create elite commando units of 
handpicked volunteers, but these commandoes worked closely with the conventional 
units they supported and traced their command and control to the battalions and brigades 
to which they were assigned. Figure 1 shows a military structure conducive to effective 
command and control with the proper leadership. 
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Figure 1.  Greek Military Organization 
Source: Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group, “JUSMAPG: Brief 
History 1 January 1948 to 31 August 1949,” September 15, 1949, Entry 155, Box 146, 
31, JUSMAGG, USAG, AGS, CFU, Historical File, 1947–50, RG 334, NACP. 
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C. BATTLEGROUND 
Greece’s borders in 1947 were nearly identical to those of today. Greece consisted 
of numerous islands and a mainland with an inordinately long coastline in comparison to 
its landmass. Its northern border with Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria measured more 
than 600 miles and was impossible to secure. These three countries provided arms and 
supplies to the Greek Communists and served as safe havens where Communists could 
rest, rearm, and refit in safety. Approximately 25 percent of Greece’s land was available 
for farming, but poor soil conditions, mismanagement, and primitive farming methods 
resulted in insufficient agricultural productivity and thus a net import requirement for 
Greece.32 The other 75 percent of Greece was mountainous, sparsely populated, and 
poorly connected by roads. The Communists established their main base areas in the 
northern mountains, although they launched attacks throughout the country. 
Demographically, Greece had become more homogeneous in the decades leading 
up to the civil war. A war with Turkey in the 1920s and the subsequent population 
exchange resulted in an ethnic Greek population as high as 96 percent.33 This 
homogeneity removed ethnic division as a significant factor in the conflict and made it 
more difficult for the communists to recruit support among the Greek population. Despite 
these factors, the Greek economy was underdeveloped, its people were poorly educated, 
and many were surviving on subsistence farming with little hope for a better future.34 
Thus, Greece was still a fertile territory for a populist revolutionary movement. 
D. ACT I: U.S. INVOLVEMENT—DOLLARS AND SENSE 
Vigorous U.S. involvement in Greece under the newly minted Truman Doctrine 
began in a haphazard fashion with questions surrounding the military mission’s role. The 
State Department created the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG), which 
operated independently of the ambassador under former Nebraska Governor and close 
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friend of President Harry Truman, Dwight Griswold. Likewise, the War Department 
established the United States Army Group Greece (USAGG) subordinate to AMAG on 
14 April 1947. The department envisioned this organization as one whose primary 
mission was to assess the GNA’s materiel requirements and transmit those to the 
appropriate authorities for procurement.35 Even though Public Law 75, which codified 
the Truman Doctrine in Greece, allowed for advisory functions, the War Department 
restricted USAGG’s authorities to supply.36 It would require further reflection on the 
deteriorating situation in Greece for U.S. leaders to accept the need for a more expansive 
and aggressive mission. 
Major General Livesay assumed command of USAGG shortly after its 
establishment. Livesay had served as a lieutenant in World War I and as a division 
commander in The Second World War. Even though the War Department projected his 
command would consist of fewer than 100 personnel, the scope of his responsibilities and 
the gravity of the situation required a senior officer—a common pattern in U.S. advisory 
programs throughout the Cold War. Although the operational and tactical level advisors 
working for Livesay were typically junior in rank to their counterparts, there was value in 
the senior advisor being of a near-equivalent grade to the senior military commander in 
the host nation force. 
Upon arrival in Greece, Griswold and Livesay energetically began coordinating 
U.S. aid across the gamut of assistance sectors, including infrastructure, communications, 
and the military. In his initial report of May 1948, Griswold assessed the situation in 
Greece as particularly dire and “rapidly deteriorating” due to “guerrilla warfare” and the 
“heightened public fear” it produced.37 He further observed that economic reconstruction 
was impossible without addressing the guerrilla problem, since it disrupted nearly all 
aspects of daily life, including creating a refugee problem that placed an even greater 
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strain on a very weak economy.38 This observation simply confirmed the challenge of 
battling an insurgency due to the interrelated nature of political, military, and economic 
spheres to the roots of the conflict. 
Livesay set out to determine GNA shortcomings and began addressing them 
through Greek and U.S. channels. In one of his initial assessments of the GNA, he 
evaluated it as having an “excellent combat record,” with its main shortcoming being 
infiltration by communist sympathizers; he also noted the improved GNA morale that 
appeared to accompany the public U.S. announcement of assistance to Greece.39 This 
assessment was overly optimistic based on the GNA’s unimpressive record. Livesay also 
began receiving requests from Greek leadership to increase the size of the GNA. The 
issue of Greek leaders viewing the GNA’s size as insufficient would plague him and his 
successor throughout the war. In part, these requests had merit despite the significant 
advantage in manpower the GNA possessed. Many GNA units were deployed in static 
positions guarding towns and villages, and thus were unavailable for offensive action 
against an elusive guerrilla enemy that numbered approximately 22,000 at this point in 
the war.40 Figure 2 shows the disposition of communist forces in January 1948. Despite 
this argument, the GNA’s poor performance against the Communists was more the result 
of incompetent command and control, insufficiently aggressive leaders, political 
meddling, and poor morale than imbalance in forces.41 Considering a small British force 
had crushed the 1944 rebellion and struck fear into the hearts of the communists, it 
seemed entirely reasonable that a well-led, motivated, and much larger GNA could do the 
same. Livesay and Griswold set about to assist as they could while addressing the 
elephant in the room—the willingness to fight hard—which U.S. dollars could not buy 
for Greece. 
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Figure 2.  Disposition of Communist Forces in Greece, January 1948 
 
Source: Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group, “JUSMAPG: Brief 
History 1 January 1948 to 31 August 1949,” September 15, 1949, Entry 155, Box 146, 8, 
JUSMAGG, USAG, AGS, CFU, Historical File, 1947–50, RG 334, NACP.  
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Despite the élan of the Truman Doctrine speech and subsequent legislative action, 
there was nevertheless pressure to be reasonable in the recommended size of the GNA; 
any increases needed to be justified with strong arguments. Livesay resisted initial Greek 
demands for increasing the GNA’s size, but eventually supported a growth of 10,000 to 
eliminate insufficient forces as an excuse for GNA lethargy.42 Livesay and Griswold also 
sought to rectify the defensive mindset of the GNA by supporting the creation of a 
National Defense Corps (NDC) of lightly armed soldiers that could fill the routine, but 
necessary static security role and relieve the GNA units to pursue the DA.43 Additionally, 
they pushed the Greeks to dismiss ineffective leaders—calling for the relief of the Greek 
First Army Commander and two of the three corps commanders—citing their lack of 
aggressiveness.44 These recommendations, backed primarily by Griswold’s forceful 
personality and deep pockets, began to force some necessary reforms in the Greek 
government and military. 
By the end of 1947, however, the military situation in Greece had deteriorated to 
the point that it threatened the effectiveness of the larger aid program, which was the 
cornerstone of U.S. Cold War strategy. On Christmas Day 1947, 3,500 DA guerrillas 
attacked the 900-man garrison in Konitsa in northern Greece to establish a communist 
capital, which they hoped would lead to greater credibility, foreign recognition, and most 
importantly, greater aid.45 Fighting for their lives, the GNA troops held off the attackers 
until reinforcements could break through and relieve them. Although this defensive 
victory served to rally deflated Greek army and civilian spirits, it still highlighted 
inadequacies in GNA combat performance. As AMAG Chief Dwight Griswold reported 
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afterward, the GNA “infantry troops still do not close with the enemy.”46 U.S. advisors 
spent the next twenty months addressing this problem. 
Washington and its representatives in Greece subsequently concluded that 
military and economic aid alone was insufficient for Greece to defeat the communists. 
They determined that Greece needed direct U.S. military advice and directed the 
establishment of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) 
under General Livesay. JUSMAPG’s mission statement was “to assist the Greek Armed 
Forces in achieving internal security in Greece at the earliest possible date, by providing 
to GNA (including NDC), Royal Hellenic Navy (RHN), and Royal Hellenic Air Force 
(RHAF), stimulating and aggressive assistance in the form of operational and logistical 
advice.”47 Marshall emphasized this change in focus to Griswold noting that the 
“destruction [of] guerrilla forces and establishment internal security now have assumed 
paramount importance as necessary preliminary for American aid to Greece.”48 
USAGG remained as a logistics hub for receiving equipment and supplies, but the 
JUSMAPG commander assumed responsibility for all military recommendations to the 
U.S. senior civilian representative, JCS, and the Greek Armed Forces. The creation of 
this new entity also required a reexamination of its chain of command. Since military 
operations assumed the central role, the military leadership in the United States 
recommended that strictly military matters rest in JCS channels versus flowing through 
the Department of State. Thus, JUSMAPG reported to JCS on all military matters, while 
maintaining open communication with embassy and AMAG leaders.49 
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Figure 3.  JUSMAPG Chain of Command 
 
Source: Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group, “JUSMAPG: Brief 
History 1 January 1948 to 31 August 1949,” September 15, 1949, Entry 155, Box 146, 8, 
JUSMAGG, USAG, AGS, CFU, Historical File, 1947–50, RG 334, NACP. 
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The proximity of The Second World War to the Greek Civil War meant that 
Livesay could draw from a pool of officers and enlisted who had experience in combat 
and training forces for combat. In January 1948, Livesay briefed the arriving U.S. 
officers on their duties as operational advisors. His speech to them set the tone for the 
difficult political and military environment they would operate in and echoed 
contemporary guidance and best practices on advising foreign armies. He presented the 
mission as “quell[ing] the riots and establish[ing] a stable Greece,” with JUSMAPG 
personnel “advis[ing] them [Greeks] and assist[ing] them in every way that we can.”50 
He cautioned against trying to “make an American Army out of the Greek Army” 
because the Greeks had their own customs and way of doing things.51 American methods 
might not work for them. Finally, he rightly pointed out that advisor success was 
measured in the counterpart’s performance. Throughout his speech, he emphasized the 
overriding theme of instilling aggressiveness due to the GNA’s defensive attitude. 
Despite this theme, Livesay directed the advisors to avoid directly participating in 
combat. For this reason, they were unarmed. Nevertheless, they were still expected to 
conduct themselves in a fashion that would not discredit the bravery of the American 
soldier. Thus, Livesay’s instruction to his advisors was to “observe combat but don’t get 
involved in it.”52 
This ambiguous directive belied the urgency of the U.S. position in the Greek 
Civil War and seemed to place a higher value on remaining unobserved than on winning 
or advising effectively. Furthermore, it presented significant difficulties for advisors who 
were asked to instill aggressiveness in their counterparts, yet had to remain inconspicuous 
during times when aggressive action was needed most. During times of indecisiveness or 
timidity on the part of the Greeks, advisors could not play the vital role of setting a bold 
example that might transfer to their counterparts. Instead, they were expected to reshape 
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the culture through critique and subtle suggestion. Judging from the advisors’ reports, this 
approach did not always achieve the results desired. 
E. ACT II: GENERAL JAMES VAN FLEET TAKES OVER 
In early 1948, the military situation in Greece was showing little improvement, 
and the expectations for rapid success from Washington were far too high. Consequently, 
Secretary of State Marshall recommended the need for a more “impressive personality at 
the head of the military contingent [in Greece].”53 Greek government officials also had 
made disparaging remarks about Livesay.54 Any negative assessment of Livesay’s 
performance, however, was primarily a result of the War Department’s initial structure of 
the military’s role in the aid mission. For his first six months, Livesay was Griswold’s 
subordinate and merely supervised the military supply effort, which meant his role was 
naturally subdued. Seeking a replacement also may have been a Greek political play to 
find someone more sympathetic to their constant requests for more aid. Whatever the 
deciding factors, Marshall supported the nomination of Major General James A. Van 
Fleet to replace Livesay as commander of the expanded military mission. Van Fleet, 
newly promoted to Lieutenant General, assumed command of JUSMAPG on 24 February 
1948. 
General Van Fleet was a member of the famed West Point class of 1915, which 
also included Dwight Eisenhower and Omar Bradley. His career was marked by his 
notable efforts to turn around underperforming commands in Europe during The Second 
World War at the division and corps level. By war’s end, Van Fleet had distinguished 
himself as an aggressive commander who was adept at taking over delicate situations 
marked by forced leadership changes and immediately improving morale and combat 
effectiveness.55 His leadership traits would be tested in the even more delicate 
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international environment in Greece where he and his team would have only moral 
authority with which to exert influence over others. 
By Van Fleet’s arrival, the GNA had increased in size to 132,000 troops, and the 
NDC had grown steadily to 66 battalions on its way to 96 for a final strength of 48,000 
troops.56 His first realized achievement was reducing the amount of political interference 
and security leaks in GNA operational plans. In a meeting of the Supreme National 
Defense Council (SNDC) on 26 February 1948, its members decided to remove 
themselves from the review process for military plans, instead granting full authority to 
the commander of the Greek General Staff to plan and execute military operations 
without interference.57 Thus, the fruits of Livesay and Griswold’s efforts began to be put 
into practice, although the results would not be immediate. 
Under Van Fleet, JUSMAPG focused on three key areas of improvement for the 
Greek military: training, operational and tactical advice, and the replacement of 
ineffective leaders. Beginning in 1948, JUSMAPG attempted to improve the GNA 
training standards and mentality.58 The advisors addressed training deficiencies by 
introducing U.S. methods and doctrines as the basis for instruction. Additionally, they 
established schools mirroring the U.S. training pipeline. This U.S.-centric model was a 
common theme in other U.S.-led advisory missions throughout the world and may have 
needlessly disrupted the system the Greeks had in place up to that point. Realizing that it 
would be difficult for Greek units to come off line from fighting the ongoing war, 
JUSMAPG instituted demonstration training teams consisting of a platoon from a larger 
element, which would be trained and then returned to its unit to provide instruction.59 
This concept had merit, but Greek failure to follow through on training was a source of 
consternation for JUSMAPG leadership that was never adequately rectified. 
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In January and April 1949, General Reuben Jenkins, Van Fleet’s deputy, 
admonished the respective American advisor chiefs of the Greek B and C Corps for their 
corps’ failure to emphasize training at every opportunity, even when some of the unit was 
engaged in operations.60 Jenkins referred to the U.S. experience when he wrote, “every 
American Division regimental and battalion commander soon learned in WWII that a unit 
can conduct offensive or defensive battle and at the same time carry on some vitally 
needed tactical or technical training with its supports and reserves at the same time. They 
also learned that this combination paid large dividends.”61 Greek leaders nevertheless 
largely ignored advisors’ recommendations on training during or outside of combat. 
As late as September 1949, the senior U.S. advisor to B Corps was still urging 
that “a vigorous training program be instituted by the GNA without delay” in the areas of 
“leadership and initiative on all levels,” combined arms operations, and basic infantry 
skills such as organizing “in preparation for possible counterattacks.”62 This report came 
from one of the two corps primarily involved in the final operations against the 
Communists and after all major combat operations in Greece had ceased, thus calling into 
question how much impact advisors had on the training standards of Greek forces. 
Moreover, the JUSMAPG reports did not truthfully reflect the reporting from the 
subordinate echelon advisors. In the 30 June 1949 quarterly JUSMAPG report, for 
example, the training section reads, “response to acceptance of the JUSMAPG 
recommendations on various training projects has been excellent during the quarter and 
reflects an improved general attitude among GNA commanders as to the appreciated 
value of actual training for their troops.”63 This statement directly contradicted the B 
Corps senior advisor, who wrote in May 1949, “‘Lip service’ is rendered by the GNA 
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but, by our standards, training conducted and being conducted is negligible. The thought 
of training troops on position continues to fall on unfertile ground.”64 Even the more 
positive C Corps senior advisor implied that little training had taken place due to 
operations and the lack of suitable training areas, although he noted “an honest effort 
made at all levels to carry out training directives.”65 
In March and April 1948, the GNA launched operations with U.S. advisor support 
in central Greece to clear out two enemy pockets totaling 3,800 Communists.66 The 
Greeks displayed significant tactical acumen during these operations, accounting for 
3,140 communists killed, captured, or surrendered.67 From these successes, it appeared 
that the GNA had recovered its fighting spirit and that further offensives might decisively 
conclude the conflict by the end of 1948.68 In other areas of the country such as the 
Peloponnese, however, the guerrillas inflicted heavy losses against NDC units.69 Despite 
a solid foundation in theory, the NDC turned out to be largely a failure. Its forces lacked 
the training and equipment to challenge communist attacks adequately, its numbers 
counted against overall GNA numbers, and its units did not replace as many GNA 
battalions as originally promised.70 As seen in its performance in the Peloponnese, the 
idea that the NDC could secure areas cleared by the GNA remained in doubt. The 
effectiveness of the government’s campaign, however, relied on each to perform its role. 
Meanwhile, despite the DA’s heavy losses in direct confrontations with the GNA, it still 
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managed to find either willing or forced replacements in the northern mountain areas it 
controlled with populations more sympathetic to the movement.71 March 1948 also saw 
the replacement of nearly the entire Greek military leadership as ten lieutenant generals 
were retired and replaced with newly promoted corps commanders. Other critical 
positions in the War Ministry, NDC, and Army were also reshuffled or replaced.72 These 
personnel replacements at least showed a willingness on the part of the Greek 
government to address decisively the politicization of its military. 
In July and August, the GNA attacked the strongest concentration of DA forces in 
Greece in the Grammos Mountains near the border with Albania. This area was 
particularly challenging since it was isolated logistically from Greece but could be 
supplied from across the border.73 A successful attack on the communist stronghold 
would appear to be an important symbol of GNA superiority and the Greek government’s 
ultimate victory. The terrain favored the defenders, however, and the lack of 
infrastructure meant envelopment by the GNA would depend on skill, leadership, and 
aggressiveness, three traits generally lacking in that organization. The operation 
commenced in a disorganized fashion against a well-fortified and determined enemy led 
by General Markos. 
Beginning 16 June 1948, the GNA attacked approximately 11,400–12,500 DA 
guerrillas with the Greek A and B Corps totaling at least 40,000 troops plus air and 
artillery support.74 Despite the mismatch in forces, the Communists fought well from 
their strong positions, and the GNA was unable to make significant headway during the 
early phases of the operation.75 Moreover, the B Corps commander frustrated his senior 
U.S. advisor, which quickly elevated to Van Fleet’s level.76 JUSMAPG provided specific 
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direction to the senior advisor, but he was unable to compel his Greek counterpart into 
action.77 This threat to the operation’s successful outcome caused Van Fleet to intervene 
personally and request the corps commander’s relief.78 The corps responded with a 
renewed effort, but the communists fought tenaciously—despite mounting casualties—
until Markos ordered the remaining forces to escape across the border into Albania or 
east to another DA stronghold in Vitsi. 
The fighting had been costly for both sides. The DA lost approximately 3,600 
killed, captured, and surrendered, and the GNA, 800 killed, 5,000 wounded, and 60 
missing.79 With its victory, the GNA gained mostly insignificant land to which it had to 
devote troops to prevent communist recapture. Additionally, since the borders were 
porous, the guerrillas maintained freedom of movement that the GNA could not affect. 
Nevertheless, the victory displayed the value of advisors in planning and incorporating 
supporting arms such as artillery and airpower. Unfortunately, it also illustrated their 
continued inability to compel into action Greek leaders otherwise disposed to inaction 
and defensive measures. Only the relief of these leaders seemed to improve the situation, 
but this was an unwieldy method that took weeks to accomplish.80 The GNA could not 
afford to waste time squabbling over personnel matters while concurrently trying to 
maintain the initiative during offensive operations. 
In a clear attempt to encourage future aggressive action through positive 
reinforcement, Van Fleet lauded commanders he identified as having performed well in 
the Grammos operation with personal congratulatory letters invoking visions of 
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“inspiring leadership,” heroism, and epic “Greek military history.”81 Additionally, his 
reports to this point implied significant progress in the GNA’s morale and leadership. 
These reports and the succession of relatively successful GNA operations had inspired 
such optimism in U.S. circles that officials in Washington began inquiring whether 
assistance to Greece could be reduced by the end of 1948.82 Since the Grammos 
operation did not destroy the defending DA force, however, Van Fleet and the new 
ambassador to Greece, Henry F. Grady, were forced to backpedal from earlier optimistic 
reports.83 Moreover, the GNA’s performance in the months following Grammos would 
lay bare weaknesses that advisors had been unable to fix. 
Contemporary and official accounts of the advisory program generally give the 
impression that advisors had great impact on their Greek counterparts, and successfully 
instilled a spirit of aggressiveness, which was the overall intent of JUSMAPG since its 
inception.84 Primary accounts of the time, however, contradict this assertion. The GNA 
had many methods to avoid aggressive action and responsibility by its individual 
commanders. One of these methods was the “double company,” in which a commander 
would assign an objective to multiple battalions that would then cobble together a 
makeshift element under a commander from yet another battalion.85 This phenomenon 
undermined unit integrity, unity of command, and unit interoperability training. 
Additionally, it allowed the commanders to shirk responsibility since they could blame 
each other for any ensuing confusion in planning or execution. Clearly, the GNA 
improved its operational and tactical execution compared to the beginning of the war. In 
contrast to the spirited defense of Greece against the Italian invasion in 1940, however, 
the performance of the GNA was frustratingly apathetic, and the advisors were limited in 
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their ability to impart significant change due to entrenched culture and differences of 
opinion.86 
Frustration with the Greek conundrum was not limited to U.S. advisors in 
country. The State Department’s Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs held the 
same view toward the Greek government and its lack of dedication to solving its own 
internal problems. In a memo from its chief, Joseph Satterthwaite, to the Under Secretary 
of State, he noted the important message that the United States sent to other nations 
through the assistance it provided Greece and Turkey. Despite this assistance, however, 
he lamented the “Greek political leaders [who] frequently seem more concerned with 
their own narrow party ambitions than with the urgent necessity of working together. . 
.[to advance] the welfare of the Greek people as a whole.”87 The crisis did not unite 
Greek political rivals as closely as one might have hoped. 
Another difficult problem was Greece’s dependency on the United States to solve 
its economic and military woes. As noted by previous observers such as Griswold, the 
abundance of U.S. aid led “Greek political leaders to expend all their energies on 
attempts to increase the amount of aid from the United States, instead of on concentrated 
efforts to make the most effective use of available resources.”88 Moreover, the tendency 
of Greek leaders to blame the United States for providing insufficient aid risked making 
the Greek people believe that they could not overcome the Communists.89 Washington 
reflected this sentiment in National Security Council (NSC) 5 in January 1948, stating, 
“the armed forces of Greece, both military and police units are hampered in their effort to 
eliminate Communist guerrilla forces by lack of offensive spirit, by political interference, 
by disposition of units as static guard forces and by poor leadership, particularly in the 
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lower echelons.”90 Later, the NSC recommended insisting that the Greek government 
address its shortfalls “as a condition for the continuance of the assistance program.”91 
Yet, in the next paragraphs it recommended that additional funds be appropriated for 
addressing the Greek problem.92 This contradiction exposed the seemingly unavoidable 
conflict of interest wherein it was to the Greek nationalists’ advantage to maintain at least 
a smoldering security problem if that meant continued U.S. support. The only way for the 
United States to address this problem was with a GNA victory. While this factor does not 
fully explain the GNA sluggishness, it was clear that GNA leaders in 1948 bore greater 
resemblance to the overly cautious General George B. McClellan than the audacious 
General Ulysses S. Grant.93 
In an attempt to conclude the civil war before December 1948, the GNA 
maintained its pressure on the DA, whose forces had shifted to Vitsi. On 30 August 1948, 
the GNA launched a clearing operation against a force of 6,000 to 7,500 guerrillas, many 
of whom had moved through Albania and Yugoslavia back into Greece.94 The same 
systemic problems plagued the GNA in addition to general fatigue following two and a 
half months of sustained operations. The result was a lackluster effort on the part of the 
GNA that saw whatever small gains it made reversed by guerrilla counterattacks.95 Van 
Fleet lamented the GNA’s poor performance in a message to Army G-3, citing 
“leadership, poor morale, and Communist influence in ranks.”96 The morale boost and 
lessons learned that the GNA should have gained from the Grammos operation did not 
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equate to success in the Vitsi operation. Moreover, the concentration of GNA forces in 
northern Greece had left opportunities for DA violence elsewhere. 
As fall dragged on, the Vitsi operation stalled. The longer it remained static, the 
greater the likelihood that the war would not be decided until spring 1949 at the earliest. 
This delay led Van Fleet to reassess what Greece required to prevail in its struggle 
against communist takeover. His recommendations belied his previous arguments that the 
Greeks did not need more men and firepower and brought him into conflict with the 
newly appointed U.S. ambassador to Greece. 
After nearly a year that had seen Greece without an official U.S. ambassador, 
Henry F. Grady took up the post and assumed complete control over all aid and 
diplomatic functions. Griswold thereafter resigned after more than a year of service as the 
head of AMAG. In Paul Braim’s account of Van Fleet’s relationship with Ambassador 
Grady, he presents Grady as disrespectful of Van Fleet and of the military in general.97 
Grady, in his memoirs, indicates no ill feeling toward Van Fleet besides disagreement on 
two significant issues.98 The first was the Greek political crisis at the end of 1948. 
The coalition government that the United States and Great Britain had helped 
establish in 1947 was coming apart, and the king was considering appointing General 
Papagos as emergency dictator much like his brother did with Metaxas in 1936. Papagos’ 
name was already under consideration by the U.S. and British missions to replace 
General Yiadzis as chief of the Greek General Staff because it was becoming 
increasingly obvious that the country required a more forceful senior military 
commander. On this issue, opinions among senior U.S. civilian and military personnel in 
Greece differed.99 
Van Fleet had established strong rapport with the royal family, and he already saw 
Papagos as the Greek leader most capable of leading the country through the current 
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crisis. Grady, acting from a position of lesser influence with the king, argued that a 
dictatorship under Papagos would have “dire consequences” for the war effort and would 
not be keeping with the democratic principles that U.S. support to Greece was intended to 
promote.100 Not only would there have been a loss of popular support, but it also would 
have prevented Papagos from assuming the role of commander-in-chief, which ended up 
being vital to reversing the stalled military effort. With the help of British diplomatic 
pressure, the risk of another dictatorship fortunately was averted. Preserving an elected 
Greek government helped maintain popular support throughout 1949. General Papagos 
was subsequently named Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Armed Forces and given 
broad powers to prosecute the war effort fully free from political interference. Van 
Fleet’s promotion of Papagos as a possible dictator nevertheless undermined the 
diplomatic process and, in retrospect, calls into question his disposition to provide 
impartial military (as distinct from political) advice to the recipient government.101 
News of Papagos’s return to active duty and assumption of command was greeted 
positively by all friendly parties, including Van Fleet, who lauded his commitment to 
“successfully terminate operations this year [1949].”102 Upon Papagos’s request, 
however, Van Fleet provided his advice on the GNA’s needs in a form that cast doubt on 
his show of enthusiasm. Van Fleet’s five-page response laid out some of the most basic 
military advice imaginable, scarcely appropriate to someone who had spent nearly forty 
years in military service.103 If Van Fleet truly felt this level of instruction was necessary, 
it indicated his lack of confidence that the Greeks had any sound military minds in their 
ranks. 
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General Papagos’s promotion to commander-in-chief was the culmination of a 
long and arduous process to find someone with the charisma and ability to accomplish the 
mutual objectives of the United States and Greece. America’s search for a strong, 
legitimate leader who could unify the country against communism would become a 
common theme in other conflict areas like China, Korea, the Philippines, and Vietnam 
with varying degrees of success. In Greece, U.S. investment in Papagos appears to have 
been successful, and if the United States had pushed for his appointment earlier, perhaps 
the GNA would have defeated the DA sooner. It was only in the aftermath of the political 
and military crisis in early 1949, however, that the Greek leadership could unite and grant 
the type of unfettered control of military operations that Papagos finally wielded. 
Moreover, Papagos’s main value was not in his operational or tactical acumen, but in his 
ability to push his leaders to act and to identify and relieve incapable commanders. With 
his authority, Papagos could act quickly on personnel matters that Van Fleet had 
previously had to painstakingly push through a byzantine approval process.104 
Even the removal of ineffective officers was no panacea, however. For example, 
following the replacement of the B Corps commander in early 1949, the senior advisor 
reported, “really, from an operational standpoint, except for planning, there is less going 
on now than there was before the change in command, if that is possible. A lot is said of 
patrolling, but results do not show that it is aggressive or accomplishing a great deal.”105 
Unfortunately for the GNA and its leadership, they faced a spirited, resourceful, and 
cunning enemy in the DA forces. Fortunately, however, this motivation could only carry 
the communists so far as the odds were stacked against them from the outset and only 
became worse due to decisions made by their own leadership. 
F. DEMOCRATIC ARMY MISTAKES 
Successful insurgent movements often follow a recognizable pattern of military 
escalation. This escalation begins with small-scale attacks that bring support either 
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through their success or the disproportionate government response. Increased guerrilla 
strength results in the ability to attack larger groups of government forces. The final, 
decisive phase of guerrilla operations occurs when large battlefield formations of 
guerrilla soldiers are able to win conventionally against government forces. The decision 
to shift to this final phase is of the utmost importance and the most care must be taken to 
ensure the time is right for its implementation. If the shift is made too early, the risk to 
the revolutionary force is significant since it exposes itself for set-piece battles that could 
seriously deplete its forces and crush its morale.106 
Throughout 1946, the DA expanded its guerrilla operations to great effect. The 
GNA, while increasing steadily under British tutelage, remained ill equipped to react 
effectively to the increase in enemy activity. It responded with a mix of short-term 
clearing operations and static outposts. The latter were easily isolated and attacked while 
the former allowed the guerrilla forces to melt away until the GNA left the area then 
return and resume their activities.107 
The impending British withdrawal and American assumption of support to Greece 
in 1947 signaled a new chapter in the conflict. Despite the uncertainty this change 
brought, the Communists decided in September 1947 to shift to conventional 
confrontation with the GNA in a final effort to establish their goal of a communist 
Greece.108 Shortly thereafter, the KKE aligned itself publicly with the DA and 
championed a communist Greek breakaway state in the northern areas it controlled.109 
Neither the neighboring communist states nor the Soviet Union recognized these claims, 
however. The KKE’s decision to seek a decisive confrontation prematurely doomed them 
to failure. 
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The KKE also fell victim to internal squabbling among the communist nations to 
whom they looked for support. In June 1948, Stalin ejected Marshal Josip Tito’s 
Yugoslavia from the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) because Tito did not 
want to subjugate his country to Moscow.110 Within the KKE, Markos, the military 
commander, was pro-Yugoslavia, if only from the pragmatic standpoint that nearly all his 
materiel aid came from Yugoslavia. Zachariades, the KKE political leader, remained 
staunchly pro-Soviet. When Tito and Stalin parted ways, Zachariades used his influence 
to oust Markos and takeover the KKE.111 At the time, Markos was considering returning 
the DA to guerrilla warfare to reduce the number of casualties it was suffering. With his 
ouster at the end of 1948, the KKE’s military strategy remained unchanged. This factor, 
combined with the GNA’s ten-to-one advantage in manpower and its supporting arms 
capabilities that the DA did not have meant that the Communists’ fate was sealed. 
Moreover, Zachariades’s pro-Soviet stance alienated the only significant source of 
support, Marshal Tito, who parted ways with the Greek Communists and sealed the 
Yugoslavian border with Greece in July 1949.112 
The KKE’s decision to transition to conventional operations prematurely drained 
the communist forces at a rapid rate, especially in attacks on fortified GNA positions. The 
Communists also suffered from recruiting problems, and often forced into service Greek 
peasants. Serving against their will, these Greeks were often ineffective or would desert, 
thus requiring additional effort spent recruiting and training. From January 1948 to 
August 1949, DA casualties were 61,985, compared to GNA casualties of 34,200.113 
Considering that the GNA had approximately 265,000 personnel under arms, plus a 
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sizeable reserve, compared to the DA’s peak strength of 25,000, meant the DA could not 
sustain these losses.114 
Finally, the Communists were never able to gather large numbers of the Greek 
population to their cause. Any marriage of convenience or support the Communists 
enjoyed during The Second World War quickly evaporated in the postwar period. 
Additionally, the KKE promised certain contested parts of Greece to Yugoslavia, 
Albania, and Bulgaria in exchange for their support. Even the Greek peasants were proud 
of their nationality and did not support their country’s sale for the communist cause. The 
Greek government also benefitted from a Greek polity that, while politically divided 
among various parties, was relatively free of ethnic divisions. The peasants of the 
mountain areas were just as likely to be anti-communist as anti-nationalist government. 
Thus, the Communists found themselves hard pressed to find any true support among the 
population.115 
G. ACT III: THE FINAL PUSH 
The U.S. honeymoon over Papagos’s appointment was short lived. Despite his 
promise for aggressive action and the U.S. hope that he would quickly put the already 
sizeable and well-equipped GNA to good use, one of Papagos’s first actions was to issue 
a political curveball to Ambassador Grady, albeit one perfectly familiar from prior 
American experience in Greece. At a Greek War Minister meeting on 5 February 1949 
billed as “announcements by the Commander-in-Chief,” General Papagos used the forum 
to present a dire picture of the fight against the Communists and insist on a GNA increase 
of over 100,000 troops to a grand total of 250,000.116 Papagos also threatened to resign if 
his request was not met. Grady and Van Fleet had already clashed over the issue of 
providing even greater support to the Greeks, with Van Fleet presiding over a volte-face 
from his previous stance on the needs of the Greek Army. 
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As 1948 waned, JUSMAPG drafted the Fiscal Year 1950 proposal for the 
estimated needs of the Greek armed forces. It called for between $450 and $541 million 
dollars compared to a Fiscal Year 1949 budget of $150 million.117 Despite the optimistic 
reports that JUSMAPG submitted throughout 1948, its budget submission implied that 
victory was not forthcoming. Grady criticized JUSMAPG’s proposal, stating “the key to 
success according to JUSMAPG [whenever the GNA experienced a setback] is always 
more: more men, more money and more equipment. In this the thinking of JUSMAPG is 
in line with that of Greek political leaders.”118 He noted that the United States already 
supported “an armed forces organization of 263,000 men” supported by “heavy artillery, 
an air force and navy” that faced a “bandit organization of some 25,000 men fed with 
what they could steal or buy locally” and “not backed by a single airplane, heavy gun or 
naval vessel.”119 He surmised that since previous army increases had failed to result in 
any appreciable success against the DA, further increases were not the solution. The State 
Department and JCS largely concurred with Grady and supported only a modest increase 
to $200 million, less than half of JUSMAPG’s lowest figure.120 
JUSMAPG’s proposal was a marked departure for Van Fleet, who consistently 
pressed the Greeks to improve leadership, training, and aggressive combat action versus 
requesting further increases in the size of the armed forces. Perhaps Van Fleet had a 
moment of empathy for the Greek position on the armed forces to which he was 
constantly subjected since his assumption of command. If so, it again calls into question 
to whom he was providing his best military advice. While it is common for military 
leaders to provide a worst-case estimate of a military’s needs, a recommended tripling of 
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the previous year’s budget can only be regarded as exceptional. Whatever the cause for 
Van Fleet’s deviation, he did not insist on his proposal and accepted the outcome.121 
By early 1949, JUSMAPG had in place virtually everything one might have 
hoped for in an advisory effort. The GNA had overwhelming force structure and 
technological advantages over its adversary. Van Fleet had established training plans and 
schools to improve the overall quality of the GNA. Advisors were present in the field and 
assisted in the development of operational plans. The assignment of General Papagos to 
the post of commander in chief had solved the problem of excessive political meddling in 
military matters. The parliamentary procedures insisted upon by U.S. and British 
diplomatic representatives resulted in elections that reflected the will of the Greek 
citizenry and improved public morale and the government’s legitimacy.122 Finally, U.S. 
economic assistance efforts were slowly improving life for the average Greek citizen. 
U.S. civilian and military efforts had addressed nearly all the friendly impediments to the 
war’s successful prosecution. Additionally, the GNA faced an enemy that lacked 
significant external support and had chosen to abandon its guerrilla campaign and focus 
on pitched battles against a numerically and technologically superior enemy. It seemed 
reasonable that even a modest effort by GNA field commanders to execute the plans 
Americans helped draft would spell the end of the communist insurgency in 1949. 
Nevertheless, the year 1949, began with disappointing failures by the GNA and 
NDC in defense of villages subject to DA attacks. Specifically, guerrillas occupied 
Naoussa for three days, killed the mayor and other government officials, destroyed 
businesses and infrastructure, and forcibly recruited members of the town.123 The 
situation in Karpenision was even more disheartening because the GNA failed to 
adequately prepare for the attack despite forewarning.124 The DA occupied the town for 
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over two weeks, likewise recruited every military age male, destroyed much of the town, 
and looted supplies to support further operations.125 These two attacks and occupations 
occurred in central Greece, an area reported cleared the summer prior. Both were 
characterized by slow, piecemeal, and ineffective GNA responses. 
These setbacks were mitigated only by the GNA’s spirited defense of Florina in 
northern Greece. Disputed from 12–14 February 1949, this action saw the GNA 
adequately prepare for and hold the town against a force of approximately 4,000 
guerrillas.126 The GNA beat back the Communists, who retreated after suffering heavy 
casualties, approximately 1,122 killed and captured with perhaps as many as 800 
wounded against only 309 friendly casualties.127 Additionally, the Royal Hellenic Air 
Force provided critical close air support during the battle and interdiction as the DA 
forces retreated to the safety of Vitsi. While the GNA soldiers successfully fought for 
their lives against considerable odds, the after-action report illustrated the continuing 
problems that plagued GNA units. It stated, 
Beyond the defensive phase, into the phase where the GNA had a superb 
opportunity to pursue aggressively and completely eliminate the bandits of 
Vitsi, the GNA presented all the previous falts [sic] of vacillation, lack of 
aggressiveness, indecisiveness, willingness to let the initiative evaporate 
through time, reluctance of subordinate commanders actively to abide by 
and to pursue the superior commander’s decision, reluctance of the 
superior commander to force his will upon his subordinates and untimely 
and exaggerated sympathy of all echelons to the rigors of nature and 
warfare endured by the soldier.128 
Since one of the main principles in an insurgency is that the insurgent wins by not losing, 
the Greek failure to pursue and harass the defeated enemy was a lost opportunity that 
underscored the serious weaknesses that the advisory effort still had been unable to 
correct. 
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Fortunately for the GNA, Zachariades’s emphasis on conventional operations, 
Markos’s relief, and a reduction in external support made the communist situation that 
much more untenable. To its credit, the GNA also began a systematic clearing of 
communist pockets in southern and central Greece with the intent of pushing all enemy 
forces into one location in the north where they could finally be destroyed. For the first 
quarter of 1949, the GNA was winning the war of attrition as DA casualties reached 
12,240 compared to the GNA’s 4,086.129 Although the DA had been capable of replacing 
casualties throughout 1948, continuing casualties and desertions and the slowly shrinking 
area it controlled were beginning to affect its ability to maintain its strength. From a 
height of 26,000 in 1948, the DA had declined to 19,450 and was trending downward.130 
The Royal Hellenic Air Force also had been playing an increasing role in combat 
operations. Having begun as a fledgling force of a few leftover Spitfires, it had added 
transport planes and Navy Helldivers before the final offensives of summer 1949. These 
platforms allowed the RHAF to air resupply remote units and conduct close air support, 
medical evacuation, interdiction, and observation. In contrast, the DA had none of these 
capabilities, which put it at an even greater disadvantage.131 Additionally, the GNA had 
added howitzers, which were particularly useful in the mountain terrain, and 75 mm 
recoilless rifles, although the proper use of these weapons too often were disregarded by 
the Greeks, who preferred to use them however they saw fit, regardless of their 
effectiveness or the recommendations from their advisors.132 
Beginning in May 1949, the GNA launched the first of two operations to rid 
Greece finally of the communist menace. The first operation, codenamed Rocket, set 
about to re-clear central Greece of communists, thus leaving only the Grammos and Vitsi 
areas with significant numbers of communist forces. Launched on 2 May 1949, this 
operation resulted in 5,448 guerrillas killed, captured, or surrendered and the 
                                                 
129 Van Fleet, “Quarterly Report, 31 Mar 1949,” 7. 
130 JUSMAPG, “Brief History,” 26. 
131 Van Fleet, “Quarterly Report, 30 June 1949,” 8. 
132 Jesse L. Gibney, “Monthly Report as of 2400 Hrs 31 Jul 49, Headquarters JUSMAPG Det, ‘B’ 
Corps, Kozani Greece,” August 1, 1949, Entry 146, Box 55, JUSMAGG, USASG, AGS, CFU, General 
Decimal File 1949, 311–319.1, RG 334, NACP; Braim, Will to Win, 209–210. 
 66
neutralization of the guerrilla threat in central Greece.133 The only real weaknesses 
highlighted during the operation were corps level operational management, which the 
GNA rectified by reorganizing while undergoing operations, and an ongoing failure to 
completely surround guerrilla forces.134 The former mistake might have been foreseeable, 
but the latter mistake occurred “despite constant warnings by JUSMAPG advisors,” 
highlighted the advisors’ limitations, and resulted in some guerrillas escaping to 
Albania.135 Despite these setbacks, Operation Rocket set the conditions the GNA 
required for what turned out to be the final major operation of the war, Operation Torch. 
The GNA, with JUSMAPG planning and advisory support, prepared Operation 
Torch to clear the guerrilla strongholds of Grammos and Vitsi in northern Greece that it 
failed to eradicate in 1948. The GNA arrayed four divisions numbering approximately 
50,000 troops possessing close air support and two mountain artillery batteries against 
approximately 7,750 communist troops.136 The DA forces, according to the official 
history, were “composed of a great percentage of women and abductees,” and their 
fighting ability “was estimated to be poor.”137 Despite the element of surprise the GNA 
held and the uncharacteristically effective movement of forces, as much as 60 percent of 
the guerrillas escaped the envelopment and retreated into the neighboring communist 
countries.138 The official history held that “the operations of the GNA Infantry Divisions 
during the Vitsi campaign were on the whole below the standards expected of infantry 
troops. . .too much dependence on air and artillery was displayed by infantry.”139 
General Papagos, for his part, recognized that his army still needed much 
improvement in the same areas that Livesay and Griswold identified in 1947.140 
Fortunately, the communists had been decisively broken and scattered among the 
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neighboring communist countries, which were quick to publicly distance themselves 
from the Greek Communist movement.141 Absent any significant source of support from 
their communist allies in the region and suffering from forced recruitment to replace 
losses, DA morale had plummeted in the summer of 1949.142 These facts, combined with 
the loss of most of their war making materiel, resulted in a significant drop in communist 
activity in Greece.143 The war was essentially over. 
In the months following Torch, fear of a renewed communist guerrilla campaign 
subsided to the point where Ambassador Grady and JUSMAPG recommended a steady 
GNA demobilization to a more appropriate size for the remaining threat and a 
corresponding reduction in aid. The United States remained dedicated to intervention in 
Greece, however, with Van Fleet extolling its position in the eastern Mediterranean as 
“the keystone of the defense line from Western Europe to [the] Middle East.”144 This 
mindset took hold in Washington, and the United States found itself in a long-term 
commitment with Greece. During his last months there, Van Fleet toured the many 
battlefields and received praise for his contribution to the Greek victory.145 Although the 
victory did not come as quickly as many would have liked, the impression seemed to be 
that adequate resources combined with the right U.S. personnel could assist other nations 
threatened by communism to achieve outcomes similar to those in Greece. 
H. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. advisory mission in Greece was meant to be a visible display of U.S. 
resolve without the expense and escalation risk that U.S. ground forces would have 
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entailed. From its inception, the advisory effort was attractive because it conveyed a U.S. 
commitment to Greece that was unbounded in principle by virtue of being rooted in a 
policy of global anti-communism, but circumscribed in practice. Even so, the U.S. 
investment required to defeat the communists in Greece far exceeded that of the 
communist nations to keep the resistance alive.146 Without the large U.S. military 
assistance effort, the GNA would certainly have been less effective against the DA in all 
of its encounters. Lacking airpower and heavy artillery, and even accounting for the 
Communists’ decision to conduct a more conventional campaign, the GNA would have 
suffered more casualties to achieve the same results. The Greek economy was incapable 
of maintaining an army of the GNA’s size without U.S. assistance. Thus, the GNA would 
have fought the DA at much closer odds, which may not have been sufficient for outright 
victory. Furthermore, U.S. economic assistance helped improve the lives of average 
Greek peasants, thus improving overall loyalty to the elected government. 
What, however, can the advisory effort claim specifically to have accomplished? 
If a successful advisor is able to bend others’ will to his way of doing business, then the 
advisory mission to Greece had a mixed record. U.S. advisors were in Greece to instill 
aggressiveness and improve training and execution in the Greek Army. Yet, at war’s end, 
the JUSMAPG advisors concluded they had failed to significantly alter their 
counterparts’ actions based on their advice. The advisors should have been motivated to 
show GNA improvement as a reflection of their own performance in reports. The inverse 
actually happened. 
Greece offered favorable conditions for advisors. The Greek government was 
relatively stable, the language barrier was easily overcome, the opposing force made 
costly errors, and financial aid was readily available. To their credit, the Greeks requested 
and accepted the advisors at all levels, but whether commanders accepted their advice 
was more sporadic in practice. On a grand scale, the GNA relied heavily on operational 
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plans drafted jointly by JUSMAPG and GNA planners. Further down the echelons, 
however, advisors were stymied by lack of initiative and failure to carry out even the 
most obvious of necessary tactical operations such as simple patrolling, blocking 
maneuvers, or interdiction operations. Moreover, the Greeks were rewarded for failure 
with increased operational capability. By the end of the war, the U.S. supported Greek 
armed forces numbered 263,000, almost 4 percent of the population.147 This bloat was 
paid for with American dollars, to which must be added the additional cost arising from 
the fact that these men could not participate in the livelihood of their families or the 
economy of the country for two years. In the final analysis, it is obvious that American 
aid created forms of dependency that American advisors could not overcome. 
Secretary Marshall ostensibly replaced Livesay with Van Fleet because Livesay 
lacked forcefulness when dealing with the GNA. The lackluster effort in Grammos in 
1948, the subsequent stalemate in Vitsi, and the failed defenses of Naoussa and 
Karpenision nevertheless belied Van Fleet’s reports of improved GNA performance. 
Finally, the corps level advisory reports at the end of the war also contradicted much of 
the positive impact of the advisors’ presence on the tactical and operational decision-
making or execution of their counterparts. Ultimately, GNA numbers, equipment, 
training, and slightly improved battlefield performance proved sufficient to defeat the 
Communists and their panoply of errors. But even so, and despite the accolades that Van 
Fleet and his subordinates showered on any hint of assertive battlefield leadership, it 
appears the GNA fell far short of what its advisors might reasonably have expected and 
surely hoped for. 
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III. U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS IN KOREA: BACKING INTO 
CONTAINING COMMUNISM 
With Japan’s defeat in August 1945, Koreans rejoiced because that meant the 
departure of the despised Japanese who had occupied and colonized their land for forty 
years. This departure did not mean an end to Korean occupation, however, as Soviet and 
American forces replaced the Japanese, each with its own vision for Korea’s future. 
Although negotiations began toward a unified Korea, Moscow immediately began 
promoting Marxist Socialism north of the 38th parallel—the mutually agreed dividing 
line for Korea—while Washington governed the South under the United States Army 
Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK).1 Beginning in January 1946, an ad hoc U.S. 
advisory effort assisted in the formation of the Korean Constabulary that became the 
Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) in 1948, defeated a Communist insurgency in the 
South in 1949, and then found itself severely outmatched by the Soviet-armed North 
Korea People’s Army (NKPA) in 1950.2 
The ROKA’s near disintegration following the NKPA’s 25 June 1950 invasion 
gave the impression that it lacked the will to fight and that the advisors failed in their 
mission to build a competent partner nation force. The reality is more complex. From 
1945 to 1950, Washington’s ambivalent foreign policy toward Korea—caught between 
the competing desires to avoid provocation, sustain deterrence, promote national unity, 
and contain communism—resulted in a minimally resourced advisory effort in terms of 
human and materiel resources. Although these advisors assisted the ROKA to defeat a 
small communist-inspired insurgency, they were unable to overcome the vast materiel 
superiority of the North simply with advice and training. The conventional war that 
followed in 1950—while perhaps inevitable—ultimately required a greater U.S. 
investment in lives lost and financial expenditure than if Washington had resourced the 
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ROKA from inception to defend against a Northern invasion. Since the threat of invasion 
became increasingly apparent up until the North actually attacked, Washington’s 
dismissive attitude toward the ROKA appears even more imprudent. When the United 
States finally committed to a powerful ROKA, it proved capable of facing the best the 
Chinese and North Koreans could throw at it. The ROKA’s stalwart performance in July 
1953 directly preceded the armistice ending the war. Throughout the period 1945–1953, 
U.S. advisors provided important administrative and operational advice to their Korean 
counterparts, yet it was the South Koreans’ inherent will to fight that ultimately led to the 
ROKA’s success.3 
A. FROM JAPANESE OCCUPATION TO COLD WAR DIVISION 
As the war in the Pacific wound down, Korea was a low priority in U.S. strategic 
planning.4 The Allies had already addressed the larger postwar questions concerning 
Korea at the 1943 Cairo Conference, stating that “at the proper moment after the 
downfall of Japan, [Korea] shall become a free and independent country.”5 For the 
Koreans, this declaration meant independence would come immediately following 
Korea’s liberation. For the United States and Soviet Union, however, the details remained 
undecided. When the Soviets unleashed their offensive against the Japanese in Manchuria 
and Korea on 8 August 1945 as promised at Yalta, the United States was unprepared to 
address Korean occupation.6 Fear that the Soviets would seize all of Korea led the United 
States to propose the 38th parallel as a boundary separating a northern Soviet zone from a 
southern U.S. zone of occupation to facilitate the Japanese surrender and withdrawal 
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from Korea.7 The U.S. Army hurriedly moved three divisions from Okinawa to Korea 
and established a military government, USAMGIK, under Lieutenant General John R. 
Hodge who arrived at the port of Inchon on 8 September 1945. 
General Hodge was a proven combat commander during The Second World War, 
but he was unprepared for the complex political environment of post-liberation Korea.8 
Arriving in Korea one month behind the Soviets, Hodge began executing his orders based 
on the little guidance he had received. Historian Allen Millett writes that Hodge was to 
“disarm the Japanese, enforce the anticipated surrender terms, keep order, and await 
instructions on how to pass power to the Koreans.”9 A self-organized prospective Korean 
government in the U.S. zone, the People’s Republic of Korea, presented itself to Hodge 
upon his arrival with the hope that he would accept it as the legitimate government. To its 
members’ dismay, Hodge dismissed them since his mandate made his organization the 
sole executor of Korea’s sovereignty. Since Koreans had not governed themselves in 
forty years, Hodge initially maintained Japanese administrators in their positions to allow 
time to train Korean replacements.10 While pragmatic, this action was an affront to the 
Koreans and added to the postwar animosity toward the new American occupiers, whom 
the Koreans increasingly viewed as simply having replaced the Japanese. 
While Hodge’s troops worked to maintain law and order in a country whose 
language they did not speak and whose culture they did not understand—nor particularly 
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respect—joint U.S. and Soviet negotiations followed to determine Korea’s future.11 At 
the Moscow Conference in December 1945, the United States and Soviet Union agreed to 
a joint trusteeship of Korea lasting up to five years whose goal was to form a “provisional 
Korean democratic government . . . for developing the industry, transport and agriculture 
of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people.”12 The agreement depended on 
both the Soviets and Americans approving the composition of the provisional 
government, which was unlikely since neither would agree to the other’s preferred form 
of government. In the North, the Soviets supported Kim Il Sung and a totalitarian Marxist 
agenda characterized by forced land reform, immediate expulsion of the Japanese, and a 
crackdown on any dissidents to Communist rule.13 The Americans in the South slowly 
transitioned the functions of government to Koreans but showed little sign of preparing to 
turn over sovereignty to an elected or appointed Korean government until they could 
reach an agreement with Moscow. For the southern Koreans who had expected 
independence immediately following the Japanese surrender, the thought of five more 
years of foreign occupation was unpopular and resulted in angry anti-American 
demonstrations. General Hodge tried to assuage the Koreans, but this issue would 
dominate the remainder of his time in Korea. As 1945 ended, the Allies had liberated 
Korea only to occupy it and cut it in half. The Soviet masters in the North had a vision 
and were executing it. American policy in the South remained ad hoc and extemporized, 
aiming mainly at administrative efficiency. 
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B. BELLIGERENTS 
Conveniently divided by the 38th parallel, the two initial parties to the conflict 
were the North Korean Communists and the South Korean Nationalists. Both groups had 
emerged during the Japanese occupation, returned following the war, and established 
themselves in their respective zones. Coming to the rescue of their Korean Communist 
counterparts in November 1950 were the Chinese Communists fresh from their victory 
over Chiang Kai Shek’s Chinese Nationalists. 
1. North Korean Communists 
The North Korean Communists came to power due to the direct intervention of 
the occupying Soviet forces. Although the Japanese had mostly dismantled the Korean 
communist movement during their occupation, the Soviets nurtured its reemergence 
following the Second World War and supported Kim Il Sung’s rise to power. Kim’s 
personal history is obscured by aggrandized state-directed biographical accounts of his 
heroism, wartime leadership, and devotion to country fabricated to justify his position as 
supreme ruler over the North Korean people.14 Kim’s actual story is that he spent much 
of his life in Manchuria and Russia, fought the Japanese before and during the Second 
World War, and ended the war as a captain in the Soviet Army.15 The Soviets supported 
Kim’s emerging totalitarian regime with advice and materiel that far outweighed what the 
United States provided to the South. As Allan Millett writes, the Soviets sent “as many as 
eight hundred advisers and administrative personnel” and supplied the NKPA with 
weapons to replace those seized from the Japanese.16 As James Minnich writes, the 
NKPA “adopted much of the Soviets’ military doctrine and tactics, incorporating 
combined arms operations and depending upon conventional lines of communication for 
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resupply.”17 NKPA leaders attended Soviet military schools in Siberia to learn Soviet 
armored doctrine.18 Additionally, North Korea sent 30,000 to 40,000 troops to aid the 
Chinese Communists in their war against the Nationalists. These troops began returning 
in 1949 and provided the NKPA with the veteran army it needed for success over their 
countrymen in the South.19 The Koreans who served in China gained experience and 
strengthened the ties with Mao’s new regime, which would play a critical role in the 
Korean War.20 
2. South Korean Nationalists 
Unlike the Soviet occupation, American forces quashed attempts at Korean self-
governance until the appropriate parties could settle the Korea question. The South faced 
a more diverse group of potential leaders across the political spectrum, but Syngman 
Rhee emerged as the dominant figure during the period of U.S. military rule. In contrast 
to the thirty-three year old Kim, Rhee was in his seventies and had spent much of his life 
in the United States. Politically, he was an autocratic nationalist who was often compared 
to Chiang Kai Shek, a figure of similarly autocratic bent whose personal corruption did 
not disqualify him as an American client. Rhee also was a constant irritant for U.S. 
leaders at all levels.21 Throughout the U.S. trusteeship, he campaigned against the U.S. 
occupation of Korea and never hesitated to profit politically from USAMGIK’s 
unpopularity.22 When the United States began withdrawing troops from Korea in 1948, 
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however, Rhee’s attitude shifted toward insisting that the forces remain in Korea to 
support his weak regime.23 
3. Chinese Communists 
China’s relationship with the United States evolved alongside that of Korea’s and 
ultimately ended in a costly war for both sides. Under such notable generals as Joseph 
Stilwell, Albert Wedemeyer, and George Marshall, the United States provided advice and 
$1 billion in military aid to Nationalist China to maintain anti-communist Chiang Kai 
Shek’s government in power.24 The result was a case study in frustration for U.S. 
advisors as Chiang’s intransigence, poor decision making, and rampant government 
corruption negated any positive impact the advisors might have hoped for. Despite U.S. 
efforts to appear neutral and negotiate a mutual power-sharing agreement, these efforts 
failed, and the United States appeared instead to be the benefactors of the corrupt, 
unpopular, losing side. The subsequent establishment of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) ultimately was a greater blow to the Truman administration and U.S. Far East 
policy than some estimates had presumed. In addition to the wasted investment in 
Chiang’s lost cause, aid to the Nationalists alienated Mao’s government to the point that 
the United States would be fighting it directly only a year after the PRC’s founding. 
Domestically, the perception that the United States had lost China to communism 
plagued future administrations and called into question the effectiveness of military aid 
alone as a tool of containment. 
C. BATTLEGROUND 
The Korean peninsula occupies an unfortunate crossroads of the great power 
struggles between China, Japan, and Russia with the United States inheriting Japan’s role 
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in 1945. Korea’s terrain is rugged and mountainous, particularly in the North, which led 
the Japanese to concentrate industrial and hydroelectric productivity there while 
agriculture dominated in the South. The ostensibly temporary split at the 38th parallel, 
described by Edgar Kennedy “as one of the worst ever devised . . . often divid[ing] 
dwelling houses from their wells and their outdoor privies, and rice paddies from their 
source of irrigation,” hobbled the postwar Korean economic recovery by separating 
Korea’s interdependent halves.25 
From west to east, the defensive planning for the South was challenging.26 On the 
far western edge was the isolated Ongjin Peninsula that was nearly impossible to defend 
against a coordinated attack. Continuing east, the peninsula consisted of multiple natural 
north-south invasion corridors suitable for mechanized units with high ground on either 
side that favored an adequately armed defense.27 The capital, Seoul, sits on the northern 
bank of the wide Han River and only about 30 kilometers south of the parallel, making its 
defense operationally precarious as defending units would find themselves backed up to 
the river. Since Korea is a relatively narrow peninsula—averaging 150 miles across—it is 
susceptible to the effects of naval power, which both sides exploited at various times 
during the eventual war.28 
The Korean population was ethnically homogeneous, but there were divisions 
between peoples of the far north and the rest of the country.29 As Charles Armstrong 
writes, northern Koreans had been left out of the political process throughout much of 
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Korea’s history.30 This factor, combined with the North’s geographical proximity to 
Chinese Communists, gave rise to a sense of independence and self-reliance among this 
population and explains why the Japanese found this area the most difficult to control 
during its occupation.31 Out of a total population of 30 million, two-thirds lived in South 
Korea, thus giving it an advantage in a prolonged conflict.32 
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Figure 4.  Map of Korea 
 
Source: Billy C. Mossman, Ebb and Flow: November 1950–July 1951, United States 
Army in the Korean War (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1990), 6. 
D. CREATING A KOREAN SECURITY APPARATUS 
Since the Koreans had not been responsible for policing themselves during the 
Japanese occupation, U.S. leaders identified a national police force as the first critical 
security need for the U.S. zone. Thus, the Korean National Police (KNP) was created in 
advance of the ROKA. USAMGIK was responsible for recruiting, organizing, and 
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training these initial peace officers, but the effort received only a handful of advisors. 
Washington had little interest in bankrolling a Korean security apparatus. When General 
Douglas MacArthur requested permission to transfer surplus armaments and equipment 
to the 25,000 man KNP, the War Department approved the request only if the Koreans 
returned them after use, purchased them, or transferred them in some way once the issue 
of Korean unification was settled.33 While the United States was readily assisting other 
countries to rebuild and rearm to resist communism, this treatment of the Koreans stood 
in stark contrast. Despite his support in securing the armament for the Koreans, 
MacArthur quickly soured on Korea, however. In a December 1945 memo to the JCS, he 
recommended mutually withdrawing forces with the Russians and leaving Korea “to its 
own devices and an inevitable internal upheaval for its self-purification.”34 
Even though some in Washington suspected as early as October 1945 that the 
38th parallel was likely to become a permanent line of separation, American leaders 
hoped that a unified Korea and a national army could be established.35 A separate army 
for the South would only further divide the Koreans, but three factors contributed to the 
need for the immediate establishment of an additional security force in the U.S. zone. 
First, civil unrest was increasing due to the deteriorating economic and uncertain political 
situation. Second, General Hodge’s combat forces were ill-suited for maintaining the 
peace in a foreign land that could not be treated as if it were a defeated enemy. Third, 
intelligence indicated that the Soviets had already begun establishing armed forces in 
their zone.36 
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Acting on his own initiative, General Hodge directed the establishment of the 
Office of the Director of National Defense on 13 November 1945. Its mission was 
threefold: 
1. Provide an organized and reserve force capable of maintaining the internal 
security of Korea 
2. Provide an organized force capable of patrolling Korean coastal waters 
3. Provide adequate means at the disposal of the Head of the Korean 
Government to assist the existing Bureau of Police in Maintenance of 
Law, Order and internal security.37  
Hodge’s staff determined that the South needed a 45,000-man army to maintain its 
security. The idea of distinct military services for the U.S. zone met with resistance in 
Washington, however, and the War Department only approved a 25,000-man force. 
Furthermore, the Koreans received neither U.S. military aid nor surplus equipment for 
this new organization. This limitation would have drastic consequences on the speed at 
which the ROKA would come to exist and the measures its members took to provide for 
their families on the meager salary the Korean economy could provide. Political 
sensitivity toward the Soviets also prevented naming this organization a defense force; 
USAMGIK instead designated it the Korean Constabulary.38 
USAMGIK planned to recruit and train nine regiments, one for each of the 
South’s eight provinces and Cheju Do, a large island off Korea’s southwest coast. The 
first class of recruits made up the crucial initial leadership of what would become the 
ROKA. The Americans charged with the screening process naturally gravitated toward 
Koreans who had already served with other militaries during the Second World War. 
Seventy-eight members of the first class become generals, and thirteen became the 
ROKA Chief of Staff.39 Subsequent classes saw the standards of recruitment decrease, 
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however, resulting in the selection of greater numbers of communist sympathizers who 
would create problems for the constabulary going forward.40 
Perhaps the most important figure throughout the advisory effort in Korea was 
Captain James Hausman, who arrived in Korea in July 1946. A veteran of the Second 
World War, Hausman had experience forming the Women’s Army Corps before leaving 
for the European Theater in 1944, where he was wounded in the Battle of the Bulge.41 
Originally assigned to advise the South Korean 8th Regiment, he demonstrated the ability 
to organize and advise his unit effectively and was moved to constabulary headquarters 
where his acumen would have an even greater impact.42 Considering the dearth of 
personnel the United States assigned to the advisory effort, Hausman’s arrival was 
particularly fortuitous. 
Support to the advisory effort began inauspiciously. USAMGIK assigned 18 
lieutenants in January 1946 to the constabulary training mission, but by September, this 
number had dropped precipitously.43 Hausman recounts that there was an average of six 
advisors from September 1946 to April 1948, which was hardly enough to oversee 
training for even one regiment apiece.44 Advisors had to shuttle between regiments, 
sometimes driving hundreds of kilometers, limiting their effectiveness. With this 
limitation, Korean officers with prior military service stepped into the void and proved to 
be effective trainers, albeit while often training to Japanese tactics such as banzai 
charges.45 With the lack of attention the United States paid to the efforts to build a 
bulwark against the increasingly communist North, at least these homegrown methods 
provided a martial spirit to the nascent ROKA. 
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Hausman and the other advisors grappled with many challenges throughout their 
time working with the Koreans. The first was the language barrier. Few Americans who 
served in Korea during the advisory period ever learned the language but relied instead 
on Korean interpreters. Although interpreters were generally available to fill this void 
before June 1950, afterward they were in short supply since the requirement increased 
exponentially with the arrival of thousands of UN troops. More importantly, however, the 
Korean language lacked military and industrial-age terminology. This shortcoming meant 
that advisors could not make themselves understood when explaining military concepts 
like “squad,” “phase line,” or “movement by bounds.”46 Even words like “machine gun” 
and “headlight” would be translated as “gun that shoots very fast” and “the rice bowl 
with a candle on a truck.”47 A different interpreter might invent a different phrase for the 
same thing. It was not until 1950 that a group of Korean military officers and translators 
completed a Korean dictionary of U.S. military terms. Most, if not all, copies of this 
dictionary were lost during the NKPA invasion.48 
Korean culture proved even more difficult to overcome. Despite Korean 
animosity toward the Japanese, Korean military leaders nevertheless adopted their harsh 
treatment toward subordinates and civilians. U.S. advisors recommended less brutal 
methods, but this behavior continued throughout the advisory mission and resulted in at 
least one mutiny.49 The advisors also had to deal with the delicate aspect of “face” in 
Korean culture.50 The ignorant or uncaring American might evoke an unwanted negative 
response from a counterpart or Korean civilians because of a failure to understand or 
respect public honor. Relationships thus violated were virtually impossible to repair. The 
quality of individuals assigned to Korea duty likely exacerbated this problem. General 
Hodge struggled with his soldiers’ conduct throughout his three-year tour as seen in a 3 
June 1946 missive admonishing certain members of his command who contributed 
                                                 
46 Sawyer and Hermes, KMAG in Peace and War, 63. 
47 Ibid.; Eighth U.S. Army Korea, Special Problems in the Korean Conflict (Carlisle Barracks, PA: 
Office of the Chief of Military History, September 24, 1952), 23. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Millett, War for Korea, 1945–1950, 79. 
50 Sawyer and Hermes, KMAG in Peace and War, 65-66. 
 85
negatively to the already unpopular occupation.51 Unfortunately, duty in Korea was 
considered unpopular at best and punishment at worst. 
The advisors also faced the miniscule funding the constabulary received. Since 
the weak Korean economy provided the constabulary’s entire budget, food and wages 
were insufficient to support its members. As a result, pilferage, personal business use of 
military equipment, and black marketeering were important sources of income for the 
soldiers and a serious concern for the Americans. This behavior—a feature of many 
postwar occupations before and since—became embedded in the fabric of daily life and 
created a rift with the Americans, who naturally began to look down on the men they 
were to train, advise, and work alongside. Unfortunately, to maintain a reasonable 
working relationship and a force that did not splinter because of a lack of ability to 
support itself, advisors did not have much choice but to tolerate these activities. 
Growth of the constabulary was anemic. By the end of 1946, it numbered only 
5,000 personnel, yet it was employed immediately.52 The division of Korea continued to 
fall harder on the South as the North had a more balanced economy.53 In August 1946 
General Hodge directed the KNP to collect rice from farmers to prevent a shortage and 
widespread hunger. This act angered the farmers, since it reminded them of Japanese 
behavior, and resulted in the Autumn Harvest Uprising of September and October 1946 
that was in protest against the U.S. actions and occupation. In response to these events, 
USAMGIK relied on a patchwork of KNP, constabulary, and U.S. forces that proved 
inadequate for the task. Korean security forces suffered as many as 300 casualties while 
killing or wounding over 600 demonstrators and arresting over 5,000.54 Further uprisings 
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in November were less severe but continued to reflect the need for a rapid resolution of 
what was becoming de facto partition. The negative blowback from these events fell on 
USAMGIK, which was unable to address effectively the Korean anger. South Korean 
political factions used these events to benefit from USAMGIK’s unpopularity and to 
maneuver for the eventual power struggle sure to occur once the trusteeship ended. These 
events also gave the first indications of Soviet-inspired subversive activities in the 
South.55 
Although resolute U.S. action toward communist subversion in Greece and 
Turkey dominated the headlines in the spring of 1947, Korea remained a subject of 
foreign policy apathy for U.S. military and diplomatic leaders. Syngman Rhee continued 
to lobby for Korean independence, national elections, and the simultaneous departure of 
Soviet and U.S. forces.56 Meanwhile, the Special Inter-Departmental Committee on 
Korea recommended a similar show of resolve toward Korea as that being considered for 
Greece, something in the realm of $600 million in aid over three years. Without it the 
committee opined “that the Korean situation will so deteriorate as to seriously impair the 
U.S. world position.”57 In February 1947 General Hodge and Syngman Rhee separately 
lobbied for increased support to Korea on Capitol Hill, but nothing significant came of 
these efforts. Having failed to reach an agreement with the Soviets on a unified Korea, 
the United States pushed the matter to the United Nations General Assembly in 
September 1947, calling for Soviet and U.S. forces to withdraw and the Koreans to 
decide their political future through elections in their respective zones in 1948.58 
In September 1947 the Joint Chiefs of Staff were split on their feelings toward 
Korea. In a memo to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal relayed 
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the JCS position that the “United States has little strategic interest in maintaining the 
present troops and bases in Korea” since the troops were geographically isolated and 
ostensibly easier for an enemy to attack than for the United States to reinforce.59 
Furthermore, they noted the great expense necessary to maintain the occupation force for 
“little, if any, lasting benefit to the security of the United States.”60 This position was all 
the more ironic since the money spent maintaining troops there would have gone much 
farther if applied toward the constabulary instead. 
In March 1948 the Central Intelligence Agency stressed Korea’s importance, 
stating that its loss to the Soviet sphere would “have a seriously adverse political and 
psychological impact throughout the already unstable Far East” and “furnish an important 
Soviet position threatening both Japan and the North China coast.”61 In April 1948 the 
National Security Council laid out its position on Korea in NSC 8 based on the principles 
of independence and self-determination while promising U.S. economic assistance 
toward Korean economic stability.62 It assessed that the NKPA numbered 125,000 
personnel and that the South Korean security establishment was incapable of defending 
itself against this force.63 Despite this realization, the NSC recommended completely 
withdrawing U.S. forces from Korea and leaving only an advisory mission capable of 
preparing the South Koreans to protect “the security of South Korea against any but an 
overt act of aggression by North Korean or other forces.”64 The problem with this 
statement is that it did not address the U.S. reaction if North Korea did invade. Since 
Washington did not know the answer to this question, neither did the advisors who would 
be the only U.S. military personnel in Korea fourteen months later. 
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In accordance with UN oversight of the Korean problem, South Korea held 
elections on 10 May 1948 to determine the Korean National Assembly. It subsequently 
elected Syngman Rhee as the first president of the Republic of Korea, and he took the 
oath of office on 24 July 1948. Meanwhile, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK) declared itself established on 9 September 1948 with Kim Il Sung as its premier. 
By this point, the difference in the support given to each side by their respective 
benefactors was stark. In the North, the Soviets had established a strong, pro-Soviet 
totalitarian dictator; recruited, trained, and equipped an effective army capable of 
offensive operations; and left behind an advisory group of 550 personnel.65 Meanwhile, 
the Americans had lost their way in the labyrinth of post-colonial South Korean politics 
and had become preoccupied with the problems of internal security and policing at the 
expense of arrangements to ward off external aggression against a country whose very 
existence the U.S. viewed with ambivalence. U.S. leaders recognized early that delaying 
a decision on Korean unification was putting the U.S. zone at a disadvantage and that the 
Soviets had been establishing and arming a satellite state from the very beginning. 
Despite this realization, the United States, fearful that an overt military buildup in the 
South would provoke a conflict, rather than deter one, did little besides try to maintain 
order and provide economic aid in the South. Meanwhile, one of the critical requirements 
for exit—an effective South Korean military—was left to a grossly inadequate advisory 
effort for three years. 
1. Communist Insurgency 
By early 1948 Washington finally had supported an increase in the constabulary 
to 50,000, but that number still fell short of what was required for Korea’s defense. With 
this decision came the first general officer associated with the advisory effort, Brigadier 
General William L. Roberts, who assumed command on 20 May 1948. The assignment of 
a brigadier general as the chief advisor—versus a three-star general as in Greece and later 
in Vietnam—reflected Korea’s low importance. Although this was Roberts’s last post 
before retirement, he took to the job with alacrity. He established a stand-alone advisory 
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command, the Provisional Military Advisory Group (PMAG), and increased its personnel 
to address the severe manpower shortfall the advisors had faced since inception. By the 
end of 1948, PMAG had 248 advisors, and Roberts’s seniority permitted him to request 
officers with more experience, although Korean duty still was unpopular. PMAG created 
an Advisor’s Handbook and standardized training plans to provide written guidance to its 
personnel on how to perform their duties and what training to instruct.66 The 
constabulary also began receiving surplus American armament including small arms, 
light artillery, M-24 light tanks, and armored cars.67 The additional materiel and 
manpower were still insufficient compared to the Soviet arming of the North. For 
example, each constabulary regiment of 2,000 personnel still only had an advisory 
detachment of one or two officers and three to four enlisted men headed by a captain or 
first lieutenant.68 Nevertheless, enough progress had been made up to this point for the 
constabulary to successfully tackle its next test. 
The first signs of open communist rebellion occurred on the island of Cheju Do 
off Korea’s southern coast in April 1948.69 The island’s governor was corrupt, the KNP 
and constabulary units on the island were at odds, and Communists had infiltrated the 
constabulary regiment. When discontented islanders launched attacks on government and 
police facilities, the constabulary forces did not reinforce the government, and some even 
joined the rebels.70 Constabulary reinforcements from the mainland restored order and 
scattered the rebels, but the event highlighted the tenuous nature of the constabulary’s 
loyalty. This incident resulted in a concerted effort to purge the constabulary of leftist 
elements and provided valuable real-world experience to the constabulary troops and its 
advisors. 
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The next test took place on the Yosu peninsula in southern Korea on 19 October 
1948.71 The enlisted leadership of the ROKA 14th Regiment contained many communist 
sympathizers. Believing they could ignite a Communist rebellion in the South, the 
Communist cell took over the regimental headquarters, armed up to two thousand 
insurgents who rallied to their cause, seized the towns of Yosu and Sunchon forty miles 
to the north, and initiated a reign of terror against government personnel.72 This situation 
was the first major emergency for Rhee’s government and had to be addressed 
immediately and decisively. General Roberts sent Captain Hausman to be the senior 
advisor to a collection of Korean colonels and lieutenant colonels overseeing the 
employment of eleven battalions drawn from six different regiments.73 With Hausman 
and the advisors providing the planning and staff expertise, the constabulary managed to 
break the traitors’ hold on the area. 
The performance of the constabulary troops during these two uprisings displayed 
that individual soldiers were willing to fight. Millett recounts the story of Army 
Lieutenant Robert Shackleton, who was the advisor to the ROKA 1st Reconnaissance 
Troop. His unit led the decisive counterattack at Yosu, suffered twenty-five percent 
casualties, and, according to Shackleton, fought bravely.74 Despite the individual bravery 
exhibited by the constabulary soldiers, their leaders exhibited significant shortcomings in 
tactical planning and execution. As historian Bryan Gibby points out, command and 
control, lateral communications, and lack of familiarity with supporting arms such as 
mortars and machine guns hampered the ROKA counterattack.75 Additionally, the two 
sides were evenly matched in weaponry—possessing only individual small arms. It took 
the heavier armament of the reconnaissance troop, which was the only constabulary unit 
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with armored vehicles, to finally break the resistance.76 These deficiencies were directly 
attributable to the insufficient support provided to the South Korean security 
establishment since 1945. Fortunately, the incident highlighted these shortcomings, and 
the ROKA with its U.S. advisors could begin addressing them with greater alacrity. 
2. Growing Threat 
These uprisings highlighted the U.S. failure to appreciate that its position in Korea 
would not improve by continuing to neglect a security force consistent with the 
requirement of a permanently independent South, especially considering the imminent 
departure of all U.S. forces. Although General Hodge had requested a larger Korean army 
from the outset, the Department of State elevated the issue to a level that initiated action, 
pointing “out that while the Department of the Army was proceeding with plans for 
increasing the Korean constabulary to a strength of 50,000 men it was placing the 
equipping of such a force at such a low level of priority there was danger that an adequate 
force could not be trained and equipped in the time available [prior to the U.S. 
departure].”77 Understandably, the United States had held out hope for an acceptable 
settlement leading to unification, but as this became increasingly unlikely through 1947, 
U.S. leaders failed to commit to Korea as a bastion against its communist neighbors. 
The Mutual Defense Assistance Act (MDAA) of 1949 finally codified what had 
been a piecemeal effort to fund military aid but was a clear reminder of Korea’s place in 
U.S. strategy. Prior to the MDAA, the U.S. assistance program dealt out aid on a 
piecemeal basis according to perceived threat and the recipient government’s lobbying 
ability. The MDAA was an attempt to standardize this arrangement in a coordinated 
global strategy whose intent was to contain the global communist threat through the 
Military Assistance Program.78 Domestic budgetary considerations played a larger role 
than the strategic communist threat, however, as an arbitrary cap determined how much 
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MAP planners could propose for military assistance.79 Congressional debate over the bill 
resulted in a $1.314 billion fund for military assistance, with nearly all of it assigned to 
European nations or Turkey; a mere $11 million was scheduled for Korea.80 For Rhee’s 
government and Roberts’s U.S. command, there simply was no influential proponent for 
Korea in Washington’s military or civilian leadership to lobby for greater support. 
On 1 December 1948 the constabulary became the Republic of Korea Army. In 
January 1949 the United States extended recognition to the Republic of Korea, the last 
Soviet units left North Korea, and all but one U.S. regiment departed South Korea. In 
February 1949 the CIA estimated that communists in the South had been effectively 
neutralized to isolated instances of violence but warned that the planned removal of U.S. 
troops in 1949 would “probably in time be followed by an invasion” based on the 
increasingly aggressive actions of the North toward the South.81 Anxious to recapitalize 
its remaining forces in Korea, the Department of the Army countered that invasion should 
be considered “a possibility rather than a probability” and continued to push for 
withdrawal, with all forces departing by July 1949 except Roberts’s advisory mission.82 
On 23 March 1949 President Truman signed NSC 8/2, which formally restated, 
and slightly revised, the U.S. position on Korea. It again recognized Korea’s strategic 
importance but emphasized the removal of all remaining U.S. troops “as early as 
practicable.”83 It supported an increase of the ROKA to 65,000 but refused to make a 
strong statement of support to the “territorial integrity of South Korea.”84 Between March 
1948 and January 1949, the ROKA had grown from 20,000 to 65,000 officers and 
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enlisted.85 This hasty growth had a negative effect on the training and readiness of the 
ROKA just as combat actions against the Communists were increasing. On an inspection 
tour of the ROKA units in the summer of 1949, General Roberts found equipment in poor 
states of repair, unit leadership that was ignorant of the fundamentals of infantry tactics, 
and units that had accomplished little training in the previous six months due to constant 
anti-insurgent operations.86 Leaders at all levels advanced quickly through the ranks to 
assume positions for which they were unprepared. The ROKA was making regimental 
commanders out of officers commissioned as lieutenants only three years earlier.87 
General Roberts secured positions in U.S. military leadership training institutions in the 
United States and established schools in Korea based on the U.S. system to address this 
problem, but the ROKA was playing catch-up with the NKPA. This rapid expansion was 
necessary because U.S. leaders outside of Korea had ignored the growing threat and 
downplayed Korea’s importance. 
Beginning in spring 1949, the NKPA and ROKA began small-scale border 
incursions of the 38th parallel that escalated into battalion-sized battles focused on the 
isolated Ongjin peninsula and the natural invasion routes north of Seoul. These incidents 
were due as much to the South’s aggressiveness as the North’s: both sides violated the 
border. Even with these border skirmishes, however, by April 1950 the ROKA had 
eliminated the insurgent threat in South Korea and was maintaining itself well on the 
border. Despite the reports of growing North Korean capability and threat, the U.S. 
Ambassador to Korea, John Muccio, remarked as early as June 1949 that the ROKA 
“would give an excellent account of itself against the North Koreans.”88 
PMAG transitioned to the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic 
of Korea, KMAG, on 1 July 1949. Its newly stated mission was “to develop the internal 
security forces of the Republic of Korea within the limitations of [the] Korean economy, 
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by advising and assisting Republic of Korea in organization, administration, and training 
of such forces . . . and by insuring effective utilization any U.S. military assistance by 
these forces.”89 With this transition and the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces, 
KMAG’s chain of command shifted from falling under General MacArthur via 
USAMGIK to falling under the JCS via Ambassador Muccio. This relationship was not 
unique and reflected the global nature of military assistance, but it also reflected a certain 
lack of interest in Korea on MacArthur’s part before the outbreak of hostilities.90 
Throughout 1949 and 1950, President Rhee continued to be a difficult U.S. 
partner. His government appeared unstable, he constantly pressured the United States for 
greater aid, and he made bellicose statements toward the North and disparaging 
comments about the United States. Rhee enlarged the ROKA beyond what the United 
States had approved to equip, and he was engaging in a limited border war that risked 
escalation.91 Since Korea already was relegated already to the third tier of military aid, 
Rhee’s personality did not increase the likelihood that his campaign for greater assistance 
would meet with success. If anything, his aggressive posture reinforced the American 
reluctance to arm his regime to a level that, while it might have sustained a more 
adequate defense, would also have supported more significant provocation. In contrast to 
the $100 million in economic aid money the Department of State requested for South 
Korea in Fiscal Year (FY) 1950, the military aid appropriated for FY 1950 was 
insufficient even for uniquely defensive armament like antitank weapons and mines to 
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meet the North Korean threat.92 Furthermore, only $1,000 worth of equipment out of the 
$11 million appropriated for Korea in FY 1950 had arrived by June 1950.93 
KMAG’s semiannual report for July through December 1949 outlined the 
defensive plan in case of North Korean invasion. The concept emphasized a strong point 
defense on the corridors leading toward Seoul, abandonment of the Ongjin Peninsula, and 
the tactical use of border terrain to channelize and stop the invading army.94 Meanwhile, 
the divisions in the southern provinces would be brought to bear as a reserve for a 
counterattack.95 The report estimated that “if the Korean Army abides by the present 
plan, it can contain and repel the NKSF [NKPA] if no Chinese Communist troops are 
committed.”96 Only a few pages later in the logistics section of the report, however, 
KMAG estimated that the ROKA “is capable of maintaining internal security but, due to 
logistical restrictions, can offer only limited resistance to an invasion from the North.”97 
Since the operations estimates failed to give enough weight to the materiel disparity 
between the two armies or appreciate the logistical shortfalls in the ROKA, the 
logisticians would be proven correct. 
Kim Il Sung had been campaigning in Moscow and Beijing since at least 1949 for 
support to intensify offensive action against the South. Stalin rejected him in September 
1949 because U.S. forces remained in the South, Mao and his Chinese Communists were 
still fighting their civil war, and the North’s army could not defeat the South’s rapidly.98 
By 1950, however, the geopolitical landscape had changed: U.S. forces had departed 
Korea, many of the battle-hardened North Koreans lent to Mao had returned and created 
new NKPA divisions, Mao’s Communists were victorious and motivated, and the 
materiel disparity between North and South had only increased. Additionally, guerrilla 
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activities in the South, even if successfully contained, had prevented the ROKA from 
completing anything more than company-level training and forced it to use stockpiled 
equipment and ammunition. Kim promised Stalin a one-week war, but the latter was still 
unwilling to give his full support.99 He required Kim to seek Mao’s support for an 
invasion. Assuring Mao that the NKPA would win quickly and that the United States 
would not intervene, Mao gave his tacit approval to Kim’s plan.100 
When Roberts departed Korea on 15 June 1950, the ROKA was in a far better 
state than when he arrived. Building on the hard work of the initial handful of advisors, 
the fledgling constabulary was moving in the direction of becoming a capable, 
professional army that had already defeated a communist insurgency and was holding its 
own on the border with the North. Meanwhile, KMAG finally had the manpower it 
needed to address effectively the ROKA’s deficiencies in combined arms operations, 
logistics, and staff planning. Roberts’s public statements, meant to encourage and 
highlight the successes of the ROKA and KMAG, lauded the ROKA’s patriotism and 
courage while still acknowledging the challenges ahead.101 Although some have painted 
Roberts as being overly boastful of the ROKA, he tirelessly pushed for the equipment he 
believed it needed and was candid when discussing its weaknesses.102 His final semi-
annual report dated 15 June 1950 underscored the ROKA’s condition after a turbulent 
two years of counterinsurgency operations and border skirmishes. Four of the eight 
ROKA divisions were deployed along the border. KMAG estimated the combat 
effectiveness of their thirty-three battalions at 51.7 percent while only six of these 
battalions had completed battalion training.103 Three of the other four divisions were 
deployed in counterinsurgency operations further south and only consisted of two 
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regiments, instead of the standard three for a division.104 The ROKA had grown and 
fought hard during his watch, but Washington’s lack of interest in adequately outfitting 
the ROKA to repel a Northern invasion, despite Roberts’s and Muccio’s 
recommendations, left the ROKA in a dangerously unbalanced state compared to the 
NKPA. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff had consistently viewed Korea as a liability since the 
effort needed to defend it against a concerted Chinese or Soviet attack would be out of 
proportion to the benefit gained. Despite the JCS’s position toward Korea, however, 
Chairman Omar Bradley directed a staff study delivered in June 1949 that considered 
U.S. courses of action in the event of a North Korean invasion. Although it recommended 
the same course of action eventually taken by the administration—involving the UN 
Security Council—the JCS did not forward the study to the NSC since the military 
leaders had already conveyed their position on Korea’s low strategic value.105 What was 
more important than considering the options available to the United States in the event of 
invasion—withdraw or commit to the defense of South Korea—the JCS failed to provide 
guidance to the 500 members of KMAG who would potentially find themselves on the 
receiving end of a North Korean attack. Since the KMAG chain of command went 
directly to the JCS via the Chief of Staff of the Army, this guidance was critically 
important. KMAG’s actions in the first seventy-two hours after the invasion had serious 
impact on the ROKA’s decision-making. 
On 19 June 1950 the CIA reversed its 1949 estimate on the threat of northern 
invasion. This reversal was particularly noteworthy considering North Korean aggression 
had only increased since the previous estimate.106 The estimate noted the North’s 
superiority in “armor, heavy artillery, and aircraft,” and the return of forces that had been 
fighting with the Chinese Communists, but it failed to appreciate the effect this 
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superiority would have in the event of invasion.107 The CIA questioned the North’s 
ability to conquer the South without Chinese or Soviet support based primarily on the 
South’s anti-communism and the ROKA’s will to fight.108 North Korea’s success would 
be as shocking as the United States’ response. 
The materiel disparity on the eve of war between North and South was heavily 
weighted in favor of the NKPA, although strictly speaking the numbers of security forces 
in the two halves of Korea were roughly equal, at about 100,000. KMAG estimated the 
NKPA possessed 65 heavy T-34 tanks and 296 pieces of towed and self-propelled 
artillery.109 The real number of tanks was probably closer to 150, although the official 
South Korean history claims 242.110 Additionally, the North Korean air force numbered 
between 100 and 200 propeller-driven attack planes while South Korea’s air force was 
virtually nonexistent. Arrayed against the North’s force, the ROKA had 27 light tanks, 91 
short-range mountain howitzers, and 22 training aircraft.111 Furthermore, the NKPA 
outranged the ROKA artillery by 4000 meters or more and had three times the artillery in 
their divisions.112 Only one troop of the ROKA 1st Cavalry Regiment had armored 
vehicles—the other two troops had horses.113 
E. WAR COMES TO SOUTH KOREA 
The failure to appreciate the threat of North Korean invasion became starkly 
apparent in the early morning hours of 25 June 1950. At approximately 0400, the NKPA 
began attacking along the parallel in the Ongjin peninsula and around Kaesong and 
                                                 
107 CIA, Current Capabilities of the Northern Korean Regime (ORE 18-50) (N.p.: Government 
Printing Office, June 19, 1950), 1, 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/44/1950-06-19.pdf. 
108 CIA, “Northern Korean Regime,” 1. 
109 KMAG, “Semi Annual Report, 1 Jan–30 Jun 1950,” Annex 7. 
110 American survey teams eventually found 239 Soviet T-34s destroyed or abandoned below the 38th 
parallel, but it is unlikely that all of these were committed in the initial attack. Korea Institute of Military 
History, Korean War, 1:51; Daniel Moran, Wars of National Liberation (London: Cassell, 2001), 56. 
111 Korea Institute of Military History, Korean War, 1:90. 
112 Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950) (Washington, 
DC: Center of Military History, 1992), 18. 
113 KMAG, “Semi Annual Report, 1 Jul–31 Dec 1949,” Annex 7. 
 99
Uijongbu north of Seoul. KMAG Headquarters began receiving reports at approximately 
0430, but the operational picture remained unclear for several hours since border 
skirmishes were common. Ambassador Muccio sent his official report to Washington at 
1000 Seoul time assessing that the “nature of attack and manner in which it was launched 
. . .constitutes [an] all out offensive against ROK.”114 The invasion could not have come 
at a worse time for KMAG and the location of its leadership. Many of the unit advisors 
were in Seoul for the weekend. General Roberts had departed for the United States, and 
his replacement had not yet arrived. The acting commander, Colonel William H. S. 
Wright, was in Japan. Absent this leadership and having received little guidance outlining 
its role in this situation, KMAG headquarters was in a state of shock and uncertainty for 
the first twenty-four hours. With his military counterparts absent, Ambassador Muccio 
urgently requested a ten-day supply of ammunition for the ROKA but confidently 
assessed that “if adequately supplied, ROK security forces will fight bravely and with 
distinction.”115 While this statement turned out to be generally true at the individual 
soldier level, its optimism belied the ROKA’s rapidly deteriorating ability to resist an 
enemy it had no means of stopping. 
There simply had been little planning for an invasion apart from the general 
concept of operations that KMAG had worked out with the ROKA.116 The only plan that 
had been fleshed out in detail was Operation CRULLER, which was the emergency 
evacuation plan for the American mission and KMAG. After some hesitation, 
Ambassador Muccio directed the evacuation of dependents and most of the staff, but 
KMAG’s responsibilities remained unclear.117 Advisors in the Ongjin peninsula, for 
example, were evacuated by air while their ROKA unit made its way to port facilities to 
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withdraw by sea.118 The few advisors with or near their units conducted themselves as 
the tactical situation allowed.119 Those at ROKA HQ passed information, and the rest 
awaited guidance. 
As seen in Figure 5, the NKPA had massed its strongest forces north of Seoul: 
four infantry divisions, one armored brigade, and one armored regiment. Opposite them 
were two of the best ROKA divisions, the 1st and the 7th, each with two regiments on the 
parallel and one in reserve. As the NKPA began to gain ground despite significant 
casualties, the weaknesses in the lack of contingency planning became apparent. The 
strong point defense that the ROKA and KMAG had worked out did not make provisions 
for a planned withdrawal if the ROKA could not hold their assigned defensive positions. 
Moreover, NKPA advances in the 7th’s sector risked cutting off the 1st from its line of 
retreat. Even though these two organizations fought bravely, their armaments simply 
could not stop the NKPA tanks. 
  
                                                 
118 Sawyer and Hermes, KMAG in Peace and War, 114-15. 
119 Ibid., 115-16. 
 101
Figure 5.  North Korean Invasion 
 
Source: Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 
1950) (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1992), Map 1, 20–21. 
Roberts’s untimely departure and Wright’s absence only aggravated the harried 
decision making taking place at the highest ROKA levels, exactly where KMAG had 
judged the ROKA for years as being weakest. For example, Captain Hausman was the 
senior advisor to the ROKA Chief of Staff, General Chae Byong Duk. Despite the trust 
and expertise he had built over his long time in Korea, Hausman was still only a captain. 
Chae enacted the invasion contingency plan and ordered the divisions deployed in 
southern Korea to begin moving north for a counterattack. Elements of the 2nd Division 
began arriving on the evening of the twenty-fifth, and Chae ordered them to counterattack 
with the 7th Division the following morning on the roads north of Seoul. Hausman and 
the 2nd Division commander objected because only two of the division’s six battalions 
had arrived, and there was insufficient time to coordinate and conduct reconnaissance. 
Chae ignored these warnings and ordered the counterattack. As might be expected, the 
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counterattack failed due to poor coordination and insufficient forces. A more senior U.S. 
personality might have been more persuasive and thus realized a more effective 
counterattack, although the ROKA still had no effective way of stopping NKPA 
armor.120 
As observed by Major Richard Crawford, the assistant advisor to the Korean 
Army Corps of Engineers, “the sight of tanks advancing against South Korean troops 
threw them into a state of complete panic.”121 Crawford further notes his failure to 
provide any training in anti-tank engineering tactics to his unit before the invasion.122 
The ROKA engineers nevertheless demonstrated the ability to learn while displaying 
bravery and ingenuity in the days that followed. Crawford and his advisory team 
instructed the Korean engineers in improvised tank destruction methods, and the Koreans 
managed to destroy five NKPA tanks by the night of 26 June.123 Further improvisation 
by the Koreans led to the idea of suicide bombers with the explosives attached to them 
versus on a pole or satchel charge.124 Although there were some volunteers, this method 
did not appear to find widespread use among the ROKA soldiers. Had these brave 
soldiers been outfitted with non-suicidal means of destroying the enemy tanks, their 
effectiveness surely would have been greater. 
When Colonel Wright made his way back to headquarters on the morning of the 
twenty-sixth, he had to decide what to do with his command. KMAG had heard virtually 
nothing from Washington in the first twenty-four hours other than a message inquiring 
whether its members required guidance.125 As LTC Walter Greenwood, KMAG Deputy 
Chief of Staff recounts, “It appeared that the loss of Korea to Communism was to be 
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accepted in much the same manner as the loss of China had been accepted eighteen 
months earlier. That line of thinking consequently played a very considerable role in the 
recommendations subsequently presented to Chief KMAG [Acting Chief, COL 
Wright].”126 There were now elements of four ROKA divisions north of the Han River 
resisting the NKPA advance but, unable to stop the armor, they risked being bottled up 
with their backs to the river. The ROKA divisions in central and eastern Korea, the 6th 
and 8th respectively, were also fighting a delayed retreat in the face of armor and 
amphibious landings on the east coast. In light of the deteriorating tactical situation and 
assuming that Washington’s position on Korea had not changed, Wright decided on 27 
June to evacuate the bulk of the KMAG personnel, keeping only 33 as advisors to the 
ROKA HQ, the 3rd Division in the vicinity of Pusan, and the 8th Division on the East 
Coast.127 As these personnel were in the process of departing, Roberts received a cryptic 
message from MacArthur stating that, “‘Help is on the way. Return to your former 
location. Be of good cheer.’”128 This message led Wright to recall the remainder of his 
personnel awaiting evacuation, approximately 150, and return to Seoul on the evening of 
27 June after having already begun shifting HQ locations with the ROKA HQ south of 
the Han River. MacArthur’s vague, ambiguous message simply added to KMAG’s 
confusion, ineffectiveness, and near-capture. 
Still unknown to KMAG, President Truman had called an emergency meeting to 
determine how to address the situation. Despite the apathy toward Korea that had 
characterized the U.S. military and civilian establishment, the administration committed 
to the country’s defense almost immediately. The first actions were logistical to keep the 
ROKA supplied and able to fight. Airpower soon followed to protect evacuees but 
quickly expanded to interdict NKPA forces. The United States called an emergency 
meeting of the UN Security Council on 25 June. The Soviet Union’s famous absence 
allowed the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 82 calling for 
cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of North Korean forces from areas south of the 
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38th parallel.129 The Security Council followed up with another resolution on 27 June 
recommending that “the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the 
Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore 
international peace and security in the area.”130 
Having driven back toward the advancing enemy that was then on the outskirts of 
Seoul, Wright’s group awaited instructions and learned that MacArthur was sending a 
survey team to facilitate U.S. intervention. In the early morning hours of 28 June, the 
ROKA decided to shift its HQ south of the Han River. KMAG learned of this move 
afterward and also of the ROKA decision to blow up all of the bridges across the Han, 
which ROKA engineers carried out while people and vehicles were still crossing. Aside 
from the 500–800 soldiers and civilians who perished in the blasts, this foolish tactical 
move was operationally devastating since the remains of four ROKA divisions were still 
making their way through Seoul to reestablish a defensive line south of the Han. The 
destruction of the bridges meant the ROKA had to abandon all of its heavy equipment 
and artillery, which of course fell into the NKPA’s hands. Seoul fell to the NKPA on 28 
June leaving ROKA survivors to straggle across the Han any way they could. Out of the 
98,000 troops the ROKA began with on 25 June, it could account for only 54,000 at the 
beginning of July.131 
The remaining 130 KMAG members also found themselves on the wrong side of 
the Han and had to search for a ferry crossing. They eventually walked much of the way 
to Suwon where they linked back up with the ROKA HQ. Once in Suwon, KMAG 
learned that it now worked for MacArthur’s survey team, designated Advance Command 
and Liaison Group in Korea (ADCOM). Due to the circumstances and lack of guidance, 
KMAG’s main effort during the initial critical hours became its own survival, not helping 
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the ROKA survive. This confusion contributed to the premature destruction of the Han 
River bridge, an ill-advised counterattack against the enemy’s strongest forces, and loss 
of situational awareness of ROKA forces. KMAG’s requirement to focus the bulk of its 
effort on the evacuation, lack of direction in the event of invasion, and the absence of its 
commander hurt its ability to integrate into the ROKA decision-making and perhaps 
affect the outcome of these events. 
In his memoirs, Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins speaks 
disparagingly of the ROKA’s performance against the NKPA invasion, noting that the 
“failure of the ROK Army to stand and fight was a great disappointment to the officers of 
the advisory group.”132 General Collins lays the blame for the ROKA’s critical military 
situation squarely at Roberts’s feet, stating that “the Army staff, the Joint Chiefs, and the 
Economic Cooperation Administration had been led astray by the faulty estimates of 
General Roberts.”133 Collins admits, however, that “no member of the Chiefs of Staff nor 
its Joint Strategic Survey Committee had visited Korea from 1946 until I went there on 
July 14, 1950, shortly after the fighting began.”134 Blaming Roberts for misrepresenting 
the ROKA’s ability to stop the NKPA makes him a convenient scapegoat considering the 
entire U.S. military and civilian establishment had regarded Korea as a third-tier interest 
since 1945. Despite the CIA reports and increasingly aggressive communist attacks on 
South Korea from 1948 to 1950, Korea’s position remained unchanged in U.S. national 
security circles. 
The war’s first week also allows the ROKA’s performance to be judged against 
U.S. performance under similar circumstances. Truman authorized the use of U.S. ground 
troops on 30 June to halt the North Korean advance since the ROKA continued to retreat 
south from Seoul. ROKA resistance followed the same pattern: NKPA armor—
unhindered by ROKA weapons—penetrated the ROKA lines followed by NKPA 
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infantry, forcing the ROKA to retreat. U.S. forces from the 24th Infantry Division under 
Major General William Dean began arriving in Pusan on 1 July to delay the NKPA 
advance. The first two companies, under Lieutenant Colonel Charles Smith, met the 
advancing NKPA on 5 July near Osan. The results were similar to the ROKA experience: 
artillery shells and bazooka rounds failed to pierce the NKPA tanks, and a coordinated 
infantry attack followed that overran Smith’s position. Although his small force gave a 
good accounting of itself, many of its combat-inexperienced members panicked at the 
sight of tanks and left the officers and non-commissioned officers to fight. Out of a force 
of 540 soldiers, Smith suffered 150 killed, wounded, or missing in the first U.S. firefight 
with the NKPA.135 As Detzer writes, “the retreat from Osan became a helter-skelter 
flight. Men bolted like terrified creatures fleeing a forest fire. Some ran in packs, some 
alone. . . . They dropped weapons, helmets, utensils, belts, anything that might slow them 
down.”136 The newly arrived ADCOM staff was no better. Co-located with the ROKA 
HQ at Suwon, its members panicked on the night of 30 June due to mistaken reports of 
NKPA forces in the area. The U.S. members destroyed equipment and even burned down 
a command post building in their haste to flee a non-existent enemy, thus abandoning 
their ROKA counterparts who looked on in confusion. 
On 7 July, the Security Council recommended placing the UN relief force under 
U.S. command, which meant MacArthur and his Korea command, the Eighth U.S. Army 
Korea (EUSAK) under Lieutenant General Walton Walker.137 Subsequently, President 
Rhee issued an order placing all Korean forces under the combined command. The 
language barrier remained, but challenges associated with incorporating the ROKA into 
operational plans and directing it in the field were greatly reduced. Additionally, this shift 
gave General Walker the ability to relieve ineffective ROKA commanders and replace 
them with those recommended by KMAG.138 This relationship would prove decisive to 
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the advisory effort since it allowed MacArthur’s experienced staff to make up for the 
ROKA that had shown a willingness to fight but lacked conventional war experience. On 
25 July, Brigadier General Francis Farrell assumed command of KMAG, once again 
giving it the influence that a general officer could provide. 
The first six weeks of the invasion saw the NKPA push aside U.S. forces in the 
same manner as the ROKA forces that many would later denigrate. The difference was 
that U.S. forces had the benefit of better coordination with their supporting arms and a 
clearer idea of the enemy conditions than the ROKA had on 25 June. By the end of its 
fifteenth day of fighting, General Dean’s 24th Infantry Division could only account for 
8,660 of its 15,965 assigned personnel; it had lost a division’s worth of equipment, 100 
miles of ground, and its division commander—who was captured—to the NKPA.139 
Fortunately for the UN command, attrition also was taking its toll on the NKPA, and its 
supply lines were stretching longer and longer and were susceptible to air attack. By 
August 1950, with reinforcements pouring in and frantic recruiting by the ROKA, 
Walker’s command finally managed to halt the NKPA advance around Pusan. 
F. REBUILDING THE ROKA 
With the entry of U.S. forces into the war and both KMAG and the ROKA falling 
under U.S. command and control, KMAG could focus on its two most important missions: 
advising and rebuilding the ROKA. To accomplish the former, KMAG integrated advisors 
into each division staff to improve staff functions and communication with other units. 
Advisors in the field coordinated with U.S. supporting arms to provide close air support 
and artillery fires to ROKA units to help even the playing field against the NKPA units 
they faced. Equally as important, KMAG assisted in a massive, rapid ROKA expansion. 
This latter mission oversaw the creation of four new recruit training centers that were 
graduating 1,700 recruits per day by 31 August 1950 to replace ROKA losses and form 
new divisions.140 
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These recruits were critical to shoring up the five ROKA divisions that remained as 
they took up positions along the northern line of the Pusan Perimeter. Historian T. R. 
Fehrenbach credits the ROKA for having caused most of the NKPA’s 60,000 casualties 
during its retreat toward Pusan. Kim’s promise of a seven-day war had long since passed its 
mark.141 With their backs to the sea and finally accompanied by adequate fire support and 
3.5 inch rocket launchers that could destroy North Korean tanks, the ROKA held fast 
alongside the U.S. divisions against the NKPA’s last ferocious gasp. Individual ROKA 
soldiers displayed their resiliency as survivors of the actions north of Seoul continued to 
straggle back to their units throughout July and August. Furthermore, the dogged ROKA 
defense around Pusan began to restore U.S. confidence in its combat ability. As the ROKA 
counterattacked northward in conjunction with the landing at Inchon, however, it again was 
being set up for failure. U.S. units entering the war consisted of soldiers possessing at least 
the minimum amount of training required for their specialties. In contrast, the ROKA began 
to be diluted by the heavy influx of raw recruits, many with less than a week of training. 
Furthermore, the United States never addressed the ROKA’s shortfalls in artillery and 
tanks. This lack of heavy equipment allowed ROKA divisions to advance faster than their 
U.S. counterparts, but again left them vulnerable to a concentrated attack. The Chinese 
offensives of 1950 and 1951 exposed weaknesses that were due at least in part to the 
continued U.S. neglect of the ROKA. 
Winter and spring of 1950–51 saw the Chinese push U.S. and ROKA forces south 
past the 38th parallel, but EUSAK, under General Matthew Ridgway, recovered and 
restored much of what was lost back up to the parallel.142 MacArthur’s relief in April 1951 
brought General James Van Fleet to Korea in command of the Eighth Army and all ROKA 
forces.143 Van Fleet’s reputation had only increased with his service in Greece and its 
success against communism. As Clay Blair writes,  
Truman and others tended to view Greece and Korea as similar situations. . . 
. The ultimate long term “solution” to the Korean problem, like that of 
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Greece, was the creation of a reliable indigenous army. Van Fleet had been 
almost miraculously successful in Greece. Even though he had never set 
foot in the Far East, perhaps he could repeat the near miracle in Korea.144  
Although at least some of this praise was overblown given the Greek contribution to its 
own defense, Van Fleet did recognize the potential in the individual Korean soldier, and his 
efforts to bring this potential out would have an enormous impact on the ROKA’s fighting 
ability. 
Compared to their U.S. counterparts, the ROKA divisions were smaller, had only 
one battalion of artillery versus four, and were manned with a high percentage of 
inexperienced personnel, including officers.145 Despite these knowable characteristics, the 
ROKA divisions were nevertheless assigned the same length of front as U.S. divisions. The 
Chinese excelled at infiltration and finding weak spots in the line. They knew from fighting 
American and ROKA divisions which one had greater firepower, so they chose to attack 
the latter.146 It also did not help that ROKA soldiers seemed to have an inherent fear of 
Chinese forces.147 These characteristics resulted in a series of disastrous retreats beginning 
with the Chinese offensive at the Yalu and continuing into 1951 until the front stabilized. 
This problem became a catch-22 since the ROKA would retreat in the face of concentrated 
Chinese attacks, abandoning equipment and vehicles along the way. When the Koreans 
would request more artillery to aid in defense, U.S. commanders would respond that the 
Koreans first needed to display better leadership and training.148 Thus, in an act of ironic 
counter productiveness, U.S. commanders withheld artillery from ROKA units that might 
have helped it perform better against the Chinese until the ROKA could fight better without 
it. 
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Simply assigning the ROKA these tools would not guarantee success either since 
the officers had little experience employing equipment they normally did not have. Van 
Fleet’s frustration culminated during a Chinese offensive on 16 May 1951. Expecting a 
Chinese attack around Seoul, Van Fleet had concentrated his strongest units there and 
placed the ROKA units stretching to the east through the center of Korea to the east coast. 
Unknown to Van Fleet, the Chinese had shifted their main attack to fall against the ROKA 
units who were known to possess less armament. Three Chinese armies fell upon six 
ROKA divisions, with the ROKA III Corps performing especially disgracefully and nearly 
risking the entire UN line. A rapid shift of forces shored up the defenses, but drastic 
changes clearly were needed to fix the underlying problems.149 
The stalemate that began in the summer of 1951 gave KMAG the opportunity to 
rebuild the ROKA in a fundamental way, not simply patch it up as KMAG had done 
following the initial collapse in 1950. On 17 May 1951 the NSC recognized that the 
introduction of Chinese forces into the conflict made reunification of the peninsula 
impossible and finally committed to “the development of a strong ROK[A] military 
establishment for continuation of the struggle against communist forces (in case of a 
stalemate), and for the organization of a strong barrier to defend the ROK[A] against future 
aggression.”150 This new direction brought a new KMAG commander, Brigadier General 
Cornelius Ryan—a Van Fleet protégé—and an increase in KMAG manpower. KMAG 
already had grown from its pre-war strength of 500 to 1013 by March 1951 to meet the true 
needs of training and advising the ROKA. 
As he had shown with the Greek Army, Van Fleet took great interest in the 
ROKA’s improvement, which included increasing the quality of advisors in KMAG by 
sending successful battalion and regimental commanders to train ROKA officers. The 
pause in fighting allowed for a more focused and structured training curriculum at all levels 
of leadership that mirrored U.S. Army schools. With the resources on which he was able to 
draw and his operational control of the ROKA, Van Fleet put all of the ROKA divisions 
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through two months of division-level training, which was something the pre-war KMAG 
could only have dreamed of. KMAG also had significant leeway to identify poor leaders 
and remove them from their positions.151 Within a year from the ROKA’s failure in May 
1951, Van Fleet went from denigrating it and disbanding a corps to publicly praising it.152 
Simply put, he recognized that an adequately resourced advisory mission coupled with a 
native partner that possessed an inherent willingness to fight could be prepared to stand 
against the Communists, but one without the other was a recipe for disappointment if not 
disaster. As Gibby writes, “American trainers were nearly unanimous in their admiration 
for the ROK soldier, who despite his lack of formal training showed great resolve and 
enthusiasm to learn and build confidence.”153  
In conjunction with the improved training, the ROKA also was equipped to the 
level of U.S. divisions. Less firepower invited more attacks, which increased the likelihood 
the ROKA divisions would not be able to hold their place in the line. By January 1953 the 
ROKA consisted of two corps, twelve divisions, and forty artillery battalions. It also held 
59 percent of the line, inflicted 55 percent of the enemy casualties, conducted 61 percent of 
combat patrols, and received 87 percent of enemy attacks.154 From the standpoint of 
keeping the ROKA in the war and creating a force that could keep the Chinese and North 
Koreans at bay, KMAG’s job was complete. The only thing left was to prove it. 
Stalemate at the truce negotiations over the treatment of prisoners of war (POWs) 
led to Chinese offensives in 1952 and 1953 to force a settlement by increasing the UN costs 
of continuing the conflict. The Chinese assembled their largest offensive to date in July 
1953 with some of the heaviest fighting near Kumsong to reduce a salient held by the 
ROKA II Corps. Despite receiving nearly 400,000 rounds of artillery and suffering 30,000 
casualties, the ROKA line cracked but ultimately held and inflicted over 70,000 casualties 
for the month.155 A signed armistice soon followed.  
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G. CONCLUSION 
The United States did not cause the Korean War. Whether the Soviet Union did so 
is harder to say. As MacArthur rightly implied in 1945, the vying Korean factions would 
have resorted to force of arms in some fashion to decide their political future regardless of 
the policies that outside powers might have overlaid on the peninsula. It is hard to believe 
that anything short of an overwhelming military imbalance against the North would have 
deterred Kim Il Sung from attempting to reunite the peninsula by force, particularly given 
that Stalin’s ultimate support for Kim’s action did not require an outright Northern victory 
in order to accomplish its task, which was to divert American attention and resources and 
bind Communist China firmly to the Soviet Union. 
U.S. actions from 1945–1950, however, made Kim’s guarantees of success more 
believable, thus lowering the overall risk that Stalin would necessarily incur in supporting 
the war. The willingness of U.S. leaders to squander three years of occupation with anemic 
support to an anti-communist military establishment in the South implied that the United 
States was not committed to defending South Korea, which is what it had decided in secret 
NSC decisions. The Soviet and North Korean intelligence services surely were aware of the 
imbalance of forces between North and South and appeared to have a better appreciation of 
the true impact of that imbalance. Therefore, the United States deserves to conduct some 
self-reflection for the position in which it found itself in June 1950. 
In 1947, General Hodge’s political advisor, Joseph E. Jacobs, presented two 
possibilities for U.S. policy toward Korea. First, if Washington decided Korea was vital to 
containment, then the South should be appropriately supported and funded to reflect its 
importance.156 Conversely, if Washington decided that Korea was not important, then it 
should be gracefully abandoned to whatever might become of the chaotic political situation 
that would surely follow a U.S. withdrawal.157 Instead, the United States adopted a vague 
middle course that certainly ended up costing more in financial aid and above all in human 
and political terms than if it had made a firmer commitment earlier. 
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Allan Millett estimates U.S. costs for the Korean War came to $35 billion.158 
Furthermore, U.S. forces have remained in Korea ever since. In retrospect, the U.S. 
hesitancy to commit early to a fully-realized defense of an independent South Korea seems 
incredibly foolish. At the time, however, aid to China had failed to sustain U.S. policy 
goals there and thus portended a similar outcome in Korea. Additionally, General Roberts’s 
optimism and intelligence reports that downplayed the likelihood of invasion gave the 
impression that South Korea was in a good position despite the minimal U.S. support it had 
received. An advisory effort should nevertheless have the complementary military aid to 
counter the most likely threat. In the Korean case, the United States deemed until too late 
that the threat resided in the realm of subversion, internal security, and insurgency. This 
basic strategic miscalculation limited funding and manpower throughout the majority of 
KMAG’s pre-war effort, during which the ROKA showed it was indeed capable of 
winning an insurgency and defending itself against small-scale border skirmishes. Once 
large-scale conventional war came to Korea in 1950, however, the two main reasons for 
employing advisors—cost effectiveness and escalation management—were no longer 
relevant. Even so, KMAG helped to keep the Koreans in the initial fight during a period 
when the war might well have been lost outright and helped to build a South Korean Army 
that could hold its place alongside the UN forces that were required to defend against the 
huge Chinese armies that eventually intervened to save the North from its own defeat. 
Particularly during the initial North advance, the Korean War was a close-run affair. 
In the final analysis, South Korea survived because its soldiers were willing to fight for 
their country in conditions more desperate than American policy was prepared to 
anticipate. Even so, it would be naïve to imagine that the knowledge, encouragement, and 
leadership by example afforded by American military advisors, however inadequate they 
may appear in relation to the ultimate challenge posed by the North, made no difference to 
the outcome. 
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IV. U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS IN THE PHILIPPINE HUK 
INSURRECTION: THE POWER OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
From 1946 to mid-1950, the Philippine government fought unsuccessfully against 
the Communist-inspired Huk Rebellion that, at one point in 1950, was a serious concern 
for U.S. decision makers in Washington and the Philippines.1 A coup or other significant 
disruption of Philippine President Elpidio Quirino’s U.S.-friendly government in Manila 
would have represented a victory for communism at a time when the United States saw 
itself locked in a death struggle with the Soviet Union. It also would have symbolized the 
failure of America’s grand experiment to transform the Philippines into a successful, 
modern country founded on American ideals. Supported by U.S. aid and military advice, 
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) completely transformed themselves in 1950 
and 1951 under the able leadership of Secretary of National Defense Ramon Magsaysay 
and crushed the Huks in one year’s time. This Philippine achievement was the result of 
four key factors: the natural isolation of the Philippine archipelago, the close historical 
relationship between the United States and the Philippines, the radicalism of the Huk 
movement, and most importantly, the charismatic leadership of Ramon Magsaysay 
supported by his close American advisor, Colonel Edward Lansdale. 
A. ROOTS OF HUK DISCONTENT 
When Admiral George Dewey destroyed the Spanish Fleet in Manila Bay in 
1898, the United States inherited a Philippines in upheaval. Three hundred years of a 
plantation-based economy under Spanish rule had given way to revolt beginning in 1896. 
The revolt continued under American rule, and the U.S. Army finally suppressed it in 
1902. This victory gave the United States total control over the Philippines’ domestic and 
foreign affairs. In an effort to bring American enlightenment to the islands, the United 
States established schools, public health services, and the foundation for a prosperous 
economy. Liberation by the United States unfortunately did not result in a better quality 
of life for most of the population. Landowners who were newly enlightened by capitalism 
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tried to squeeze more and more of the crop out of their tenant farmers. As Huk 
revolutionary leader Luis Taruc writes, “when the Americans came they made boasts 
about having brought democracy to the Philippines, but the feudal agrarian system was 
preserved intact.”2 By the 1930s the average peasant was no better off thirty years after 
the end of Spanish rule than before, with many of the worst off concentrated in central 
Luzon near the capital of Manila.3 It was under these conditions that Communist and 
Socialist parties began to organize in support of agrarian reform. Filipino Communists 
were more closely associated with Marxist-Leninist revolutionary doctrine while the 
Socialists were homegrown nationalists who generally wanted a greater share of their 
farming efforts.4 Despite their differences in ideology, the two groups merged in 
November 1938 since their goals were ostensibly similar. The more radical Communists 
nevertheless exerted increasing influence over the combined group as time progressed 
and as the early, more moderate leaders were imprisoned or killed.5 
In 1935 the Philippines became a U.S. Commonwealth as a transitional 
arrangement intended to lead to full independence in ten years’ time.6 Under this system, 
the Filipinos elected Manuel Quezon as President of the Commonwealth. He set about 
addressing peasant grievances, but little changed, and internal dissatisfaction continued to 
grow. While peasants generally protested nonviolently, the government reaction was 
often disproportionate. Nor were the authorities quick to recognize that the movement 
was spreading. As historian Benedict Kerkvliet writes, “a common belief among local 
                                                 
2 Taruc, Born of the People, 26. Under U.S. rule, the plight of many Filipinos worsened. According to 
historian Benedict Kerkvliet, the traditional landowner-peasant relationship during Spanish rule meant the 
landowners were responsible for the well-being of their tenants, which included free loans of rice and other 
assistance during the hard years. In return, the tenants were expected to reciprocate as the landowner might 
request. This relationship began to deteriorate with the introduction of U.S. capitalist “enlightenment,” as 
landowners became more concerned with profit-making and less concerned with the welfare of their 
tenants. Kerkvliet, Huk Rebellion, 8. 
3 Robert Ross Smith, The Hukbalahap Insurgency: Economic, Political, and Military Factors 
(Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1963), 14, http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/ 
compoundobject/collection/p4013coll11/id/1092/rec/1. The area around Luzon was particularly good for 
cash crops such as rice and sugar, which resulted in greater efforts to maximize profits and greater 
exploitation of workers than in other areas. Kerkvliet, Huk Rebellion, 23. 
4 Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger, 16–18. 
5 Greenberg, Hukbalahap Insurrection, 11. 
6 This designation came as a result of the Philippine Independence Act, also known as the Tydings-
McDuffie Act. Philippine Independence Act, HR 8573, 73rd Cong., 2nd sess. (1934). 
 117
and national government officials was that the peasant movement was subversive, 
communistic, and manipulated by a few clever leaders.”7 This belief ignored that the 
movement originated from general dissatisfaction with the economic system; only 
afterward did leaders emerge to give direction to the disgruntled masses. Both the 
peasants and landowners continued sparring for the government’s favor, with the 
powerful landowners typically winning. Regardless, the Japanese invasion of 1941 
nullified the immediacy of the government’s need to take action and created the 
environment that allowed the Hukbalahaps to emerge as an armed resistance force. 
B. BELLIGERENTS 
The two sides to the eventual Huk Rebellion were the U.S.-recognized Philippine 
government and the Hukbalahaps of central Luzon. Key members of the former were the 
elite landowners, the small middle class, and peasants who were unwilling to take up 
arms against the government. Hukbalahap roots rested in the pre-war discontent with 
deteriorating conditions for a large percentage of the population. The Japanese 
occupation allowed them to become a formidable and motivated fighting force. 
1. Hukbalahaps 
In response to the Japanese aggression, Filipino Communists dedicated 
themselves to resisting the invaders. Their apparent commitment to country contrasted 
sharply with that of the Quezon government, which fled into exile, and with the senior 
American representative General Douglas MacArthur’s relocation to Australia. 
Following some early small-scale successes against the Japanese, the Communists 
established the Hukbalahaps as their armed resistance wing and named Luis Taruc, a 
Socialist Party leader and staunch peasant supporter, as its commander.8 
United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) formed other guerrilla 
efforts consisting of Filipinos and U.S. soldiers who had evaded Japanese capture. Their 
attempts to coordinate resistance efforts with the Huks were generally fruitless—and 
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sometimes hostile—as the Huks hoped to use the period of occupation to enact long-term 
social change rather than cooperate under the American banner to maintain the status 
quo. As a result, the Huks received no U.S. equipment and instead captured most of their 
weapons from the Japanese. Like other communist resistance movements during the 
Second World War, the political aspect of the Huk movement was an important part of 
the organization Thus, each military detachment or district had a political officer in 
addition to its normal military chain of command. The Huks divided the countryside into 
ten regional commands (RECOs) that all reported to the Secretariat and Politburo. From 
the first five squadrons of one hundred men each, they grew to as many as one hundred 
by war’s end.9 
Since there was little U.S. doctrine for guerrilla warfare, the Huks turned to 
Communist Chinese writings to learn how to organize and fight. Without outside support, 
however, the Huks lacked the armament, numbers, training, and mobility to defeat the 
Japanese. Furthermore, MacArthur had ordered the U.S.-led guerrilla groups to avoid 
armed conflict and focus instead on gathering intelligence for an eventual U.S. operation 
to liberate the Philippines by conventional invasion rather than guerrilla tactics.10 Thus, 
the Huks spent the majority of their time before 1945 consolidating their political 
position, which led to occasional armed clashes with USAFFE guerrilla forces that were 
wary of Philippine Communist ambitions. 
2. Philippine Government Forces 
The Armed Forces of the Philippines consisted of the Philippine Army (PA), 
Philippine Navy (PN), and the Philippine Air Force (PAF). Before 1949, the Philippine 
Constabulary (PC) stood apart from the AFP under the Department of the Interior as a 
paramilitary national police force.11 The PC and PA entered the Second World War with 
distinct missions: the constabulary was responsible for state policing and the Army was 
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responsible for national defense. Both organizations fought against the Japanese, and 
their members were killed, imprisoned, or scattered. The Japanese reestablished the PC 
under its puppet Philippine government to assist in maintaining order, but it was 
ineffectual since its members were poorly armed and generally avoided combat with 
other Filipinos.12 Furthermore, as historian Robert A. Smith writes, “it was a common 
saying that the Japanese had emptied the jails to fill up the constabulary.”13 As a result, 
the PC entered the postwar environment in a rather pitiful state but found itself as the lead 
force fighting the Huks since the government considered quelling the rebellion an internal 
police function. In contrast, the Huks had a cadre of indoctrinated fighters, an established 
support base near the capital, and a history of evading forces sent to eliminate them. 
C. BATTLEGROUND 
The Philippines consists of over 7,100 individual islands of which Luzon and 
Mindanao make up two-thirds of its total landmass.14 In 1950 the population was 
approximately twenty-one million, with 75 percent of Filipinos working on small 
farms.15 The Philippine population was relatively homogeneous with the vast majority 
claiming Christianity as their religion, but the Philippines was home to at least eight 
major dialects that were not mutually intelligible. Thus, language differences and 
regionalism helped prevent the spread of communism that occurred in other countries 
after 1945.16 Isolated as the Philippines was, it would have taken a concerted effort to 
provide the Huks with significant outside support of any kind, and they did not have a 
friendly, neighboring, sovereign state that could provide shelter if they met serious 
hardship. Their only significant advantage was their proximity to the capital. 
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Although poor, abused tenant farmers comprised a large share of the Filipino 
population, only the area around Manila significantly cultivated the Huk movement. 
Mount Arayat dominated this low-lying region, and other mountains and swamplands 
provided refuge for guerrilla forces. The movement’s proximity to Manila gave it distinct 
advantages including a large population base from which to recruit, relative ease in 
gaining intelligence on government activities, and tactical position to constantly threaten 
the capital. The Communists also rallied support by highlighting the contrast between the 
comparatively modern area of Manila and the extremely poor areas further afield, a 
visible symbol of the elites’ exploitation of the poor. At the same time, however, 
proximity to the capital also ensured maximum attention from government forces.17 
D. POSTWAR UNREST 
The Philippines exited the Second World War in a poor socio-economic state. As 
historian Ray Hunt writes, 
Loyalty to America and resistance to the Japanese cost the Filipinos 
dearly: 5 percent of them were killed; millions were terrorized by 
unbridled Japanese torture and rape; and scores of thousands were crippled 
permanently. They were impoverished from wholesale theft and 
destruction of their resources, and their capital was laid waste more 
thoroughly than any cities on earth save Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and 
Warsaw.18 
Accordingly, Washington prioritized economic reconstruction and generally left the Huk 
problem to the Filipinos to sort out. 
As Washington moved toward full Philippine independence by 4 July 1946, it 
secured two controversial agreements with the incoming government that served as 
targets of anti-colonial protest. The first was an expansion of the 1934 Tydings-McDuffie 
Act that allowed the United States to establish bases wherever it deemed necessary for 
mutual security. The second was the Philippine Trade Act of 1946 that guaranteed the 
United States preferential trade treatment, pegged the Filipino peso to the dollar, and 
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granted U.S. entities equal rights alongside Filipinos to exploit the country’s natural 
resources.19 In exchange for these agreements, the United States promised hundreds of 
millions in aid, which provided ample fodder for anti-government elements whose 
message revolved around the government’s sale of Filipino sovereignty.20 
The Huks nevertheless made seemingly honest attempts to affect the political 
process legally by participating in the April 1946 national elections. The Huk candidates 
won seven seats in the House of Representatives, but the new president, Manuel Roxas, 
refused to allow the Huk candidates to take their seats. In May, Huk guerrillas ambushed 
a government patrol and killed ten, while Roxas’s forces struck out at Huk leadership and 
followers in an intimidation campaign.21 These events marked the beginning of the Huk 
Rebellion. 
Following his inauguration, President Roxas initiated an uncompromising policy 
toward the Huks and directed the constabulary to eliminate them by force. Stating this 
objective turned out to be far easier than implementing it. The PC numbered only about 
24,000 poorly-armed national police personnel while the Huks may have numbered as 
many as 10,000 to 15,000.22 The result was a disorganized effort that failed to eliminate 
Huk forces or reduce popular support in the major Huk areas. As Taruc writes, “when the 
soldiers rounded up the barrio people, they would drive them at gun point to the nearest 
town”; meanwhile, government soldiers looted the barrios and blamed it on the Huks.23 
In contrast, the Huks made community outreach central to their strategy and slowly grew 
their base of support as their helping hand contrasted sharply with the government’s 
mailed fist.24 Poor operational security, clumsy maneuvers, and good Huk intelligence 
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led to the Huks knowing about most large government offensives well in advance. A 
characteristic large operation frequently saw PC units move a few kilometers from their 
bases, engage in an inconclusive firefight, and claim large Huk body counts.25 This 
practice made assessing the PC’s effectiveness against the Huks difficult, especially since 
U.S. advisors did not accompany the PC into the field. Over the next year and a half, 
Roxas’s government oscillated between this hard approach and occasional periods of 
negotiation in an attempt to resolve the continuing rebellion. Neither method brought 
about an effective conclusion. 
In June 1947, the Huks adopted a new name for their army, Hukbong 
Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB), which translated to “People’s Liberation Army” in 
recognition of its leaders’ solidarity with the global communist community. They 
maintained their regional command structure and their political arm responsible for 
indoctrinating the peasants in communist teachings. This period marked the beginning of 
the movement’s shift toward hardcore communist doctrine that even included the 
liquidation of members deemed to be bad Communists. Although this adherence to 
communism was meant to unite the peasants in common cause, Filipinos were slow to 
embrace its more radical tenets. 
To maintain the relationship between the U.S. and Philippine militaries, the United 
States established the Joint United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of the 
Philippines (JUSMAGP) on 18 December 1947 under U.S. Army Major General Albert M. 
Jones. JUSMAGP’s stated mission was to furnish advice, supplies and equipment, and 
training opportunities at U.S. military institutions.26 With an authorized strength of only 
fifty-five officers and enlisted, it initially focused on technical training and the transfer of 
equipment but became increasingly involved in the assessment of the anti-Huk campaign 
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and advising the Philippine government of recommended changes.27 In recognition of the 
continuing threats to Philippine security, Washington and Manila agreed on a continuation 
of the 1947 Military Assistance Agreement titled the Mutual Defense Assistance 
Agreement that established the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP). The MDAP 
would be the new vehicle under which all military aid would flow to the AFP. 
Roxas’s government reported on numerous occasions that it was on the verge of 
victory, but it never managed to end the fighting, and Roxas’s sudden death in April 1948 
set up a new phase in the struggle for Filipino rule.28 Upon taking office, Roxas’s 
successor, Vice-President Elpidio Quirino, enacted an amnesty period to reconcile with 
the Huks and put the rebellion to rest. It allowed rebels to receive a pardon in exchange 
for registering their weapons, but it was littered with problems. Throughout the amnesty 
period (21 June to 15 August 1948), neither side completely stopped operations against 
the other. Furthermore, registration was self-incrimination and risked reprisal, which 
made the amnesty too risky for individuals already fighting the government. This effort 
turned out to be mostly futile for the government. 
The end of the amnesty period and the continuation of hostilities coincided with 
the first indication that any senior U.S. official was taking serious note of the Hukbalahap 
problem. In August 1948 the U.S. chargé d’affaires inquired of President Quirino as to 
“the present and immediate future policy of [the] Philippine government toward the 
Hukbalahaps.”29 Quirino responded optimistically that the Huks would surrender their 
arms, although actually there was little incentive for them to do so.30 Additionally, 
Quirino assured the U.S. mission that his forces were holding back to allow for a peaceful 
resolution to the situation, but less than a month later Quirino launched a major operation 
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against the Huks centered on Taruc and his group. As Taruc recounts, “the terror 
immediately launched by Quirino exceeded by far the worst of the Roxas brutalities. 
Murder, torture, raping, looting and wholesale evacuations ensued across Central and 
Southern Luzon.”31 
In April 1949, the Huks assassinated President Quezon’s widow in her car on the 
pretense that she symbolized the worst of the Philippine elite. Quezon was popular during 
his presidency—even while in exile—and had remained so in death.32 The average 
Filipino citizen saw the targeting of his wife as a despicable act that symbolized Huk 
ruthlessness.33 It even sowed discord in the Huk ranks as their members wrestled with 
their communist beliefs versus their Catholic upbringing and nationalist sentiments.34 
The Philippine government’s response to this assassination also gave the first indications 
of what changes needed to be made to the Filipino security apparatus so it could 
effectively combat the Huk threat. Quirino ordered a reprisal operation involving four 
thousand Filipino troops who managed to destroy a Huk regional command after two 
weeks of combat operations.35 This attack showed that larger units could realize 
measurable success against the Huks. In August 1949 Quirino reported to Truman that 
the Huk movement had been eliminated, in part to assuage concerns over U.S. personnel 
stationed at bases in the Philippines.36 
Quirino’s assertions proved to be exaggerated, however, and conditions in the 
Philippines continued to deteriorate. The Huk’s high-water mark came in March 1950 
with attacks on multiple towns and cities that netted vital arms and equipment while 
placing Philippine forces on their heels. The offensive culminated in August with an 
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attack on a PA base resulting in twenty-five soldiers killed and the massacre of patients 
and nurses in the base hospital. By this time, the Huk concentration around Manila was 
becoming so dense that it began to be called “Huklandia” as seen in Figure 6. The 
success of these raids and the Philippine government’s inability to eliminate the Huk 
threat were reflected in a newfound sense of urgency on the part of the United States. 
Figure 6.  Huklandia, 1950 
 
Source: William C. Moore, “The Hukbalahap Insurgency, 1948–1954: An Analysis of the 
Roles, Missions and Doctrine of the Philippine Military Forces” (Individual Study Project 
Report, U.S. Army War College, 1971), 25. 
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E. DEBATE OVER U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES 
Throughout the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines, Washington saw that the 
solution centered on improving the country’s economic conditions. U.S. congressional 
outlays from 1945 to 1952 reflected this assessment, as economic aid was four times as 
great as military aid.37 Nevertheless, the political-military position in 1950 was such that 
money spent rehabilitating the Philippine economy meant little if the security situation 
around the capital continued to deteriorate. Thus, from Washington’s perspective, 
proactive measures to shore up Quirino’s increasingly corrupt government were 
necessary even if distasteful. Additionally, the recent successful advisory effort in Greece 
shaped people’s recommendations. U.S. leaders looked to General Van Fleet’s successful 
mission in Greece for recommendations on JUSMAGP’s force size and personnel with 
advisory expertise to achieve the same results in the Philippines.38 Even though the 
strategic picture was significantly different, the idea that duplication of the input in 
Greece would achieve similar results elsewhere would persist in U.S. civilian and 
military leaders. 
By February 1950 Secretary of State Dean Acheson was already souring on the 
Quirino government as a worthy recipient of U.S. aid. Despite $1.5 billion in aid since its 
liberation, he lamented that “Philippine ineptitude and wastefulness” resulted in a 
Filipino economic situation far short of what they should have attained.39 Acheson’s lack 
of confidence in Quirino was so grave that he even considered recommending his 
removal via unspecified means.40 The U.S. Embassy further assessed in April 1950 that 
the Philippine armed forces’ persistent inability to eliminate the Huk threat and its 
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increasing alienation of the population could “prove fatal—unless . . . remedied.”41 The 
embassy recommended increasing the size of the JUSMAG to provide better instruction 
in anti-guerrilla operations and perhaps drawing on “officers having similar experience in 
the recent operations in Greece,” and moving additional U.S. units into bases on Luzon to 
protect the installations.42 
Major General Jonathan Anderson, JUSMAGP commander, had already been 
pushing the Philippine government to reform and reorganize its method for prosecuting 
the anti-Huk campaign. He identified two key objectives. First, Philippine security forces 
needed to concentrate on internal versus external security.43 The lightly-armed 
constabulary was fighting the Huks, while the smaller but more capable Army focused on 
national defense. Since the United States had already committed itself to the Philippines’ 
external defense, an outward focus was unnecessary; regardless, the PA had little 
capability to defend the country. Second, Anderson thought that the Philippine economy 
needed to be made capable of supporting the necessary forces on its own as quickly as 
possible.44 This latter objective fit with overall U.S. goals to achieve a Philippines that 
was economically and militarily stable for the minimum U.S. investment. Failure to 
appreciate the Huk threat had led the United States mostly to ignore it and had led the 
Philippine government to delegate the defeat of the Huks to the constabulary, which had 
shown itself unsuited to the task. 
At least as early as March 1950, JUSMAGP recognized that the PC was not the 
ideal force for combatting the Huks. It was organized in ninety-nine-man companies and 
focused on internal policing duties. These companies were further divided into platoon-
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sized elements that were “scattered all over the Islands.”45 This dispersion allowed the 
Huks to avoid, harass, or cutoff PC units and attack them piecemeal, which often led to a 
“larger than life” fear of the Huks since they maintained the initiative.46 Furthermore, the 
small PC units were often subject to executing the whims of the provincial officials 
where they were stationed, as opposed to aggressively seeking out the enemy. The PC 
also began its campaign armed as a police force with “billy clubs, side arms, and 
carbines.”47 Only later did it gain the weapons it needed to meet the Huks on an equal 
basis or to decisively outmatch them. Most importantly, however, the PC had earned a 
reputation for treating the citizenry poorly.48 As a result, JUSMAGP recommended 
significant changes to the entire Philippine security construct. First, the constabulary 
needed to shift the bulk of its personnel to the army. These forces would assist in the 
establishment of battalion combat teams (BCTs) and provide the capability to engage and 
destroy Huk units, rather than simply exchange operationally insignificant retaliatory 
harassment. Second, it recommended shifting command of the PC from the Department 
of the Interior to the AFP to ensure a combined, coordinated effort against the Huks.49 
The onset of the Korean War in June 1950 increased Washington’s apprehension 
toward its position in the entire Far East and unlocked billions of dollars in military aid 
for a vast region that, up until that point, had received just a trickle. The JCS stressed the 
need to ensure the Philippines was not a point of weakness in America’s Far East 
defensive perimeter.50 It assessed that the 33,000 Filipino troops should be able to crush 
the 10,000 to 15,000 Huks in one year.51 While it considered the present JUSMAGP size 
as adequate, its members considered “pattern[ing] it generally after the United States 
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Mission in Greece during the recent large-scale guerrilla activities in that country” if the 
needs of the anti-Huk campaign so required it.52 
U.S. Ambassador Myron Cowen went so far as to recommend stationing at least 
one U.S. division in the Philippines, “reestablishing the Philippine scouts on their pre-war 
basis with American officers,” appropriating funds for “anti-Huk covert activities,” and 
increasing the Philippine ground forces to two divisions.53 In contrast, Major General 
Leland Hobbs, the JUSMAGP commander, in an October 1950 letter to General Graves 
Erskine, who had recently conducted a survey mission to the Philippines, referenced the 
“experience in Greece” to determine whether an increase in U.S. personnel beyond the 
thirty-two officers and twenty-six enlisted currently authorized was necessary.54 Hobbs 
and his staff had determined that the Philippine Army was sufficiently effective on its 
own and any additional U.S. advisory strength would detract from its motivation.55 
In November 1950 the NSC approved NSC 84/2, which recognized the “strategic 
importance of the Philippines to the United States” and the threat posed to it by the Huk 
rebellion.56 Although it assessed that the “Huks lack[ed] the capability to acquire control 
of the Philippines,” it recognized that the whole of the Philippines’ problems required 
Washington to “provide such military guidance and assistance as may be deemed 
advisable by the United States and acceptable to the Philippine government” to address 
the military problem.57 Coming as it did after June 1950 and the eruption of conflict in 
Korea, NSC 84/2 affirmed that the United States was “committed to the external defense 
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of the [Philippine] Islands and cannot permit them to be taken by aggression or internal 
subversion.”58 
In conjunction with the military efforts, the Truman-appointed Economic Survey 
Mission to the Philippines continued addressing the economic problems that were at the 
original root of the Huk Rebellion. Although these grievances, rooted in the historical 
condition of the Philippine peasantry, had been somewhat superseded by the communist 
takeover of the movement, addressing them could shore up the political situation and 
prevent the movement’s growth. In October 1950 the Economic Survey Mission 
submitted its situation report and recommended $250 million in U.S. government 
assistance “to help in carrying out a five-year program of economic development and 
technical assistance.”59 
Ultimately, JUSMAGP resisted a significant increase in military involvement—a 
resistance that was fortuitous at a time when every available fighting man was needed to 
stave off a communist takeover of Korea. The military advisors ended up being the voice 
of reason during these months. They determined that the AFP’s deficiencies were 
obvious to all parties and had already transmitted their corrective recommendations to the 
highest Philippine authorities. What was needed was an aggressive Filipino to implement 
the recommendations.  
F. RAMON MAGSAYSAY 
The succession of events that brought Ramon Magsaysay to the office of 
Secretary of National Defense is the stuff of legend in the Philippines. While some argue 
that he owed his success primarily to his friendly relations with the United States, it 
seems that most of his celebrated reputation was justified. As late as June 1952, retired 
Colonel Gyles Merrill was still extolling Magsaysay’s virtues that he witnessed during 
the Second World War. Merrill credits his leadership with providing supplies to other 
USAFFE guerrilla forces during the Japanese occupation and assisting with the U.S. 
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invasion by destroying twenty-eight Japanese aircraft, two bridges, and a radio 
installation; blocking roads that prevented Japanese reinforcements from U.S. 
beachheads; and clearing hundreds of mines.60 
Magsaysay was born in 1907 and grew up in Luzon under modest conditions. He 
excelled in school, mechanical endeavors, and displayed early signs of leadership. His 
college years were mixed, but he eventually found success as a mechanic and became a 
shop superintendent in 1931.61 During the war, he joined the resistance and ended the 
war as a renowned local commander. Following the war, he ran a populist campaign and 
won election to the Philippine House of Representatives in April 1946. From the 
beginning of his time in the Filipino Congress, he immersed himself in military affairs as 
a member of the House Committee on National Defense. One of his major early efforts 
was seeking recognition and benefits for Filipino guerrillas who fought against the 
Japanese during the occupation.62 
Magsaysay was an outspoken critic of the methods that the constabulary used 
against the Huks and Filipino civilians. He used his position to hold accountable 
commanders whom he thought were abusive and were thus counteracting the goal of 
reducing Huk support.63 He also saw a strong government as vital for helping the vast 
majority of poor Filipinos to earn a reasonable living and to have hope for a better 
future.64 Magsaysay’s altruism did not mean he was free of ambition, however. He 
quickly came to understand the workings of government and campaigned for 
appointment to head the House Committee on National Defense, which he won in early 
1948.65 His experience as a guerrilla leader and his perception of the poor effort being 
                                                 
60 “Colonel Gyles Merrill to General Frank Pace,” June 10, 1952, Box 35, Folder 752, Edward 
Lansdale Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, CA. 
61 Jose V. Abueva, Ramon Magsaysay: A Political Biography (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 
1971), 48. 
62 Ibid., 110. 
63 Ibid., 112. 
64 Ibid., 103, 113–14. 
65 Ibid., 115–18. 
 132
made by Filipino security forces against the Huks were two principal motivators for him 
to seek this post.66 
Magsaysay saw the way that the government was addressing the Huk problem 
militarily as haphazard and in need of reform. Thus, he took on the entrenched Philippine 
Army hierarchy and pushed for the retirement of old officers well past their prime, which 
served a dual purpose since some of them still harbored the stigma of collaboration with 
the Japanese. In this role as head of the Committee on National Defense, he became the 
primary emissary for lobbying to the U.S. Congress. Magsaysay also began meeting with 
the JUSMAGP commander, Major General Albert Jones, to gather his organization’s 
assessment of the security needs of the Philippines and feedback on the Huk situation.67 
By this point, many in Washington had become familiar with Congressman 
Magsaysay and began seeing him as capable of righting what was a sinking Philippine 
ship. He was already a rising star in Filipino politics, and President Quirino was seriously 
considering him for the position of Secretary of National Defense.68 Magsaysay’s U.S. 
connections may have finally tipped the scales. Department of State and CIA officials 
pressured Quirino, who appointed Magsaysay to the post beginning 1 September 1950.69 
This decision would prove to be the turning point in what was still a frustratingly drawn 
out campaign. 
Magsaysay’s predecessor, Ruperto Kangleon, was by no means Quirino’s 
incompetent lackey. Ambassador Cowen described him “as a man of unusual honesty and 
sense of duty” but saw that he was handicapped “by the fact that ranking officers of the 
Armed Forces frequently by-pass him, appealing direct to the President, and by the 
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circumstance that the President encourages them to do so.”70 Due to his relationships 
with his military cronies, Quirino had sidelined Kangleon to the point that he could not 
make the military reforms necessary to fight the Huks more effectively. Even as 
Kangleon left office, he remarked disparagingly about Quirino’s failure to follow his 
advice and relieve ineffective officers. Magsaysay recognized this negative interference 
and demanded a free hand to do what was necessary to address the Huk threat 
effectively.71 
Magsaysay wasted no time reforming the military. Within days of taking office, 
he recommended the retirement of thirteen older and underperforming officers including 
the Philippine Air Force commander.72 He also began to clean up the military’s 
reputation for abuse of the peasantry by addressing the past behavior of its members. For 
example, in February 1951, Magsaysay ordered a Filipino lieutenant colonel to return 
from the United States to face a court martial for his and his unit’s behavior while he was 
in command.73 He disciplined intelligence officers who had abused prisoners and warned 
his commanders that they would be held accountable for being afraid to go into the 
field.74 He further oversaw the final reduction in PC forces to seven-thousand and 
assumed command of these forces from the Department of the Interior.75 Napoleon 
Valeriano, one of Magsaysay’s best BCT commanders, writes, “Magsaysay was new, 
dramatic, infinitely energetic, determined to overcome, by any means necessary, the 
obstacles to effective action against the Huk.”76 In his efforts to reform the military and 
the government, Magsaysay benefitted from his relationship with Colonel Edward 
Lansdale—the virtual face of U.S. advisory efforts during the Huk Rebellion. 
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G. COLONEL EDWARD LANSDALE 
It is impossible to describe the U.S. role in the anti-Huk campaign without 
discussing the contributions of Colonel Edward Lansdale, whose naturally outgoing 
personality, initiative, curiosity, and ability to relate to people were his signature 
strengths throughout his military career. Perhaps only T. E. Lawrence’s reputation 
surpasses that of Lansdale in the chronicles of twentieth century military advisors. 
Lansdale appeared to have an above average ability to empathize with the cultures in 
which he lived and seemingly could make friends with virtually anybody. Even during 
the depression years before 1941, he was a successful advertising executive, implying an 
above average amount of talent. Commissioned in the U.S. Army, he served in the Office 
of Strategic Services during the Second World War, transitioned to the Air Force in 1947, 
and began working for the Central Intelligence Agency in 1949. In October 1945 he 
began a three-year tour in the Philippines as an intelligence officer. Not content to sit in 
the office and read reports, Lansdale spent much of his time among the people—
including seeking out Huks who would speak to him—to better understand their 
motivations and, ultimately, their weaknesses.77 
Writing in 1961, Lansdale painted the Huks in a much different light than simply 
as supporters of agrarian reform. In contrast to Taruc’s writings, Lansdale emphasizes 
that the origins of the Huk Rebellion were part of the larger “international communism” 
movement and that its unstated goal was to “win a popular revolution which would put a 
handful of communists in power, to run the country afterwards as ruthless dictators.”78 
Ironically, the Huks saw themselves as having battled a small group of ruthless Filipino 
landowning dictators for years with U.S. support.  
After Lansdale left Manila in November 1948, he continued to follow events in 
the Philippines, especially when he began working for the CIA. In 1950, Lansdale met 
Magsaysay during the latter’s trip to Washington, and advocated within the CIA for his 
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appointment to Secretary of National Defense.79 Subsequently, Lansdale convinced his 
superiors at the CIA to let him return to the Philippines and assist its government in 
fighting the Huks.80 Thus, the conditions were set for Lansdale’s relationship with 
Magsaysay that would achieve legendary status in the U.S. version of the Huk 
Insurgency. Ironically, the anti-Huk campaign would show that the more successful the 
effort, the more credit the United States would attribute to its actions and personalities. 
Biographies of Lansdale give the impression that he was an omniscient 
counterinsurgent who understood the relationship between government responsiveness 
and the needs of the people better than any of his peers.81 As such, historians have 
credited him with being the genesis for economic reform in the Philippines as a way to 
combat the Huk message. This version of the story shortchanges the multitude of State 
Department and military personnel who had worked on U.S.-Filipino relations since 
1945. There was no confusion among U.S. decision makers that economic recovery, 
fighting corruption, and civic action were the prescriptions for alleviating unrest and 
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building the economy in the Philippines.82 The problem was not a failure to understand 
Filipino problems, it was convincing President Quirino to address them effectively. It 
took a more patriotic, altruistic person like Magsaysay who would place country above 
self-interest to make serious changes. 
What seems to be universally accepted is that Lansdale had an infectious 
personality that allowed him to quickly gain Magsaysay’s trust. In his role as personal 
advisor and roommate to Magsaysay, Lansdale served as an objective source of advice 
that was untainted by Filipino politics.83 The American was a committed anti-communist 
who believed in the American ideals of democracy and respect for civilians—ideals that 
also rang true with Magsaysay.84 Lansdale biographer Cecil Currey overwhelmingly 
credits Lansdale for ideas that Magsaysay implemented or operations that he ordered like 
the October 1950 raid that captured nearly the entire Huk Politburo and for the improved 
treatment of civilians by the AFP.85 Currey’s version of the former has Lansdale 
“coordinating a plan with Magsaysay and the Philippine military intelligence people” to 
surprise and arrest over one-hundred senior Huk personnel. From what appears to be the 
more likely version, a Huk deserter gave the information to the government that allowed 
the operation to be so successful. The Lansdale-centric narrative even saw him referred to 
as “Ed Lansdale of Philippine fame” in 1954 state department correspondence between 
two high level diplomats.86  
This narrative discounts Magsaysay’s early successes in business, as a guerrilla 
leader, and as a freshman congressman, which all occurred due to his ability and well 
before his first trip to the United States in 1949. He knew his country’s problems, and his 
service in congress taught him how to effect change, which he used to seek support for 
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veterans and the armed forces.87 Currey also writes, “one suggestion that Lansdale gave 
Magsaysay in those days was to ensure that those who were fighting the Huks 
remembered at the same time to respect the rights of their own countrymen. Magsaysay 
agreed and soon ordered a reorganization of the armed forces.”88 This narrative rings 
hollow since Magsaysay had campaigned against abusive leaders since his first days in 
the Philippine Congress and had been discussing necessary changes to the military 
structure with JUSMAGP before ever meeting Lansdale. A result of this experience 
would be the expectation that Lansdale could repeat it elsewhere. The Lansdale-
Magsaysay relationship was a unique case based off of common ideals and goals. Van 
Fleet thought he had found his savior in Greece, General Papagos, who then promptly 
demanded nearly a doubling of the army before he would initiate offensive operations. 
Likewise, Syngman Rhee in Korea was particularly compliant when his country was in 
grave danger. When he was not happy with the deal being worked out in Kaesong, he 
took measures that threatened to reignite the conflict because his goals had diverged from 
U.S. goals. In the Philippines, the United States got lucky. Furthermore, if Lansdale had 
discovered the secret formula to turn anyone into a popular, charismatic leader, then his 
next assignment in Vietnam would have likely turned out differently. 
Lansdale’s real talent came in making friends, understanding the minds of the 
Huk enemy, and devising schemes to conduct psychological operations through various 
means that the less technologically advanced Filipinos might not have even considered. 
By the end of his tenure in the Philippines, Lansdale had displayed such valuable insight 
into all aspects of the Filipino political and military scene that he was one of the most 
qualified Americans to transmit thoughts on these subjects to U.S. decision makers. 
Lansdale displayed this expertise in a detailed five-page memo to Ambassador Raymond 
Spruance, outlining the political-military situation in the Philippines shortly before the 
1953 elections that brought Magsaysay to the presidency.89 
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H. HUK ERRORS 
Despite their military successes in 1949 and 1950, the Huks made a series of 
decisions that significantly weakened their strategic position. The Huks had always 
consisted of a larger group of disenchanted peasants who simply wanted a fairer 
distribution of crop production from the land they worked. In contrast, the group’s senior 
leaders were committed Communists who sought the type of revolution seen in China 
and Russia. For this Bolshevik side of the movement, there was no room for compromise 
with the government on concessions as an acceptable alternative for revolution. For them, 
the bourgeoisie were evil and had to be liquidated for the sake of the revolution, 
democracy, and freedom. In 1950 the Communists estimated that the unpopular Filipino 
government was ripe to fall, and that the United States was sure to undergo retrenchment 
due to an impending severe recession. Furthermore, the party assessed that their efforts to 
expand their influence had resulted in absolute revolutionary loyalty by the peasants of 
these areas versus grudging acceptance of the Huk presence and their communist 
ideology. Finally, the Communists chose to break away from other opposition parties 
whose goals were similar but who were not sworn to the Communist cause. All of these 
estimates were severe miscalculations.90 
Additionally, Magsaysay’s influence on the AFP’s conduct resulted in better 
treatment of Filipinos compared to the Huks. As the government troops improved their 
behavior, the Huks often had to resort to coercion to maintain adequate supplies.91 This 
shift caused the Huks to slowly lose support of the peasants. Furthermore, despite the 
U.S. belief that the Huk Rebellion was connected to the global Communist movement, 
Taruc writes, “no direct organizational link existed with either Russia or China during my 
years in the Party.”92 The Huks had labeled themselves communists but did not benefit 
from any connection to the global communist movement. 
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The Huks also never consolidated military command in one overall leader. 
Although Taruc was nominally the head of the Huk army, in practice, the Politburo 
retained overall control and moved influential commanders around to prevent them from 
consolidating power.93 This strict Party control diluted Huk command and control and 
made massing Huk forces for a decisive operation virtually impossible. 
Philippine Colonel Napoleon Valeriano and Charles Bohannon, one of Lansdale’s 
lieutenants, nevertheless estimate that the Huks might have been capable of overthrowing 
the government, based simply on their proximity to Manila. Why they never organized 
and launched an effort to this effect remains somewhat of a mystery, although Valeriano 
and Bohannon hypothesize that the Huk leadership wedded itself to strict communist 
doctrine calling for establishing and growing a power base before launching the decisive 
effort.94 This assessment conflicts with Taruc’s narrative that the Communist leadership 
decided to undertake decisive operations in 1950. The scope of these operations never 
progressed beyond small-scale raids, however, and did not risk overthrowing the central 
government. Regardless, the changes Magsaysay implemented combined with a 
catastrophic Huk failure in operational security resulted in the rapid collapse of the Huk 
movement beginning in September 1950. 
I. THE MAGSAYSAY MIRACLE 
Magsaysay had two main challenges as Secretary of National Defense: improving 
the effectiveness of the security forces and reducing the Huk support base. Fortunately 
for him, he inherited changes that JUSMAGP had already convinced Quirino to begin 
implementing in April 1950. These changes involved a wholesale restructuring of the 
army and constabulary that recognized the Huk Rebellion as the most important and 
immediate security threat to a stable Philippines. JUSMAGP had advocated reducing the 
PC to seven-thousand personnel and shifting the remainder to the PA to establish fifteen 
BCTs of approximately 1200 soldiers each with all of the necessary supporting arms to 
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locate, isolate, and destroy Huk concentrations.95 Furthermore, these BCTs were assigned 
a sector to secure and reported to the Army Chief of Staff through military commanders 
versus to the provincial civilian leadership.96 Finally, the PC retained its role of being 
responsible for law and order, but all forces fell under the Secretary of National Defense 
for prosecuting the anti-Huk campaign.97 There was no dilution of effort; each BCT was 
a self-contained unit that was not dependent on cobbling together disparate elements that 
reported to a separate organization or provincial leader. Thus, the chain of command was 
clearly defined and uncluttered by other interfering parties like the PC had experienced 
throughout its time prosecuting the anti-Huk campaign before this reorganization when 
provincial leadership sometimes interfered with military operations for local reasons.  
The BCTs also received intelligence capability because of JUSMAGP 
recommendations. Decentralized intelligence gathering and analysis were critical to the 
anti-Huk campaign. This addition significantly improved the BCT performance against 
the elusive Huks. This large reorganization did come at a cost, however. JUSMAGP 
reported that unit cohesion had been damaged by breaking up all of the PC units to form 
BCTs.98 Nevertheless, in the months that followed, these changes proved their worth 
against the Huks. With the United States providing the equipment for these BCTs and the 
Huks receiving nothing but what they could scrounge or steal from depots, the Huks were 
outmatched from that point forward. 
Fortune shone brightly on Magsaysay within a few weeks of his appointment as 
Secretary. Perhaps unbeknownst to him, the Huks had decided to strike Manila on 
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Christmas 1950.99 Shortly after taking office in September, however, Magsaysay gained 
intelligence on a woman who was the courier to all of the communist leaders in 
Manila.100 By following her delivery route, his forces marked suspect locations and 
arrested nearly the entire Huk Politburo, 105 personnel, in one lightning operation on 19 
October 1950.101 Although the Huks elected new membership shortly thereafter, the 
movement was never the same. William Pomeroy, an American deserter turned Huk, 
describes his feelings when he learned of his comrades’ arrest: “ours is the feeling that 
divers have when their air hoses are cut deep down in the jagged caverned coral reefs, or 
that men have in mines when the tunnel behind them caves in and the choking dust rushes 
through the dark hole underground.”102 He further laments that “it is the worst possible 
news, for the whole direction of the struggle was in the hands of those arrested.”103 
Ultimately, twenty-six were imprisoned for their crimes against the state, and the 
operation significantly disrupted Huk plans and organization.104 
In January 1951 JUSMAGP reported its list of accomplishments over the previous 
six months, including the establishment of six new BCTs for a total of sixteen, 
streamlining the chain of command, and a “change in the entire philosophy of the 
dissident campaign from one of police-minded static defense to one of aggressive action 
against located HMB units.”105 At many points before the reorganization, the 
constabulary had attempted aggressive campaigns against the Huks only to fail. 
JUSMAGP’s recommendations to reorganize, U.S. support in equipping the BCTs, and, 
most importantly, fresh leadership began to turn the tide in the stalemated effort. 
In January 1951 Magsaysay launched Operation Saber. This operation had key 
characteristics with which the Huks previously had only limited experience. First, the 
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BCT organization meant the government forces possessed sufficiently-sized units to 
conduct more than pinprick raids against Huk forces. While part of the force conducted 
clearing operations, the remainder could pursue or encircle the enemy. Second, improved 
armament and logistics, specifically rations, provided by the United States allowed the 
AFP to minimize the looting or seizure of property in the barrios. Third, Magsaysay 
aimed to change the culture of the government forces fighting against the Huks. As 
Valeriano writes, “Magsaysay issued a statement to the armed forces declaring that every 
soldier had two duties: first, to act as an ambassador of good will from the government to 
the people; second, to kill or capture the Huk. Nothing else, he said, really counted as far 
as he was concerned.”106 Magsaysay also changed the government’s message toward the 
Huks to “All Out Friend or All Out Force.” With this motto, he promised aggressive 
action against those who chose to continue fighting against the government and 
conciliatory action toward those who chose to give up the fighting and rejoin the law-
abiding Filipinos.107 
Providing written guidance to his troops and producing catchy slogans was one 
thing, but Magsaysay enforced his standards with an indefatigable work ethic that saw 
him visiting his troops in the field constantly. He was quick to praise those who 
maintained high standards and to criticize or relieve officers who took a lackadaisical 
approach toward their responsibilities. Magsaysay was not about to accept less than 100 
percent from himself or his subordinates, and it began to show in the improved 
performance of the AFP. As Taruc writes, “the new discipline he [Magsaysay] imposed 
within the army, his good public relations, and his treatment of Huks who had 
surrendered or had been captured and who were willing to turn over a new leaf, seriously 
threatened the morale of our rank and file, which had, incidentally, been at its peak 
during the period of the ‘mailed-fist’ and terrorist policies.”108 
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With JUSMAGP and Lansdale’s help, Magsaysay established the Civil Affairs 
Office to implement all non-warfighting activities.109 These included many ancillary 
services that were meant to address grievances and reduce Huk influence in their 
strongest areas. Magsaysay made his military judicial system available to adjudicate land 
disputes. He established a direct line for everyday Filipinos to send messages directly to 
his office for a very small fee and medical care to civilians hurt during government 
operations against the Huks. Finally, and most controversially, he opened a land 
redistribution program to reformed Huks.110 
While the military actions of attacking and eliminating Huk forces and safe areas 
were the decisive effort, civic actions played an important role in showing that the elected 
government could address many long-standing peasant frustrations. They gave the Huk 
rank and file a reason to quit the organization and return to a normal life, perhaps in an 
even better condition than they had been in before. Magsaysay took liberties as Secretary 
of National Defense to establish some of these programs even though he did not 
specifically have the authority to spend defense dollars on domestic programs. He saw 
them as necessary to counter Huk messages of agrarian reform and land redistribution. 
The most renowned of these efforts was the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR), 
which was a resettlement plan with land grants and pardons for Huk prisoners who 
promised to renounce fighting the government and become peaceful farmers. This plan 
consisted of land set aside on Mindanao and settled by retired Filipino soldiers into which 
the government introduced a small percentage of reformed ex-Huks. This program gave 
Huks the choice to achieve what they were ostensibly fighting for while offsetting the 
humiliation of surrender. Despite its promise, the EDCOR resettlement program was 
never an overwhelming success. Perhaps only two hundred Huks relocated to the farms, 
and fewer than half of those surveyed had even heard of it before surrendering.111 
Furthermore, it served as ammunition for Magsaysay’s opponents in the 1953 presidential 
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election because of the questionable use of military funds for civic projects.112 It 
nevertheless played an outsized propaganda role by making cooperation with the 
government look more attractive than armed insurrection, which appeared more likely to 
result in death or imprisonment as government forces continued to put pressure on the 
Huks.113 
On the psychological operations side of the coin is where Lansdale’s expertise 
and creativity truly flourished. He contributed to ideas and planning designed to sow 
discord among the Huks by making them question their equipment and each other’s 
loyalty. These operations included seeding the battlefield with “exploding radios, 
flashlights, and doctored Huk weapons” that the Huks then used to their detriment.114 
One type of operation required well-developed intelligence on Huk formations. Huk 
members were addressed publicly over loudspeakers or in village gatherings and thanked 
as informers to make their comrades question their fealty.115 Other operations aimed 
simply to draw support away from the Huks by appealing to their sense of humanity. For 
example, a Filipino government sector commander discovered a Huk commander’s wife 
was expecting a baby. Upon delivery, the sector commander sent a doctor and nurse to 
the village and flew overhead offering his congratulations. This act of thoughtfulness 
contributed to the Huk commander’s decision to surrender himself and the rest of his 
platoon.116 Meanwhile, word of this treatment spread, which was certainly more valuable 
than the individual action. 
On strictly military terms, however, Lansdale’s advice was perhaps not as fruitful. 
He proposed the creation of an airborne BCT that he thought would be especially useful 
as a mobile force to help block retreating Huk formations. He managed to obtain the 
necessary equipment while in Washington and assisted in the BCT’s formation and 
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training.117 Despite this effort and a number of opportunities to employ it, however, 
JUSMAGP stymied his efforts and the BCT was deactivated on 15 August 1953.118 Since 
the airborne BCT was never tested, it is impossible to definitively state whether it would 
have been effective. Based on U.S. experiences with airborne troops, however, it seems 
likely that dropping hundreds of inexperienced personnel into jungle areas would have 
resulted in mass confusion and injury, while still allowing Huks to escape through 
jumbled, disorganized lines. 
By July 1951 Magsaysay had won over JUSMAGP, which was evident by its 
reporting that “the United States is fortunate in having, in the person of the Secretary of 
National Defense of the Philippines, the Hon. Ramon Magsaysay, whose forthright 
honesty, aggressiveness, and courage coupled with a genuine admiration and faith in the 
United States is continuing to correct many of the deficiencies which have lessened the 
efficiency of the AFP in the past.”119 Furthermore, his troops were displaying increased 
aggressiveness in the field. The days of constabulary companies shooting a few rounds in 
the air and submitting fictitious casualty reports were over. 
The centralized command and control recommended by JUSMAGP and fully 
implemented under Magsaysay allowed for coordinated follow-on campaigns to Saber. 
These operations resulted in the Huks losing control of the populated areas they relied on 
for logistical support. Once the AFP was able to control the barrios, the Huks were left 
without reliable sources of food or supplies. Trapped as they were in the swamps and 
forests of Luzon, the Huks could not retreat to an area that offered them a long-term 
ability to sustain themselves. It was only a matter of time before they starved to death, 
fought a pitched battle out of desperation, or surrendered.120 
By September 1951 even the safety of the forested mountains of Luzon was 
melting away for the Huks. U.S. Army deserter William Pomeroy recounts his attempts 
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to evade the ever-tightening noose of AFP BCTs as they sought to stomp out the 
remainder of the Huks. There was ultimately no escape from the island, and the isolated 
safe havens the Huks used to their advantage could not sustain them as food sources for 
very long. In less than a year, the Huks had gone from installing their leadership in the 
capital and dreaming of a grand armed revolt to being, as Pomeroy describes, “less than 
beggar[s]; we are the hunted.”121 Taruc, Pomeroy, and their followers escaped, half-
starved, to northern Luzon in 1952, but little infrastructure awaited the last remnants of 
the Huk leadership. The AFP captured Pomeroy in April 1952.122 
By November 1952, the PA had grown to twenty-six BCTs consisting of 39,400 
soldiers, including 1500 who had attended U.S. service schools.123 Another 450 were 
scheduled to attend in Fiscal Year 1953, which JUSMAGP commander Major General 
Albert Pierson assessed would “only result in an impressive improvement in all levels of 
operations in the Armed Forces.”124 He also reported that the Huks had diminished to a 
mere 4,000 armed troops and perhaps 40,000 sympathizers and supporters.125 By July 
1953, these numbers had dwindled to 33,576 sympathizers and 2,691 armed troops, and 
JUSMAGP had captured Huk documents that directed their forces to avoid armed 
conflict in an attempt to seek peaceful resolution in conjunction with the 1953 
elections.126 The AFP nevertheless maintained pressure on Taruc and his followers, and 
Taruc surrendered in May 1954. Writing from prison, he admits that “democracy and 
freedom can never be realized under Communism.”127 He nevertheless had fought 
against the AFP for nine years before realizing that Filipino Communists cared less about 
their fellow countrymen than the government he was fighting. 
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As the anti-Huk campaign subsided, President Quirino began to begrudge 
Magsaysay’s popularity among the people and U.S. officials. As the war concluded, the 
United States shifted support to Magsaysay in the 1953 elections since Quirino had failed 
to take the necessary steps to address the root causes of the country’s problems. Despite 
Quirino’s attempt to recruit Magsaysay as his vice president, Magsaysay resigned as 
Secretary of National Defense and handily won the election against Quirino due to his 
charisma, the respect he had won from the people, and perhaps some help from his U.S. 
advisor.128 
J. CONCLUSION 
The Huk Rebellion never seriously threatened Philippine security. It began as a 
small movement and flourished because the government proved inept at defeating it 
while simultaneously lending it additional legitimacy due to the constabulary’s poor 
treatment of civilians and the Quirino administration’s ongoing corruption. Whether the 
Philippine government would have formulated and enacted on its own the necessary 
changes that JUSMAGP recommended seems unlikely. Allowed to smolder indefinitely, 
the Huk problem had the potential to grow out of control. The natural position of the 
Philippines and Washington’s assurance of its protection from external enemies allowed 
all security forces in the Philippines to concentrate on the Huks as the primary security 
threat. It also prevented the Huks from receiving any meaningful outside help apart from 
moral support. The only real possibility for Huk success might have been a surprise coup 
on the heels of North Korean aggression in June 1950. Timely action on the 
government’s part under Magsaysay prevented any organized Huk action from 
accomplishing this feat, which illustrated the movement’s fragmented nature and its 
isolation from the global communist movement. 
                                                 
128 To what extent Lansdale was able to influence the elections that resulted in Magsaysay’s 
presidency is a matter of real debate. As Jonathan Nashel recounts, Lansdale assisted Magsaysay in his 
campaign with slogans, songs, and buttons. It seems far-fetched that these gimmicks would have been 
enough to win the election unless Magsaysay was already popular. Nashel, Edward Lansdale’s Cold War 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005), 33–37. For more on Magsaysay’s popularity during 
the election, see: Smith, Philippine Freedom, 168–69; Greenberg, Hukbalahap Insurrection, 137–38. 
 148
The series of decisions the Huks made in aligning themselves with extreme 
communist ideology during the late 1940s did little to endear them to the population that 
they depended on for support. The anti-religion communists were at odds with a 
population identifying itself as one of the most Catholic in the world. Furthermore, these 
decisions allowed the United States and other western nations to label the Huk movement 
as communist, which served as an immediate source of support from other established 
anti-communist movements. If the Huks had guarded their public persona as a poorly-
treated peasant group, they would likely have faced less U.S. resistance and perhaps even 
support from some elements within the U.S. government more sympathetic to their 
plight. Following the 1950 arrest of the communist leadership, the newly elected 
replacements did not seriously consider retrenchment. Instead, they adopted an 
aggressive policy of armed struggle that doomed the Huks to virtual extinction against a 
reorganized and re-motivated AFP. 
The United States resisted the temptation to intervene directly in the Philippines 
or even to significantly grow the size of JUSMAGP to provide field advice to individual 
battalions. This decision was understandably more difficult in the wake of the communist 
invasion of South Korea that was perceived as perhaps the beginning of a larger global 
communist expansion by force of arms. JUSMAGP recognized the Filipino soldier’s 
potential and contributed adequate military aid to outfit the BCTs formed under U.S. 
advisors’ guidance. A combination of proper military command and control by placing 
internal security under the Philippine Army, adequate-sized individual units for the 
mission, and a change in defense leadership that started with Magsaysay but filtered 
down to key subordinates combined produced success in the anti-Huk campaign. 
American advisors provided critical insight into the shortcomings of the military effort, 
and the Filipinos began acting on them even before Magsaysay arrived in the Secretary’s 
office. His arrival provided a sense of urgency and energy to the endeavor that had not 
existed at any point since liberation. Since the United States would not allow its bases to 
be attacked or its long-standing position in the Philippines to be threatened, it was willing 
make an even larger investment than what was actually required. Like in Greece and 
Korea, the Philippine government shouldered a heavy load for supporting its army. Major 
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General Pierson reported in August 1952 that 43 percent of the Philippine national budget 
went to the Department of National Defense.129 
The members of JUSMAGP identified the shortcomings of the AFP early and 
began taking action to implement the recommended changes in addition to serving as the 
vital conduit for the weapons that gave the AFP an advantage over the Huks. It took a 
charismatic personality like Magsaysay’s to put the plan into action within a reasonable 
amount of time. His direct, personal involvement helped to improve his troops’ behavior 
toward the population and to instill an aggressive spirit in the army that transformed the 
anti-Huk campaign in a matter of months. Furthermore, his altruistic public persona and 
the government programs he implemented to help those who swore off armed revolt 
implied an honest willingness to govern effectively, which had been largely absent since 
liberation. 
Good fortune seemed to surround Magsaysay in nearly every endeavor. His rise to 
prominence in Filipino politics, including his rapid ascension to head of the Committee 
on National Defense despite possessing zero experience before 1946, was remarkable. 
Magsaysay, whose personal qualities included an ideal balance between ambition and 
benevolence, came to the attention of U.S. decision makers at the right time, which may 
have helped him advance to the post of Secretary of National Defense. Immediately 
following his appointment, at least some luck intervened to allow his forces to develop 
the intelligence and operation that netted nearly all of the Huk communist leadership in 
one masterful stroke. That he survived, despite an overwhelming desire among the Huks 
to assassinate him, was merely the final impossible act of his success against the Huk 
enemy. Valeriano and Bohannon assess the differences between the two most prominent 
leaders: “Luis Taruc, most influential of the Huk, achieved that position because of his 
love for his fellow men and his distorted view of a society in which he was unable to 
work his way through school. Ramon Magsaysay defeated him because of his love for his 
fellow men and his clear view of a political system that enabled him eventually to 
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become his country’s best-loved President.”130 The greatest tragedy in the Philippine 
story is that Magsaysay died when he did. Otherwise, the corruption-wracked 
governments that followed might have been tempered. 
The American experience in the Philippines represented an almost ideal 
environment in which advisors could be expected to succeed with reasonable certainty. 
From serious implementation of advice to the end of major resistance took about 18 
months while scattered resistance lasted until 1956. Success depended heavily on the 
fortuitous coming to power of the right individual, Magsaysay, at the right time. With a 
lesser individual, the advisory mission likely would have had to grow so its members 
could spend more time in the field with their units. Attempting to overcome 
incompetence at the top by building competence at the bottom was unlikely to have had 
the same effect in such a short time. Fortunately, additional manpower was unnecessary, 
and the United States was able to realize its foreign policy goals in the Philippines with 
only a fraction of the advisors that other efforts required. 
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V. U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS IN INDOCHINA: DRAGGED 
INTO THE FRENCH MORASS 
In 1950 the United States, increasingly committed to preventing the spread of 
communism, above all in Europe but also more generally, began supporting France’s 
effort in Vietnam to defeat the communist Viet Minh forces under Ho Chi Minh.131 The 
purpose of this support was twofold: to prevent a communist expansion into Southeast 
Asia and to reinforce the U.S. position in Europe where France was one of the key pillars 
for resisting Soviet aggression.132 Up to that point, Washington had remained generally 
detached from Southeast Asia, but it calculated that French failure there risked further 
losses in the region and even greater repercussions in Europe. Despite the precariousness 
of their position, however, the French were also wary of the generally anti-colonial 
coloration of American policy in Asia, and they were unwilling to countenance any 
significant outside involvement in what they considered their rightful sphere of influence. 
Thus, U.S. military advisors became an avenue for support that was both essential and 
grudgingly accepted. They were present from the very beginning of U.S. participation in 
Vietnam under the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina. 
From 1950 to 1954, U.S. advisors were obliged to support a French strategy that 
had little hope of success. France’s objective—hegemony over Vietnam—ran headlong 
into burgeoning Vietnamese nationalism, which France’s defeat in 1940 had allowed to 
flourish. The Viet Minh were the most significant and determined of Vietnam’s postwar 
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political parties, among which anti-Japanese and anti-French attitudes were the rule.133 
French and U.S foreign policy toward Vietnam relegated U.S. advisors to a supporting 
role consisting almost exclusively of filling French requisitions for U.S. equipment, but 
their role also ensured that they would become well informed about, and increasingly 
frustrated with, the French conduct of the war.  
U.S. criticism of the French military effort centered on four general themes: a 
failure to aggressively pursue and destroy the Viet Minh, insufficient effort toward 
building a non-communist Vietnamese army, a failure to cultivate native Vietnamese 
army leadership, and adherence to a battalion-centric organization when faced with a 
division-centric enemy.134 Despite identifying these weaknesses, and despite France’s 
growing financial dependence on the United States, American advisors were never able 
to influence the French conduct of the war in a meaningful way.135   
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A. FROM LIBERATION TO U.S. INVOLVEMENT 
As the Second World War wound down, France moved to resume control of its 
pre-war colonies in Indochina.136 President Roosevelt, rhetorically a staunch anti-
colonialist, declined to take a definitive stance against this move, stating that a decision 
on Indochina’s future was “a matter for post-war.”137 His death in April 1945 removed 
this potential external impediment to France’s reassuming its position in Vietnam, and 
the following month Washington assured Paris that the U.S. government had no record of 
ever “questioning, even by implication, French sovereignty over Indo-China.”138 France 
had won the tacit approval of the most important postwar power to resume its station in 
Vietnam. 
Following the Japanese surrender, Chinese Nationalist and British troops 
occupied north and south Vietnam, respectively. They encountered a well-established 
Viet Minh force under Ho Chi Minh and General Vo Nguyen Giap that already controlled 
much of the country, particularly in the north, and numbered approximately 50,000 
armed fighters.139 Ho established the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) on 2 
September 1945 in hopes of finally achieving Vietnamese independence, a goal he had 
pursued for most of his life. The British actively assisted the French in regaining control 
in the south, but the Chinese demurred, which allowed the Viet Minh to expand its 
support base in the north. By mid-1946 these occupation troops had departed, leaving the 
French to face the growing Viet Minh nationalist movement. The Communists wanted 
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full independence, but France wanted to resume the control over every aspect of 
Vietnamese affairs that it had enjoyed before the Japanese occupation. Negotiations on 
this issue were unsuccessful and resulted in a large-scale shooting war that erupted in 
November 1946 concentrated primarily in Tonkin.140 By early 1947 the French had 
reestablished control over the large populated areas, an important series of fortifications 
along the Chinese border, and the main roads. Also, they could generally seize and hold 
any terrain they wished. Nevertheless, the Viet Minh was quickly eroding whatever 
French support existed in the countryside and was building up its forces. 
  
                                                 
140 The French and Ho Chi Minh signed a number of agreements in 1946 that granted a vague 
independence to Vietnam, but the French did not live up to their end of the agreements. 
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Figure 7.  Map of Vietnam 
 
Source: Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941–1960 
(Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1983), 6 
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In an attempt to find a pro-French counterbalance to Ho Chi Minh, Paris 
convinced self-exiled former emperor of Vietnam, Bao Dai, to become head of the new 
State of Vietnam (SoV), promising him “complete administrative autonomy.”141 This 
construct did little to build a popular anti-communist, pro-French coalition, however, and 
the French position became more precarious as time progressed. In September 1948 
Washington assessed that France was “fighting a desperate and apparently losing struggle 
in Indochina.”142 This drag on the French military and economy meant they would be 
less able to recover from the effects of the Second World War and defend against Soviet 
aggression in Europe, which Washington saw as the critical theater. By this time France 
was even shipping U.S.-supplied weapons meant for European defense to its forces in 
Indochina.143 Furthermore, French Communists were a strong force in their own 
government, and Western European countries falling to communism was a real fear after 
1945.144 Yet, the State Department had no solution to the Indochina situation since 
France could neither defeat the Viet Minh nor concede real independence for Vietnam. 
Overt U.S. support for France’s effort risked alienating other Southeast Asian countries, 
who would view the United States as a new colonialist. Yet Washington also saw Ho Chi 
Minh as part of the global communist conspiracy it was confronting in Greece, Korea, 
and a blockaded Berlin.145 
                                                 
141 Bao Dai had been a figurehead emperor under the French and Japanese but abdicated in 1945 and 
supported Ho’s DRV. Since then, he had spent much of his time outside of Vietnam, either in France or 
Hong Kong. The French, and Americans, hoped that the “Bao Dai solution” could be a popular, non-
communist Vietnamese government alternative to Ho’s DRV. This idea ended up being based more on 
hope than reality, although it remained prominent in U.S. NSC discourse through 1955. For more, see 
OSD, U.S.-VN Relations, 1945–1967, vol. 2, U.S. Involvement in the Franco-Viet Minh War 1950–1954, 
A5–A14, http://media.nara.gov/research/pentagon-papers/Pentagon-Papers-Part-II.pdf; “The Ambassador 
in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State,” telegram, February 25, 1949, DOS, FRUS, 1949, Far East 
and Australasia, 7:9. 
142 “Department of State Policy Statement on Indochina,” memorandum, September 27, 1948, DOS, 
FRUS, 1948, Far East and Australasia, 6:48. 
143 Ibid., 45. 
144 For example, the French Communists won the largest share of the French government in the 1945 
elections, 26 percent, and communist parties had significant popular support throughout Western Europe. 
Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 70. 
145 “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in China,” telegram, July 2, 1948, DOS, FRUS, 1948, Far 
East and Australasia, 6:28–29. 
 157
In September 1949 French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman notified Secretary 
of State Dean Acheson that the French “would need assistance to hold Indochina,” since 
the war was consuming one-eighth of France’s total budget.146 Additionally, Communist 
China’s victory over Chiang Kai Shek’s Nationalists in 1949 allowed the Viet Minh 
access to arms and materiel that had previously been in short supply.147 By December 
1949, the French had 150,000 troops in Indochina and had suffered 30,000 casualties 
with the Viet Minh’s position only strengthening.148 By law, France could not send 
conscripted soldiers to Vietnam, so the drain on its professional manpower was severe. 
Further Viet Minh successes led Beijing and Moscow to recognize the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam in January 1950, followed by U.S. recognition of the Bao Dai 
government in February. Unlike what the West faced in Greece and the Philippines, the 
communist bloc was willing and able to give moral and material support to the 
Vietnamese Communists.149 The combination of negative factors—an unpopular 
colonialist occupying power, the lack of a Vietnamese alternative to the Communists, a 
large and motivated enemy force, and a shared border with another communist country—
was more daunting than at the outset of any previous advisory effort. 
The United States took action in April 1950 when President Truman signed 
National Security Council Report 64 (NSC 64). The report concluded that the fall of 
Indochina to communism would be followed by communist victories in Thailand and 
Burma and stated that the “Departments of State and Defense should prepare . . . a 
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program of all practicable measures designed to protect United States security interests in 
Indochina.”150 The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred with the NSC findings, arguing in 
addition that the loss of Southeast Asia “would contribute to [the] probable eventual fall 
to the Communists” of the Philippines, Malaya, and Indonesia.151 To prevent this loss, 
the JCS recommended a number of preventive measures including the creation of a 
“military aid group in Indochina,” which led to the establishment of MAAG, Indochina, 
in September 1950 under the command of Brigadier General Francis Brink.152 General 
Brink had served in East Asia since 1938, and there were few American officers more 
qualified to lead the mission.153 In May, President Truman approved $10 million from 
the Military Assistance Program budget to aid Vietnam.  
The outbreak of the Korean War in June reinforced the fear of a general 
communist ascendancy in Asia and led to the commitment of even greater resources for 
Indochina.154 U.S. leaders initially debated providing aid directly to the Bao Dai 
government in recognition of its supposed independence, but French leaders protested 
vehemently. In the end, Washington capitulated and provided aid directly to the French. 
This decision meant that French politics would dominate Washington’s foreign policy in 
Indochina through 1954.  
B. AMERICAN FRUSTRATION AND FRENCH DISASTER 
In the months prior to the MAAG’s establishment, the Viet Minh had pushed the 
French out of their fortifications along the Sino-Vietnamese border, allowing unfettered 
infiltration of men and materiel from Communist China and crushing a large French force 
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in the process.155 This reversal of fortune contributed to Paris’s decision to send one of 
its most able generals, Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, to assume command in Indochina. 
Described by Stanley Karnow as “a Gallic version of MacArthur,” de Lattre 
reinvigorated his troops and, with the help of timely U.S. assistance, blunted a major Viet 
Minh offensive in early 1951.156 At a minimum, de Lattre’s arrival gave hope that 
American assistance would not be thrown away to no purpose. 
The MAAG’s mission was “to insure full coordination of military plans and 
efforts between the French and Vietnamese forces and to supervise the allocation of 
materiel.”157 In contrast to the advisory missions in Greece and Korea, the mission 
statement did not explicitly mention providing advice, yet U.S. leaders expected General 
Brink to make suggestions to the French if he had insights to offer and to report back to 
his superiors on the use or misuse of U.S. equipment. Although the French were eager for 
U.S. assistance, they had little interest in establishing a peer-level advisory relationship 
like that of previous U.S. advisory efforts.158 They viewed the Americans chiefly as an 
equipment delivery service.  
Even in this limited role, the MAAG still found the French to be extremely 
difficult allies. Equipment inspections required two months’ advance notice and were 
only approved if the French determined that the amount of equipment was “sufficient to 
warrant a visit,” and if the unit would be “free from tactical operations.”159 The result 
was mutual animosity that saw American MAAG personnel meticulously scrutinize 
French equipment requests, and, as Colonel Donald Dunn recounts, the MAAG members 
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would often cross out “the whole thing [the request] and say you’re not allowed to have 
this, it’s not . . . in the (perview) [sic] of the agreement, of the (MDAP).”160 Despite these 
occasional disagreements over logistics, the French generally could be counted on to 
employ and care for the U.S.-supplied equipment properly. The same could not be said 
about their creation, the Vietnamese National Army (VNA). 
The United States realized early that defeating the Viet Minh would require an 
effective native army that could one day take over the fighting from the French. Limited 
as it was to volunteers, the native French contribution to the French Expeditionary Corps 
in Vietnam was always fewer than 100,000, hardly enough to defeat the estimated 
300,000 Viet Minh forces they would eventually face.161 French and “Associated State” 
forces in Vietnam would eventually number over 400,000, but 88 percent were sourced 
from outside of France proper.162 Furthermore, the two sides remained closely matched 
in numbers of forces facing each other in Tonkin throughout the war. Brink’s assessment 
shortly after his arrival underscored the operational situation: “It must be assumed that, in 
general, [the] French are fighting in unfriendly territory in all their military efforts in 
Vietnam.”163 He further warned that the “formation of [the] Vietnamese Army is still 
under discussion, and [is] not likely to become [a] consolidated force within a year, and 
will not have any appreciable military value before 1952.”164 Thus, began a string of 
projections for a time when the VNA would be prepared to relieve the French from the 
bulk of the fighting, especially since it numbered only 16,000 in May 1950 and lacked 
the senior leadership, staffs, and institutions necessary for long-term independent 
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sustainment.165 French resistance in building a capable Vietnamese Army was an ever-
increasing source of friction between the Americans and the French. At one point, 
General Brink proposed to General de Lattre the possibility of bringing U.S. personnel to 
assist in training the VNA. According to Brink’s aide, de Lattre berated Brink for his 
suggestion, stating obstinately that the French would fight with and train the Vietnamese 
army and that the Americans should just fill French equipment requisitions.166 Living up 
to his comparison to MacArthur, de Lattre had established the Franco-American 
relationship for the rest of the war. 
A renewed French spirit and the timely arrival of U.S. supplies stabilized the 
situation in 1951, but the Viet Minh was undeterred. General Brink’s February 1952 
estimate confirmed that “[an] increase in firepower brought about largely by accelerated 
delivery of MDAP items” had contributed significantly to French success under de 
Lattre.167 Most discouraging, however, was Brink’s assessment of the French efforts 
toward building a Vietnamese Army. In September 1951, de Lattre claimed that 
Vietnamese forces consisted of 240,000 troops split evenly between the national army 
and the French army.168 Yet, Brink reported that there were only 35,420 regular VNA 
troops and 27,000 National Guard in February 1952, and that they were incapable of 
defending themselves against the Viet Minh without French assistance.169 French 
duplicity on this point simply contributed to the overall spirit of distrust between the two 
parties. Furthermore, the French allowed little contact between U.S. and Vietnamese 
troops. Thus, the MAAG could only give a rough estimate of 50 percent effectiveness 
across the board for “Associated States” military forces.170 Brink also disparaged the lack 
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of effective Vietnamese leadership at anything higher than company level.171 The 
creation of a capable Vietnamese army with native senior leadership threatened the 
French position in Indochina; thus, the French neglected to cultivate it even though it was 
necessary for victory.172 Likewise, there was little incentive for Vietnamese with any 
sense of nationalism to serve in the VNA since victory meant the continuation of French 
rule. 
The year 1952 saw new French and MAAG commanders in Indochina, but new 
personalities did not drastically alter the MAAG’s role.173 Brink’s replacement, Brigadier 
General Thomas Trapnell, was a veteran of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines and 
an airborne regimental combat team commander in Korea. He brought new energy to the 
MAAG and assisted the French in obtaining additional airlift with the hope that the 
French would use the aircraft to increase their mobility and offensive action against the 
Viet Minh. He began by supporting French requests for additional C-47 cargo planes to 
increase the French airlift capability. With a large number of forces tied down in static 
defenses, the French sought the mobility, surprise, and flexibility that came with airborne 
forces. Trapnell delivered on the French requests and even managed to supply U.S. 
maintenance crews to handle the extra workload. His efforts supported the French ability 
to resupply isolated posts and reinforce those that were besieged, but this reliance on air 
operations eventually caught up with them.174 
In June 1952 President Truman signed NSC 124/2, which signaled a role reversal 
between the French and Americans. The French were becoming war weary, but 
Washington was increasingly willing to ignore the colonialist aspect of France’s effort in 
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Indochina and had come to view the region strictly as a critical bulwark against the 
spread of communism in Asia. Thus, the NSC position paper stressed that Washington 
would “employ every feasible means to influence the French government and people 
against any conclusion of the struggle on terms inconsistent with basic U.S. objectives,” 
which were dominated by the goal of “prevent[ing] the countries of Southeast Asia from 
passing into the communist orbit.”175 Without a fundamental change in the Franco-
American relationship in Vietnam, however, U.S. influence there was minimal. 
Furthermore, the United States was not the only foreign power seeking to affect the 
outcome of France’s war. Communist Chinese support also began to make itself felt. In 
1952 the Viet Minh received an estimated 40,000 rifles, 45 anti-aircraft guns, and 30 field 
guns from China.176 Additionally, Chinese advisors mentored Viet Minh commanders in 
the field and sponsored them in Chinese military schools.177 This direct assistance stood 
in stark contrast to fruitless American attempts to coerce the French into improving the 
VNA. 
General Trapnell recognized the continuing problem of the lack of a Vietnamese 
Army that could take over the bulk of the fighting and regain the initiative against the 
Viet Minh. In December 1952 he proposed to the Chief of Staff of the Army, General J. 
Lawton Collins, that the United States assume the cost and training responsibility for 40 
additional light Vietnamese battalions meant to mirror Viet Minh skirmishers in 
armament and be capable of traveling over rough countryside like the enemy.178 He 
predicted that the forces could be trained and operational by the end of 1953 and that they 
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would “most surely bring this war to a quicker end.”179 In March 1953 the Joint Chiefs 
recommended funding the additional battalions but also recommended maintaining the 
theater and responsibilities as decidedly French.180 Furthermore, the JCS concluded that 
there was little incentive for the average Vietnamese to join the corrupt, pro-French 
government just to maintain the status quo and remarked that the French still had done 
little to develop Vietnamese army leadership.181 This light battalion proposal never saw 
the level of French commitment required to develop a useful capability. In general, 
French commanders defended their turf against U.S. encroachment. That the French had 
been able to sustain their position in Vietnam only by virtue of massive U.S. aid only 
hardened their stubbornness. 
In their constant search for influence, U.S. leaders saw their advisory mission in 
Korea as a possible model for the French to emulate in developing the VNA. Upon U.S. 
invitation, French Marshal Alphonse Juin visited Korea at the end of February 1953.182 
His reaction to this trip was politely appreciative but ultimately dismissive. He presented 
a myriad of reasons why U.S. training and organization methods from Korea would not 
work in Vietnam. He disparaged the Vietnamese soldier as being more difficult to train 
than South Koreans since “the Japanese had given a military tradition to Korea while 
there never had been such a tradition in Indochina.”183 This statement ignored that Ho 
Chi Minh’s Vietnamese troops were fighting well and winning. The official French report 
from the trip was a somewhat incoherent set of reasons why the French could not adopt 
the KMAG model in Vietnam. These reasons centered on the difficulty of conducting 
training during an ongoing insurgency and of adapting to a division versus a battalion-
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centric organization.184 Trapnell was discouraged by the French dismissal of U.S. 
recommendations, calling them “fallacious arguments,” and the conclusions, a 
“fabrication for U.S. consumption without any actual French commitment to adopt any 
U.S. method.”185 
Trapnell’s rebuttal had merit. French forces consisted of hundreds of independent 
infantry, airborne, artillery, and armored battalions and companies.186 Depending on the 
projected size of the operation, the operational commander cobbled together a collection 
of forces and a tactical commander of appropriate rank to lead the assembled force. This 
exercise added time and complexity for no apparent gain. A standardized regimental or 
divisional organization would have streamlined the planning phase and allowed for 
greater initiative against the enemy. Furthermore, the Viet Minh had fielded divisions 
since the beginning of 1951; thus, it made sense to adapt to the enemy.187 In reflecting on 
the Korean model, however, Trapnell failed to note that the ROKA had fought as 
individual battalions or as a collection of battalions against Korea’s communist 
insurgents due to the questionable loyalty of early ROKA units. Only when the North 
invaded did the ROKA fight as divisions, and it was not until the front lines stabilized 
that it could train adequately to fight that way. 
It is nevertheless surprising that the French were either unable to see the tactical 
usefulness of or were simply too stubborn to try a larger tactical unit than the rather 
limited battalion. Despite what seemed like an inferior organizational structure, the 
MAAG considered the French to be effective fighters with high morale, but the benefit 
they would have gained from being organized in regiments or divisions still would not 
have turned defeat into victory in their war with the Viet Minh. The difference of opinion 
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on this issue between the French and Americans did persist and was reflected in the 
subsequent U.S. plan for the Vietnamese Army. Furthermore, military commanders like 
Trapnell argued that the war in Vietnam had to be won politically as well as militarily, 
yet they seemed to overestimate the benefit that training and organizational changes 
might have on the French and VNA forces. In comparing Korea and Vietnam, the critical 
difference between the two scenarios was that the Koreans trained and fought against a 
foreign aggressor while the VNA trained and fought to maintain external rule. 
Improvements in advice or assistance that could be learned from America’s KMAG 
experience would not change this critical difference. 
January 1953 brought President Dwight Eisenhower to the White House. He had 
run on a party platform that lambasted President Truman’s administration for abandoning 
Eastern Europe and China to communism and withdrawing forces from Korea “in the 
face of aggressive, poised for action, Communist military strength on its northern 
border.”188 Additionally, he pledged fiscal responsibility in foreign policy in contrast to 
Truman’s large “sums [of money] incompetently spent for vague and endless 
purposes.”189 These conflicting aims met in NSC 148, which set as its goal “reducing the 
organized forces of the Viet Minh” through “increased aid to the French and 
Vietnamese.”190 Despite his campaign rhetoric, Eisenhower’s foreign policy position 
toward Vietnam remained unchanged from that of his predecessor. In his first State of the 
Union Address in 1953, President Eisenhower called the war in Korea “the most painful 
phase of Communist aggression throughout the world” and assessed that it was “clearly a 
part of the same calculated assault that the aggressor is simultaneously pressing in 
Indochina and in Malaya.”191 This statement reinforced the idea that all communist and 
anti-colonialist movements were interconnected, both materially and ideologically. 
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Eisenhower shared the sentiments of General Trapnell—the French had to be 
coerced into aggressively pursuing victory in Vietnam. As a result, he insisted on a plan 
for victory before he would send additional aid. For their part, the French had begun to 
question why the Americans refused to consider negotiations or partition with Ho Chi 
Minh while they were concurrently negotiating with the Chinese and North Koreans over 
the outcome of the Korean War.192 Eisenhower’s position nevertheless led the French to 
draft hastily a plan named after the French high commissioner for Indochina at the time, 
Jean Letourneau. Presented orally, it lacked detail and seemed more of an attempt to 
present something that would satisfy Eisenhower’s requirement, rather than a plan that 
was likely to be enacted or that would feasibly accomplish its objectives.193 In summary, 
it called for the VNA’s expansion by approximately 100,000 recruits in 1953 and 1954. 
These new forces would secure the rear areas as the regular French and Vietnamese 
forces cleared the Viet Minh out of the country from south to north in three phases by the 
end of 1955.194 General Trapnell expressed disappointment regarding the slow timeline 
but recommended the United States support the plan since there was no U.S.-centric 
option.195  
May of 1953 saw the arrival of another French commander, General Henri 
Navarre, whose Navarre Plan promised to reverse French fortunes in Indochina.196 The 
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plan was slightly more detailed than what Letourneau had provided but was mainly a list 
of broad objectives with few operational details. By this point, the French controlled only 
a small area of the Red River delta around Hanoi and Haiphong, a small coastal salient 
around Hué in Annam, and most of Cochin China in the south.197 Regaining control in 
the north required more than lofty strategic objectives. Navarre’s arrival corresponded 
with a special U.S. military mission under Lieutenant General Mike O’Daniel, 
Commander of U.S. Army Forces Pacific. Sent as an attempt to gain influence over the 
French, O’Daniel reviewed the Navarre plan and was optimistic about its chances for 
success.198 O’Daniel’s judgment proved to be unduly complacent since it did not 
appreciate either the strategic situation on the ground or U.S. Army doctrine.199 Unlike 
the communist-backed movements in Greece, Korea, and the Philippines, the Viet Minh 
had built a far greater base of popular support and had sold its message more effectively. 
If success were simply a matter of pushing the Viet Minh out of the areas it controlled 
militarily, the French would have already accomplished that in the preceding eight years. 
Viewed in this light, the Navarre plan, which focused on the provision of local security 
by indigenous forces, was not a novel concept. Neither was it feasible, given the near 
parity between the two sides.200 In any event, the change in French leadership did not 
fundamentally alter the MAAG relationship with the French in Vietnam. The French 
continued to shut the MAAG out of operational planning, as evidenced by their failure to 
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notify General Trapnell in advance of the war’s decisive operation, the occupation and 
defense of Dien Bien Phu.201 
Reflecting the previous three years of ineffective advice and assistance, 
O’Daniel’s team drew up plans for Operation Redland—the American version of the 
Navarre plan—to reverse the positions of the French and Viet Minh. It also advocated the 
rapid expansion of a capable Vietnamese National Army—what was by then a multi-year 
endeavor that always seemed to be on the cusp of being realized—and a vaguely outlined 
sweep from south to north of all Viet Minh forces. Presented as a realistic solution to win 
in Vietnam, it displayed a continued inability to appreciate the previous eight years of 
reality. Furthermore, it used the U.S. experience in Greece as a model for its proposed 
campaign plan, a comparison that was wholly inadequate for the current situation. 
Finally, it exposed American hubris with respect to training and advising the Vietnamese. 
The French had not done it right, so the Americans would show them how to do it.202 
O’Daniel’s plan called for U.S. advisors to reorganize the current VNA battalions 
into eight VNA divisions, establish an effective Vietnamese high command, and train 86 
new light battalions in six month.203 Using previous advisory efforts as a guide, O’Daniel 
would have done well just to have the manning and facilities in place to accomplish the 
task in under six months, much less have the training completed. He then expected these 
new units to begin operations against veteran Viet Minh forces beginning in Cochin Chin 
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and then push them north out of Tonkin. Drawing on historical success, the plan states, 
“Operation REDLAND follows the 1949 plan employed by the Greek National Army in 
their war against communist guerrillas. The political and military situation in Greece then 
parallels in many ways the current situation in Indochina.”204 Describing the situations in 
Greece and Vietnam as similar was optimistically or ignorantly exaggerated. Force ratios 
between friendly and enemy forces in the two conflicts were far different, the total 
population in Greece was one-third of Vietnam’s, and the Viet Minh enjoyed far greater 
support than the Greek Communists.205 A better comparison would have been the 
Chinese Revolution, but since that scenario did not end well for the U.S. side, O’Daniel 
may have chosen Greece instead. Ironically, in February 1950, W. Walton Butterworth 
from the State Department had warned that economic and military aid were not the 
“missing components” that would prove decisive in Vietnam.206 At the time, the French 
were using the Greek example to argue for U.S. support to their effort in Vietnam. 
Butterworth warned that any attempt by the French to draw an analogous line to the 
successful U.S. intervention in Greece was a “dangerous delusion.”207 Four years later, 
U.S. commanders were making the same deluded analogies. 
The French defeat at Dien Bien Phu made O’Daniel’s plan a moot point, but he 
would carry the thoughts forward when he relieved General Trapnell as MAAG Chief in 
April 1954. Confusion and indecision characterized the U.S. position toward Vietnam in 
the first months of his new tour. The French pleaded for U.S. intervention to save their 
besieged outpost but stubbornly clung to maintaining their special relationship with 
Vietnam. Washington debated intervention, even including the use of nuclear weapons, to 
try to save the French, but ultimately decided to stay out, and the fortress fell on 7 May 
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1954.208 Despite billions in aid and the insistence that the United States could not afford 
to lose Indochina, over the course of a few weeks in April and May of 1954, that is what 
seemingly happened. The French government fell soon afterward, and the new Prime 
Minister, Pierre Mendes France, promised to settle the issue in Indochina at the Geneva 
Conference within thirty days of taking office. 
Although the French remained in Vietnam until 1956, the Geneva Accords 
marked the beginning of the transition from France to the United States being the 
dominant external influence on Vietnam. Announced on 21 July 1954, the accords 
resulted in six main points: a general cease fire, a demilitarized zone at the 17th parallel, 
the withdrawal of French forces from the north and communist forces from the south, 
general elections set for July 1956, a prohibition on the introduction of reinforcements 
into the region or the establishment of new bases, and the creation of an International 
Control Commission (ICC) to monitor the accords’ terms.209 Notably, neither the United 
States nor the State of Vietnam government signed the accords. This technicality served 
later as justification for these two parties to ignore some of its provisions. 
The human cost for both sides during the eight-year conflict ending in 1954 was 
steep. Sources count between 74,000 and 110,000 soldiers killed fighting for the French 
side and between 300,000 and 500,000 Viet Minh.210 In materiel, the United States had 
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spent $2.7 billion in aid to France, which amounted to almost 2,000 tanks and combat 
vehicles, over 30,000 transport vehicles, 360,000 small arms and machine guns, 5,000 
pieces of artillery, 500 million rounds of ammunition, 10 million artillery shells, over 400 
vessels, and almost 400 planes.211 Although French leaders complained on occasion that 
equipment or supplies did not arrive quickly enough or that the MAAG overly scrutinized 
their requests, there is little evidence that the MAAG bore any responsibility for the 
French failure. Its expedited delivery of materiel saved the French during Giap’s 
offensive in early 1951. The French simply had set a very difficult task for themselves in 
retaining Indochina as a French colony and had failed. 
U.S. leaders recognized that success in Vietnam required an anti-communist 
political solution to counteract Ho Chi Minh’s popularity. Besides granting Vietnamese 
independence, however, the high-level conversations in Washington invariably revolved 
around the need to develop the VNA, as if that was an alternative solution. In January 
1954 during an NSC meeting, President Eisenhower lamented that “one of the 
outstanding failures of the Western world in Asia was its inability to produce good 
fighting material” and that the “Communists were more effective. They got hold of the 
most unlikely people and turned them into great fighters.”212 Eisenhower’s observation 
was correct but discounted the effect of the anti-colonial nationalism that accompanied 
most of these movements. Vice President Nixon recounted a conversation he had with 
General Trapnell during which Nixon argued that “what was lacking to induce the 
Vietnamese to fight was a ‘cause.’” The professional military man that he was, Trapnell 
disagreed, stating that “if the native soldiers were well led, well equipped, and well 
trained, they would fight.”213 Perhaps Trapnell was clouded by his own experiences, but 
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his response ignored the inherent belief in country and purpose felt among his own 
countrymen’s soldiers. Ho Chi Minh had established this cause in his followers, but there 
was no counterpart on the anti-communist side. With France’s defeat, the United States 
would get its opportunity to put Trapnell’s hypothesis to the test. 
  
 174
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 175
VI. U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS IN VIETNAM: FROM FRENCH 
MORASS TO U.S. QUAGMIRE, PART ONE 
The United States inherited France’s failure in 1954 and began fixing what it 
perceived were the French mistakes. Historian Frederick Logevall characterizes the 
American attitude toward the French effort in Indochina in 1954: “They [the French] had 
fought badly in Indochina and deserved to lose. Americans, on the other hand, were the 
good guys, militarily invincible, who selflessly had come to help the Vietnamese in their 
hour of need and would then go home.”1 The United States, absent even the framework 
of an agreed-upon plan in the case of French defeat, supported President Ngo Dinh Diem, 
an ardent nationalist but a difficult and divisive personality, as he struggled to unite his 
ethnically and religiously diverse population amid postwar strife and uncertainty. 
Hawkish only months earlier, Washington suddenly had second thoughts on the extent of 
this support, however, finally deciding to fund a South Vietnamese Army wholly 
insufficient for the threat it might face. Meanwhile, dysfunction between the U.S. 
Ambassador and the senior military advisor, lessons ignored from previous advisory 
experiences, and unfavorable southern geography set the conditions that would allow a 
renewed communist insurgency to gain a toehold in the South.  
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A. THE UNITED STATES TAKES OVER: ANALYSIS PARALYSIS 
Following Dien Bien Phu, the French leaders’ position on U.S. involvement in 
training the VNA suddenly changed from haughty rejection to enthusiastic invitation.2 
Acting on this change in attitude, O’Daniel began preparing to assume the VNA training 
role and to build an army that reflected a combination of Trapnell’s light division idea and 
his own Redland campaign plan. Accordingly, he recommended the creation of four light 
and five medium VNA divisions.3 He also recognized the need to increase the size of the 
MAAG since it had never numbered more than 100 personnel. He recommended an 
increase to 492 personnel and made a point to note its relationship to other advisory groups, 
(e.g., “larger than JUSMAPG (Greece) . . . and considerably smaller than KMAG 
(Korea).”)4 In contrast—and more realistically—the JCS estimated that a training mission 
of 2,250 U.S. personnel was required to build the type of force that Vietnam required to 
face the Viet Minh at its current strength.5 O’Daniel, motivated as he was, represented the 
far end of the spectrum of those with a positive outlook on Vietnam. On 9 May the chargé 
d’affaires in Saigon cautioned that O’Daniel’s plan to build a Vietnamese army in six 
months that could face and defeat the battle-hardened Viet Minh reflected unrealistic 
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Indochina, 13, pt. 1:1062. In May, the Chief of the French General Staff General Paul Ely told U.S. leaders, 
including O’Daniel, that the “more Americans got into war here [Vietnam, the] better.” “The Chargé at 
Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State,” telegram, May 22, 1954, DOS, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1952–1954, vol. 13, pt. 2, Indochina (Washington, DC: GPO, 1982), 1600, 
http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS195254v13p2. This was the same General Ely who at 
the end of March, in a meeting with JCS Chairman Admiral Radford, had resisted “any encroachment on 
French responsibilities or significant expansion of the MAAG.” “Memorandum for the President’s Special 
Committee on Indo-China, Subject: Discussions with General Paul Ely,” March 29, 1954, OSD, U.S.-VN 
Relations, 1945–1967, 5.B.3, book 2: 280. 
3 Ronald Spector, “Summary of Interview with General John W. O’Daniel,” February 4, 1975, Entry 
1089, Box 2, Spector Files, RG 319, NACP. 
4 MAAG-I, “Plan for Joint Staff U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group Indochina,” March 23, 
1954, 4, Entry 12, Box 2, USFSEA, 1950–1975, MAAG-V/AGD, SCGR 1950–1961, 092 Indo-China 
Country Statement 1954 thru 350.09 Redland Campaign Plan 1954, RG 472, NACP. 
5 “Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson),” memorandum, 
May 20, 1954, DOS, FRUS, 1952–1954, Indochina, 13, pt. 2:1592. 
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confidence, given that Vietnam’s internal situation was so problematic.6 Despite the new 
enthusiasm the French displayed for U.S. involvement in the wake of Dien Bien Phu, the 
excitement subsided as the reality of the upcoming Geneva talks set in, and the two sides 
failed to reach an agreement on the extent of U.S. involvement and French concessions.7 
As a result, little activity took place on the issue until the Geneva Conference was 
concluded. 
While the great powers were debating Vietnam’s future in Geneva, the most 
controversial Vietnamese figure to feature in the U.S. effort in Vietnam—Ngo Dinh 
Diem—stepped off a plane in Saigon in June 1954, as newly appointed prime minister to 
Bao Dai. Diem faced a daunting task: the VNA was crumbling, the Vietnamese army chief 
of staff was jostling to seize power; hundreds of thousands of refugees soon would be 
moving from north to south; the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen sects were in control 
of large areas of the south; the future status of French occupation and U.S. support was 
unknown; and French and U.S. officials had mixed feelings about him. The CIA estimated 
that even with U.S. support, the likelihood of a strong, anti-communist government 
establishing itself firmly in the South to counterbalance the North was low and that the Viet 
Minh would win the 1956 elections outlined in the Geneva Accords.8 In this tumultuous 
and uncertain time, the most important service the MAAG provided was helping to 
stabilize the new government. 
                                                 
6 McClintock listed the “complete apathy of the Vietnamese populace coupled with increasing 
tendency of fence-sitters to go over to enemy, absolute breakdown of mobilization plan, internecine 
rivalries between few men capable of showing leadership, and lack of leadership from Bao Dai and his 
Ministers” as the most significant obstacles in O’Daniel’s path. Notably, he proposed inviting General Van 
Fleet, in recognition of his reputation as a master builder of foreign armies, to Vietnam to assess the 
situation and provide recommendations. “The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State,” 
telegram, May 9, 1954, DOS, FRUS, 1952–1954, Indochina, 13, pt. 2: 1521. 
7 Eisenhower considered asking for congressional authority to intervene based on six conditions: 1. 
France and the three Indochinese states formally requested U.S. intervention, 2. Thailand, the Philippines, 
Australia, and New Zealand would join the coalition, 3. UN involvement, 4. France guaranteed 
independence for the three Indochinese states, 5. France maintained its forces in Indochina, 6. An 
agreement would be reached VNA training responsibility and command structure for the combined force. 
These conditions were never met and were superseded by the Geneva Accords. “The Secretary of State to 
the Embassy in France,” telegram, May 11, 1954, DOS, FRUS, 1952–1954, Indochina, 13, pt. 2: 1534–35. 
8 CIA, Post-Geneva Outlook in Indochina (NIE 63-5-54), CIA , August 3, 1954, 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0001166385.pdf. 
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In this endeavor, O’Daniel worked in concert with budding Cold War legend, 
Colonel Edward Lansdale. Lansdale, fresh from helping to defeat the Huks in the 
Philippines, arrived in Saigon on 1 June 1954, a few weeks before Diem. By this point, his 
reputation as an expert in unconventional warfare among U.S. leaders was well established. 
He had been part of O’Daniel’s special military mission to Vietnam in 1953 and the 
president’s special committee on Indochina in early 1954, which reflected this reputation. 
As a result, the Dulles brothers sent him to repeat his perceived Philippines success in 
Vietnam, and he entered a world that was dense with palace intrigue.9 As General Trapnell 
put it in his 3 May 1954 debriefing, Vietnam was  
a war of many paradoxes—Where there is no popular will to win on the part 
of the Vietnamese. Where the leader of the Rebels is more popular than the 
Vietnamese Chief of State. Where a sizeable French army is composed of 
relatively few Frenchmen. Where the partners of the Associated States 
[Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia] regard each other as more dangerous than 
the enemy. Where a large segment of the population seeks to expel the 
French at any price, possibly at the cost of extinction as a new nation.10 
Compared to Lansdale’s experience in the Philippines, Vietnam was far different. 
The Philippines had a stable government with regular elections, had an established army 
that outnumbered its enemy, was geographically isolated from outside communist support, 
and had no external threat. Vietnam had none of these attributes. Thus, deploying Lansdale 
as a sort of mythical cleanup man was a testament to his talent but was in many ways naïve. 
Lansdale nevertheless quickly gained the ear of Diem and became one of his biggest 
supporters and most frequent American confidants. 
As he demonstrated in the Philippines, Lansdale’s talent was psychological warfare, 
and he assisted Diem in the promotion of and the media impact of Operation Passage to 
Freedom, the voluntary movement of Vietnamese between North and South following 
Geneva. To win the media war against communism, it was useful to show a mass migration 
                                                 
9 John Foster Dulles was Secretary of State, and his brother Allen Dulles was the Director of Central 
Intelligence. Currey, Unquiet American, 136; Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 127. 
10 “Major General Thomas J. H. Trapnall [sic] debriefing,” May 3, 1954, OSD, U.S.-VN Relations, 
1945–1967, vol. 5.B.3, book 2, Justification of the War, Internal Commitments, The Eisenhower 
Administration, 1953–1960 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1967), 406, 
http://media.nara.gov/research/pentagon-papers/Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3b.pdf. 
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of Vietnamese fleeing southward from Ho’s DRV regime. Thus, Lansdale organized an 
information campaign playing on religion, fear, and economic incentive to convince 
northerners to move south.11 It is unknown how many of the approximately 900,000 
refugees Lansdale’s efforts convinced, but it did create a media win for the new 
government and gave Diem a Catholic political base.12 Furthermore, Lansdale used his 
Philippine connections to bring Filipino medical and technical expertise to Vietnam under 
Operation Brotherhood to further illustrate the idea of free Asians helping each other and 
resisting the totalitarianism of communism.13 As in the Philippines, Lansdale advocated for 
civic action programs to bring government to the political vacuum in the remote areas 
where the Communists were most likely to re-emerge.14 Lansdale’s efforts would mean 
little, however, if the Communists took over due to the lack of an effective South 
Vietnamese army. 
It was not until August that the training mission again came under serious 
discussion, and the JCS recommended four preconditions be met before the United States 
should assume the training role: “a reasonably strong, stable civil government in control,” a 
formal request for training and materiel support, full independence granted by France, and 
that “the size and composition of the forces . . . be dictated by the local military 
requirements and the overall U.S. interests.”15 The JCS, particularly General Matthew 
Ridgway, became the primary source of the paralysis surrounding the formulation of a way 
ahead in Vietnam, which contrasted sharply with the importance the United States had 
                                                 
11 Lansdale’s PSYOPS group appealed to Catholics using slogans such as “The Blessed Virgin Mary 
is moving south” and to all groups with promises of land and money awaiting refugees in the south. It 
seems reasonable, though, that Catholics also might have been more attracted to the half of the country 
headed by a Catholic leader. Nashel, Edward Lansdale’s Cold War, 60–61. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 168–70. 
14 Thomas L. Ahern, Jr., CIA and the House of Ngo: Covert Action in South Vietnam, 1954–63 
(Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2001), 52. 
15 “Memorandum from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense,” August 4, 1954, OSD, U.S.-VN 
Relations, 1945–1967, vol. 5.B.3, book 3, Justification of the War, Internal Commitments, The Eisenhower 
Administration, 1953–1960; Geneva Accords 15 March 1956, 701–2, 
http://media.nara.gov/research/pentagon-papers/Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3c.pdf. 
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placed on Southeast Asia since at least 1950.16 Ridgway, who had contended with the 
incomplete victory in Korea, was astonished that so soon after the Kaesong armistice U.S. 
leaders were contemplating involvement in another Asian war that was certain to require a 
cost “as great as, or greater than, that we paid in Korea.”17 Secretary Dulles argued strongly 
in favor of the advisory mission since a stable government depended on competent security 
forces, and the Vietnamese had already requested assistance. Furthermore, he argued that 
the MAAG could begin training while the French slowly withdrew from Vietnam. The 
only precondition left unaddressed was that of the Vietnamese Army’s appropriate size. 
Despite Dulles’s rebuttal and support from Ambassador Donald R. Heath and General 
O’Daniel in Vietnam, the sides remained at an impasse, which left the MAAG in limbo.18 
With little to do besides wait for Washington to decide on its future, the MAAG focused on 
the resettlement of refugees created by the Geneva partition. From August 1954 to May 
1955, combined U.S. operation transported 310,848 military and civilian refugees from the 
uncertain North to an even more uncertain South.19 
When Diem returned to Vietnam in 1954, he had been out of the country for four 
years. This absence allowed him to avoid the taint of Bao Dai’s corruption and 
collaboration with the French. Nor had he been idle. As Edward Miller writes, when Diem 
arrived in Saigon, he “was a man with a plan—a plan that turned out to be remarkably 
successful in the short run, even as it also sowed the seeds of later failures.”20 Diem was 
                                                 
16 The JCS had rather abruptly taken the view in May 1954 that Indochina was “devoid of decisive 
military objectives” and the allocation of more than token U.S. armed forces in Indochina would be a 
serious diversion of limited U.S. capabilities. It viewed China as the primary aggressor and recommended 
that any contemplated action be fully directed there. “Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: 
Studies with Respect to Possible U.S. Action Regarding Indochina,” May 26, 1954, U.S.-VN Relations, 
Truman Administration, 5.B.2, book 2:487. 
17 Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway (New York: Harper, 1956), 
277. 
18 For Ambassador Heath’s position in support of U.S. advisory assistance, see: “The Ambassador in 
Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State,” telegram, August 22, 1954, DOS, FRUS, 1952–1954, 
Indochina, 13, pt. 2:1966–72; For O’Daniel’s position, see: “Telegram from CHMAAG Saigon to 
Secretary of State,” August 8, 1954, OSD, U.S.-VN Relations, Eisenhower Administration, 5.B.3, book 
3:703–4. 
19 MAAG-I, “Monthly Activities Report No. 30 for May 1955,” June 10, 1955, Entry 9, Box 2, 
USFSEA, 1950–1975, MAAGV, AGD, 12/1952-02/1956, Report No. 22: Sep 1954 to Report No. 36: Nov 
1955, RG 472, NACP. 
20 Miller, Misalliance, 86. 
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first challenged by the army chief of staff, General Nguyen Van Hinh, whose own father 
had warned the Americans about his son’s “dictatorial aspirations.”21 Despite Hinh’s 
repeated threats that he would launch a coup d’état, Diem’s deft political maneuvering, 
Ambassador Heath’s stern warnings to Hinh, and Lansdale’s surreptitious actions all 
combined to diffuse the situation.22 Ultimately, Bao Dai recalled Hinh to France, where he 
remained in exile. Diem’s government, although still shaky, was beginning to show signs 
of effectiveness. This first incident with the Vietnamese military leadership would 
influence Diem’s relationship with it, however, and shape his method of control—a method 
that would undermine military effectiveness. 
In October 1954 President Eisenhower finally settled the disagreement in 
Washington over the future of U.S. aid to Vietnam, but his decision reflected the same 
mistake made in Korea nine years earlier—ignoring the disparity in the belligerents’ 
capabilities in favor of limiting the fiscal burden. At an NSC meeting on 22 October 1954, 
the Department of State recommended instituting at least a “limited training mission” to 
build an internal security force loyal to Prime Minister Diem that could lay the groundwork 
for a real VNA to meet the South’s long-term needs.23 Admiral Arthur Radford, the JCS 
Chairman, estimated that the cost to maintain the current VNA size of 235,000 was $443 
million, and the total for Vietnamese and French forces was between $800 million and $1 
billion.24 Eisenhower recoiled at those numbers, stating “that the obvious thing to do was 
simply to authorize General O’Daniel to use up to X millions of dollars—say, five, six, or 
seven—to produce the maximum number of Vietnamese military units on which Prime 
Minister Diem could depend to sustain himself in power.”25 Although Washington had 
been prepared to spend $1 billion supporting the French in 1955, the cheap option won out, 
                                                 
21 “The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State,” telegram, May 12, 1954, DOS, 
FRUS, 1952–1954, Indochina, 13, pt. 2:1544. 
22 For a detailed chronology, see: Miller, Misalliance, 100–109; For example, Lansdale recounts that 
he maneuvered to have Hinh’s closest lieutenants join him on a trip to Manila, thus spoiling a possible coup 
attempt. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 175. 
23 “Memorandum of Discussion at the 218th Meeting of the National Security Council,” 
memorandum, October 22, 1954, DOS, FRUS, 1952–1954, Indochina, 13, pt. 2:2153. 
24 Ibid., 8, pt. 2:2156–57. 
25 Ibid. 
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despite bearing little relation to the objectives sought or the enemy’s capabilities. Part of 
the rationale behind a smaller army was the recently concluded Manila Pact, which created 
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), a collective defense organization 
modeled after NATO that was intended to intervene in the case of regional aggression that 
was “of Communist origin.”26 Thus, the initial goal for South Vietnam was a well-trained, 
inexpensive army that could focus on internal security or the delay of a North Vietnamese 
invasion, even though the new, untested, loosely-knit SEATO was hardly a sure thing. 
It took until December 1954 for General Paul Ely, Navarre’s replacement, and 
General J. Lawton Collins, Eisenhower’s Special Representative and Ambassador Heath’s 
replacement in Vietnam, to conclude an agreement allowing the MAAG to assume the 
VNA training role. The agreement set the goal of establishing a 77,685-person army by 1 
July 1955 and granted full responsibility for VNA training to the MAAG underneath the 
overall French commander.27 Collins envisioned the VNA consisting of three light 
divisions focused on internal security and three field divisions capable of reinforcing them 
or delaying a northern invasion.28 O’Daniel finally had what he wanted in regards to 
training the VNA, but once again arbitrary funding considerations, rather than the military 
situation, had dictated the host nation army’s size. VNA leaders noted the problem right 
away. In a meeting with O’Daniel, Brigadier General Nguyen Van Vy expressed his 
concern that the force size was inadequate for the VNA’s three missions: border defense, 
internal pacification, and preparation for the country’s reunification after the 1956 
                                                 
26 The signatories were the United States, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, the 
Philippines, Pakistan, and Thailand. “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Australia,” telegram, 
September 8, 1954, DOS, FRUS, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, 12, pt. 1: 900. 
27 “Letter from the Acting Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to 
the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins),” letter, December 15, 1954, DOS, FRUS, 1955–1957, vol. 
1, Vietnam (Washington, DC: GPO, 1985), 1, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/ 
FRUS.FRUS195557v01. 
28 Light divisions consisted of approximately 5,225 personnel compared to 8,200 for the field 
divisions. The agreement called for an additional 3,000-person navy and 3,000-person air force. Including 
civilian support, the total number envisioned for the State of Vietnam Armed Forces was 88,000. Although 
the agreement was signed on December 13, 1954, the details are in an earlier message. “Memorandum by 
the Secretary of State to the President,” memorandum, November 17, 1954, DOS, FRUS, 1952–1954, 
Indochina, 13, pt. 2:2263–64. 
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elections.29 O’Daniel responded that the U.S. “financial contribution will support only a 
much smaller army” and that “a small, well-trained, well-led army” was preferable over “a 
large, poorly trained, poorly led army.”30 
At the height of France’s effort to regain control in Vietnam, it fielded a security 
force of 443,900, comprised of 280,400 in the armed forces and 163,500 in semi-military 
auxiliaries.31 With this force, the French barely maintained their position around the Hanoi-
Haiphong corridor, a small redoubt around Hué in central Vietnam, and the majority of 
Cochin China in the south. Granted, the strategic situation had changed since Geneva, but 
the Americans—who were so ready to point to their advisory successes in Greece and 
Korea—abandoned the need for an adequate force structure to defend U.S. interests in 
favor of the even cheaper option. Considering that Washington had learned the hard way in 
Korea that parsimony up front could mean huge investments later, its decision to repeat that 
error when the enemy was so clearly known ended up being a tremendous gamble. 
As 1955 opened, Diem was headed to a showdown with the religious sects and their 
militias, specifically the Binh Xuyen, whose power base was in the capital. Unwilling to 
form a more inclusive government, Diem lost the support of General Collins, and his anti-
French sentiments also alienated the French. Collins traveled to Washington to argue 
against continuing to support Diem, but in a masterful stroke, Diem gained the army’s 
loyalty and defeated or incorporated the sects.32 This action cemented Diem’s support from 
Washington and made him momentarily safe from his rivals in Vietnam. During this 
incident, Diem had also openly defied Bao Dai and lost his support, which led to his final 
act of 1955: challenging Bao Dai in a national election. Although the election reeked of 
voting fraud, by November 1955 Diem was the new President of the Republic of 
                                                 
29 MAAG-I, “Minutes of Conference at MAAG, 29 Nov 54,” November 29, 1954, 3, Entry 12, Box 2, 
USFSEA, 1950–1975, MAAG-V/AGD, SCGR 1950–1961, 092 Indo-China Country Statement 1954 thru 
350.09 Redland Campaign Plan 1954, RG 472, NACP. 
30 Ibid. 
31 MAAG-I, “Indochina Intelligence Brief,” 21. 
32 Collins and Diem disagreed over the makeup of Diem’s government. Collins wanted Diem to be 
more inclusive in order to build a broad coalition. Diem, who was more attuned to the fragility of the 
nascent government, resisted some of Collins’s more insistent recommendations. When Diem picked the 
fight with the sects to centralize control, Collins saw it as perhaps the last opportunity to get rid of Diem 
and try to work with one of the few other Vietnamese possibilities. Miller, Misalliance, 110, 116–119. 
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Vietnam.33 He subsequently established the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) in 
December. French and U.S. differences in Vietnam, Diem’s anti-French sentiments, 
reduced U.S. funding for French forces, and French troop requirements in North Africa led 
to the withdrawal of nearly all French forces from Vietnam in 1956. The United States and 
Vietnam were on a shared path to wherever Diem’s actions might take them. 
In this tumultuous political environment, Diem’s brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, emerged 
as Diem’s closest confidant and as the most important actor for events taking place behind 
the scenes. Judging from his memoire, Lansdale was unaware of Nhu’s involvement in the 
same activities that Lansdale was undertaking for Diem. For example, Lansdale chronicles 
Diem’s request in 1955 that he coordinate with Trinh Minh Thé, an important Cao Dai 
militia commander, to aid in bringing Thé over to the government’s side to help break the 
sects’ power.34 In Lansdale’s version, he is the single mediator, and he coordinates Thé’s 
shift of allegiance and 2,500 militia troops to the government side.35 In actuality, Lansdale 
and the CIA may have supplied the money necessary to bring Thé over, but Nhu and Diem 
conducted the critical negotiations.36 Nhu was also the leader in the creation and growth of 
the Can Lao party, which essentially made South Vietnam a single-party state. Despite 
Lansdale’s caution that silencing opposition through intimidation would be ultimately 
detrimental, Diem allowed his brother to continue, and a culture of fear and suppression 
began to grow in the South.37 Frustrated with the Ngo brothers and the Embassy staff who 
tended to restate the U.S. position of supporting Diem, Lansdale left Vietnam in 1956. He 
had helped to install Diem in power amidst a quietly emerging insurgency, and he never 
returned for more than a few weeks until after Diem’s death in 1963. Lansdale remained 
one of Diem’s most ardent supporters due to their friendship but was unable to steer the 
stubborn president in what he considered to be the right direction. Even America’s most 
                                                 
33 The elections were held on 23 October 1954, and Diem declared the creation of the Republic of 
Vietnam on 26 October. For more on likely voting fraud, see “Despatch [sic] from the Ambassador in 
Vietnam (Reinhardt) to the Department of State,” telegram, November 29, 1955, U.S. Department of State, 
FRUS, 1955–1957, Vietnam, 1:589–94; Anderson, Trapped by Success, 118–19. 
34 Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 184–201.  
35 Ibid., 185. 
36 Ahern, CIA and the House of Ngo, 67; Nashel, Edward Lansdale’s Cold War, 59–60. 
37 Currey, Unquiet American, 181–83. 
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renowned cold warrior in Asia, and arguably Diem’s closest American confidant, was 
unable to crack fully the Ngo family circle. 
B. ADVISOR HONEYMOON PERIOD IN VIETNAM 
With permission to finally begin training the VNA, O’Daniel set up his 
organization on three main pillars that mirrored previous advisory efforts: advising 
headquarters and units; establishing U.S.-style professional schools such as artillery, armor, 
and engineering; and sending personnel to the United States to attend U.S. professional 
military schools. O’Daniel established a combined Franco-American training staff titled the 
Training Relations Instruction Mission (TRIM), but due to the French departure, it fell 
from a combined 346 in May 1955 to 189 U.S. personnel in March 1956.38 The U.S. 
experience with KMAG had shown that a much larger organization was required to staff 
the schools and units with adequate advisors for even the ARVN’s modest size, but 
increasing the MAAG manpower was problematic.39 Even though the United States was 
not a signatory to the Geneva Accords, the Departments of State and Defense disagreed on 
the legalities of increasing the MAAG’s size under the restrictions that the accords placed 
on reinforcements.40 The State Department won, arguing that the size could not legally be 
increased. To circumvent these restrictions, Washington created the Temporary Equipment 
Recovery Mission (TERM) on 1 June 1956. TERM was ostensibly a separate unit from the 
MAAG, and its mission was to process the large amount of materiel leftover from the war. 
In reality, TERM primarily augmented TRIM’s manpower, bringing TRIM closer to the 
size necessary to provide adequate numbers of advisors to all of the units. TERM also 
duplicated many staff functions since it was supposed to appear as a separate entity, which 
                                                 
38 United States Army Command and General Staff College, Study on Army Aspects of the Military 
Assistance Program in Vietnam (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, 1960), D–5. 
39 In contrast, in January 1953 the State Department reported that the French training mission was 
creating an eight-division army and had 900 officers and 4500 noncommissioned officers dedicated to this 
effort. “Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary 
of State,” memorandum, January 28, 1953, DOS, FRUS, 1952–1954, Indochina, 13, pt. 1:367. 
40 The Geneva Accords prohibited “the introduction into Viet-Nam of foreign troops and military 
personnel.” The State Department presumed this to mean that the United States could not increase its 
numbers beyond what it had in country at the time of the cease fire on 22 July 1954. The Defense 
Department argued that as the French withdrew forces, the United Staes could replace them. “The Final 
Declaration on Indochina,” DOS, FRUS, 1952–1954, Geneva Conference, 16: 1540. 
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resulted in wasted manpower. Furthermore, the ruse did not fool the ICC, which was 
responsible for overseeing the Geneva Accords. Its members consistently questioned the 
U.S. Embassy concerning TERM’s status and its projected departure date.41 Thus, 
Washington would have been better off ignoring the accords as the Defense Department 
lawyers suggested and augmenting MAAG with the manpower it needed based on the 
mission it was assigned. 
The MAAG advisors faced the same challenges as their predecessors. As in Korea, 
few advisors possessed Vietnamese language skills. Vietnamese interpreters mitigated this 
problem, but operational security risks increased with communist infiltration, and the 
increase of U.S. personnel put a premium on good interpreters. Also like Korea, cultural 
concern with the preservation of personal status and dignity (“face”) created problems 
between the advisor and his counterpart. General Samuel Myers, chief of the MAAG Army 
section, recounts a story in which he upbraided a Vietnamese captain for the filthy 
conditions in his hospital; the captain committed suicide an hour later.42 Advisors dealt 
with corruption and black marketeering within the ARVN, which again were seen as part 
of the culture as in Korea. Short tour lengths, as few as six months, meant frequent turnover 
and time wasted as each new advisor figured out his job, established rapport with his 
counterpart, and figured out how to make himself useful. Finally, there was little advisor-
specific training or selection. As the 1980 BDM Corporation study notes, advisors were not 
selected based on their aptitude for advising, “but rather on the basis of military 
occupational specialty and availability for and vulnerability to an overseas hardship tour.”43 
For the most part, however, advisors had met and overcome these challenges in 
previous missions. There is no indication that the advisors in Vietnam had greater problems 
                                                 
41 “Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Jones) to the 
Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy),” July 26, 1957, DOS, FRUS, 1955–1957, 
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interacting with their counterparts than those in Korea.44 While these issues were 
undoubtedly problematic on a daily basis, the Vietnamese political environment was far 
more influential on the ultimate success or failure of their work and was something largely 
outside of their control. For example, General O’Daniel wanted units to regroup into the 
larger divisions to be trained, then returned to their stations for operations. Diem argued 
that internal security needed to be assured before training could take place.45 This 
difference of opinion led to a situation in which neither task was addressed adequately. In 
November 1955 there already were signs that internal security would be problematic 
without constant military presence. At a meeting with O’Daniel, Diem asked for support in 
building small village security elements since battalions departing their sectors to conduct 
MAAG training created a security vacuum.46 In one instance, 57 houses had been burned 
down the day following a security battalion’s departure.47 Additionally, Diem’s penchant 
for favoring loyalty over talent in his generals—a preference that difficult internal security 
conditions encouraged—degraded the military’s combat effectiveness. U. S. advisors had 
little influence over an officer corps whose senior members were chosen on the basis of 
personal loyalty to the head of state, and whose professional future was accordingly not 
entirely dependent on professional accomplishment. The situation was made worse because 
the French had inflated the VNA salary structure. The VNA soldier made more than ten 
times the salary of his peer in Korea, a reflection of the incentive required for them to fight 
in support of the French.48 This difference made U.S. support of the VNA far more 
expensive than the support it gave to other anti-communist armies, which placed even more 
pressure on U.S. personnel to cut costs and force structure, even though the imbalance in 
forces between north and south was known to be severe. 
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Although Washington had approved a Vietnamese army of fewer than 100,000, it 
was apparent by mid-1955 that the 170,000 soldiers remaining after Geneva would never 
shrink to the size that Washington had approved. The original concept was that the 
reduction in manpower would be accompanied by an improvement in quality by retaining 
the best soldiers, but VNA leaders simply did not reduce the organization’s size as Collins 
had directed.49 Diem’s efforts to gain control over the sect forces by moving them into the 
VNA created additional upward pressure on the army’s final numbers. Thus, in June 1955 
the MAAG recommended and the new ambassador, Frederick Reinhardt, concurred with a 
170,000-man army that eventually would be reduced to 100,000 by the end of 1956 when 
conscription would be enacted.50 Conscription would have allowed for a reserve force to be 
trained, and conscripted soldiers would be paid less than volunteers. This larger army was 
to consist of four field divisions, eight light divisions, thirteen territorial regiments focused 
on internal security, and an airborne regiment.51 While this force represented a more 
realistic appraisal of the military imbalance between north and south, it was still 
insufficient for the potential threats it faced. 
In October 1955 Lieutenant General Samuel Tankersley Williams replaced 
O’Daniel as Chief of MAAG and went on to serve the longest tenure of any senior U.S. 
military commander in Vietnam.52 Williams had a colorful background. He was relieved of 
his position as assistant division commander of the 90th Infantry Division shortly after D-
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Day in Normandy and demoted to colonel.53 He redeemed himself during the Korean War, 
most notably during the last Chinese offensive of June 1953 when he rallied the II ROK 
Corps and brought the offensive to a halt.54 He ended the war as a Major General. Despite 
his admirable wartime record and presumed abilities, his rough personality hindered him in 
his new role as soldier-diplomat.55 He quickly gained the trust and confidence of Diem, but 
had little patience with fellow Americans. Colonel James Muir, a highly-placed member of 
Williams’s team, stated bluntly that “Williams did not understand how to handle a staff.”56 
Williams alienated those whom he counted on for day-to-day operations and perhaps most 
importantly, he developed an antagonistic relationship with Ambassador Elbridge 
Durbrow, who replaced Reinhardt in March 1957. Durbrow believed the United States 
should demand democratic reforms and threaten to cut off aid to achieve them, while 
Williams believed that Diem was no worse than any other Asian leader and should be 
supported for his pro-American and anti-communist views. Their relationship degenerated 
into frequent shouting matches during embassy meetings, and the result was a poor 
working relationship between the embassy and MAAG staffs from 1957 to 1961.57 
In one of his first meetings with Diem, General Williams recognized that a primary 
challenge for the South would be guerrilla warfare against the Communists. Williams 
reflected on previous U.S. advisory efforts when he emphasized to Diem “that Communist 
guerrillas have been destroyed in Greece, Korea, [and] the Philippines,” and that they could 
also “be destroyed in Vietnam.”58 Reflecting U.S. Army doctrine, he prescribed “early, 
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aggressive action” and “relentless pressure” to best combat communist guerrillas.59 He was 
particularly reflective of the Korea example, arguing that the guerrilla campaign in the 
South diverted the ROKA’s attention. Thus, the ROKA “was not strategically nor tactically 
deployed to meet the North Korean attack.”60 His analysis was flawed since it ignored the 
disparity in weapons and training between the two Korean armies that was more significant 
than their relative positions. Furthermore, if the ROKA had been deployed as Williams 
suggested, then the Korean guerrillas would not have faced constant pressure that he 
prescribed was necessary. Finally, he recommended that “any regular Army troops sent . . . 
to combat guerrillas should complete their task with speed, then turn the area over to the 
Civil Guard.”61 This mindset dominated Williams’s advice and created conditions that 
frustrated the advisory effort and allowed the insurgency to regain a foothold in the South. 
Following Geneva, the Viet Minh removed nearly all of their troops from the 
South, but left a residual cadre of approximately 10,000 behind in the event that the accords 
did not produce the ultimate results the Communists desired.62 From 1954 to 1958, 
communist activity in the south focused primarily on indoctrination and building a base of 
support for future armed activity. Diem warned of growing Viet Minh activity in one of his 
first meetings with General Williams, although Williams remarked that he had not heard 
anything from his advisors in the field.63 Furthermore, some of the sect forces that had not 
come over to Diem in 1955 began allying with the Communists against the government. In 
1956 the term Viet Cong (which Diem claimed to have coined) gained currency in 
reference to South Vietnamese Communists, and they began a gradual campaign of 
indoctrination and intimidation. The latter was marked by assassinations and kidnappings, 
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with President Diem suffering a failed assassination attempt during a visit to the Central 
Highlands on 22 February 1957. His narrow escape did not seem to faze him immediately, 
but it did signal that the Communists were already able to strike virtually wherever and 
whenever they chose. Speaking later, Williams described the VC soldier as “capable of 
undergoing hardship . . . clever, cunning, and utterly ruthless,” and as someone who would 
“not hesitate to behead a village Mayor and place his head on a stake in the center of the 
village.”64 The growing Viet Cong threat was becoming more noticeable. One advisor 
recounted his experiences just walking around town: “I knew from the attitude of the 
shopkeepers and others that I passed on the streets whether or not any important Viet Cong 
cadre was observing my actions at the time.”65 Despite this growing threat, Williams 
remained focused on the possibility of conventional invasion, in many ways because that is 
what he was ordered to do and because the number of incidents was still relatively low.66 
In September 1955 the JCS began examining U.S. options in the event of a 
communist invasion of South Vietnam, even though it assessed that subversion was the 
greatest threat.67 It followed up this discussion with the outline of a concept of operations 
in June 1956 that was wholly inadequate for anything but a minor incursion by the north 
and displayed a surprising lack of historical reflection on the Korea experience. Noting the 
serious imbalance in forces between north and south in quantity, firepower, and quality, 
Admiral Radford, the JCS chairman, nevertheless expected the ARVN to “carry the main 
burden of the defeat of the aggressors.”68 It was supposed to achieve this feat with U.S. air 
and naval support, the introduction of approximately one division of U.S. ground troops, 
nuclear missiles, and the introduction of additional U.S. advisors. He expounded on this 
latter point, stating that “previous experience has amply demonstrated the success of such 
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provisions.”69 Radford’s plan was clearly dependent on hope, rather than historical 
evidence. He predicted that the enemy scheme of maneuver would be an attack across the 
17th parallel similar to the NKPA’s attack on the ROKA in June 1950. An influx of 
advisors in the midst of a disorganized retreat and reinforcement by one U.S. division 
would not have prevented the fall of South Korea. There was no reason to think that 
Vietnam would magically hold with the same prescription. 
Williams responded to this plan realistically, stating that “the lack of Vietnamese 
training, field command structure and logistic balance in effect increases the Viet Minh 
superiority above the 2 to 1 ratio.”70 Rather than accept the informed opinion of the senior 
military advisor in country in good faith, Radford took offense at his plan being questioned, 
telling Williams’s boss, “I have grave doubts as to [Williams’s] ability and as to his being a 
proper representative in this important area.”71 Williams nevertheless remained in his 
position and continued to focus his efforts on consolidating the ARVN into divisions and 
training it on the KMAG model. Although a communist resurgence was only in its nascent 
phase, the Communists were sure to launch a renewed guerrilla struggle. The only question 
was, when? For this likelihood, Williams and Diem would depend on a force that would 
prove wholly unsuited for the task. 
In 1955 Diem created the Civil Guard (CG) out of provincial militias that had 
existed during the French war. In conjunction with a village-level Self-Defense Corps 
(SDC) of armed villagers, Diem envisioned the CG as the first line of defense against the 
communist guerrillas. Williams gave full support to the plan since it supported his goal of 
keeping the ARVN out of the internal security business and focused on completing its full 
training plan. These organizations roughly mirrored the National Defense Corps that Van 
Fleet had set up in Greece to secure pacified areas and prevent guerrilla re-infestation. The 
difference was that the Greek organizations consisted of veterans and reservists facing 
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similarly-armed forces. Furthermore, disagreement between the groups involved in the CG 
discussion stunted its development at a critical time. 
Prior to assuming the prime minister position, Diem had established a personal 
relationship with Wesley Fishel of Michigan State University. As a sovereign nation, the 
RVN contracted in May 1955 for a Michigan State University Group (MSUG) to provide 
academic instruction to improve the South Vietnamese government and police.72 The 
volunteers found themselves arriving in the midst of the post-sect fighting with harrowing 
tales of being caught in anti-communist riots, random terrorist attacks, and one member’s 
kidnapping all occurring within their first few months in country.73 MSUG assumed 
training of Vietnamese personnel in many areas, but its insistence on maintaining the Civil 
Guard as a police force versus the paramilitary force that Diem and Williams wanted was a 
lost opportunity that permitted the Viet Cong to begin reestablishing itself in the South. 
From 1955 to 1960, the MSUG continually lobbied that the Civil Guard should be 
organized and equipped as a national police force analogous to a state police force in the 
United States.74 A futile conversation between Ambassador Durbrow, the MSUG 
representative, General Williams, and President Diem in March 1958 illustrated the 
incompatible visions of the four parties. Diem wanted a force under the Department of 
Defense (DOD) that could meet the growing insurgent threat at least equally matched. 
Williams wanted an additional paramilitary force under DOD to avoid using the army to 
fight insurgents at all costs, stating it was “exactly what the communists want us to do.”75 
Durbrow intimated that the Civil Guard could either fall under the DOD and be subject to 
the army manpower limitations or fall under the Department of the Interior and be subject 
to limitations on its weaponry and training.76 The MSUG maintained its viewpoint that the 
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Civil Guard should be a civil police force. This discussion made little progress nearly three 
years after the guard’s initial creation. Repeating the same mistake as in the Philippines, the 
guard fell under the Department of the Interior, which was necessary to receive any U.S. 
funding but hindered its training and limited it to castoff weapons. When the MAAG 
finally took over training in 1960 and the CG was equipped with the weapons it needed to 
face the Viet Cong, five years had been wasted due to ideological stubbornness.77 Williams 
should have known better than to entrust the fight against the insurgency to another 
organization. The fight in all the guerrilla examples he mentioned to Diem in December 
1955 had been won by the armed forces of that country. Vietnam should not have been 
treated any differently. Ultimately, intransigence on both the military and civilian sides 
resulted in a weak internal security effort that allowed the VC to gain a foothold. Since the 
Communists had focused on building support first, this foothold was more significant than 
the VC’s small early numbers would imply. 
While the Civil Guard awaited a U.S. decision on its future, it made do with the 
weapons it could acquire. These weapons were often turn-of-the-century French rifles with 
ammunition that was just as old. Furthermore, the Civil Guard often found itself guarding 
the most remote posts while the army kept the posts closer to civilization and markets.78 
Thus, the force least able to defend itself due to its poor weapons and training was also the 
least likely to be quickly reinforced if under attack. As VC activity began to increase, 
especially in 1960 and beyond, the Civil Guard naturally suffered more attacks and greater 
casualties.79 
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Despite this unfinished debate, Williams and his MAAG personnel continued to 
organize and train the Vietnamese. Working with the Vietnamese leadership, the MAAG 
divided Vietnam into military regions and assigned ARVN units to each one. Williams 
disbanded TRIM after the French departed in April 1956 and replaced it with the Combat 
Arms Training Organization (CATO), which was responsible for all advisory efforts. He 
placed his deputy in charge of inspecting ARVN units on a rotating basis to help determine 
the state of training and readiness and developed a 31-week training plan for each unit to 
complete. What he found was not surprising for a brand new army in a developing country, 
but the rate of improvement for basic infantry skills and the lack of emphasis on training in 
some units were causes for concern. The disparity between units often was stark. For 
example, one of the best units, the 2nd Field Infantry Division, was rated as “barely 
satisfactory in training” in March 1957 due in part to its participation in security duties.80 
In March 1958, however, it received a rating of superior.81 Furthermore, its leadership had 
acted quickly on deficiencies, with nearly all of them corrected prior to the next MAAG 
inspection three months later. In contrast, the 13th Light Infantry Division showcased one 
of the worst examples of the ARVN. During the MAAG’s first visit in December 1956, the 
deputy was told that the division had completed no training since it was operationally 
fighting the insurgency.82 This claim was fabricated; the unit was actually training for a 
parade.83 Over a year later, the division had accomplished virtually nothing and was rated 
as “barely satisfactory in training” and as possessing a poor combat potential.84 The 
MAAG deputy continually pressed the units he visited to stop conducting security 
operations so they could focus on training, but this request ran the risk of allowing the 
security situation in the countryside to deteriorate. Clearly there was a balance between 
security and training, especially considering the ongoing debate over the Civil Guard, but 
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the right balance was never fully resolved. For his part, Diem often took action on the 
training reports, relieving junior officers whose units were found to be lacking.85 Notably, 
he did not hold higher-level officers like colonels and generals accountable in the same 
manner out of fear of making powerful enemies.86 
Diem’s relationship with senior military leaders was a reason for concern looming 
over the ARVN, and it resulted in a lack of qualified senior officers since they were 
promoted due to loyalty, rather than competence. For example, when Williams pressed him 
to assign a permanent army chief of staff, Diem selected General Le Van Ty. Ty had been a 
captain in the French Army prior to service in the VNA and simply wanted to retire when 
Diem appointed him to replace Hinh in 1954 as the interim chief of staff.87 According to 
his U.S. advisor, Ty could not speak Vietnamese very well, was not a keenly intelligent 
officer, and had the maximum potential of company command.88 Other problems dealt 
with officers sent to the United States for professional training. Although they were 
supposed to be gaining military knowledge to bring back to their fledgling army, many 
senior officers spent more time in leisure activities like shopping and sightseeing. The 
younger officers who excelled in U.S. schools were often sent to other jobs, instead of 
returning to their units where they could pass on their knowledge. Thus, the effectiveness 
of the officer corps suffered, and the education it received did little to contribute to the 
ARVN’s combat ability.89 
In August 1958, the MAAG estimated that North Vietnamese forces consisted of 
“268,000 regular army troops organized into 14 infantry divisions, 1 artillery division, 1 
anti-aircraft artillery groupment,” and multiple independent regiments and support units.90 
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Additionally, the North had a 235,000 man paramilitary force to “conduct internal security, 
defense, and guerrilla functions.”91 Facing this formidable force, the MAAG counted on an 
ARVN of 140,620 personnel who were still battling the forces of the religious sects as late 
as December 1957.92 The MAAG assessment stated that “the Viet Cong ground forces are 
well trained, highly indoctrinated, and have the capability of executing sustained and highly 
effective operations through all types of terrain with minimum logistical support.”93 The 
force disparity and difference in quality was reminiscent of Korea, but the limits set by 
Washington remained unchanged. 
Even with the South’s force disparity vis-à-vis the North and an internal security 
plan dependent on the underequipped, undertrained Civil Guard, the year 1958 ended on a 
relatively positive note. ARVN divisions and regiments had three to four officer advisors, 
each headed by colonels for the former and majors for the latter. Although Williams had 
resisted the diversion of ARVN units to fight the slowly increasing guerrilla movement, 
Diem launched a major effort that seriously weakened the Viet Cong in the southern 
provinces.94 The security situation began to change rapidly in 1959, however, and the 
advisory effort’s early mistakes and issues it could not fix would be magnified greatly by a 
renewed and highly motivated communist insurgency. 
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VII. U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS IN VIETNAM: TRADING A 
FRENCH MORASS FOR A U.S. QUAGMIRE, PART TWO 
The situation in Vietnam from 1958 to 1963 was a tangled web of contradicting 
priorities between U.S. and Vietnamese leaders, and it provided a glaring example of the 
limits of military advising. The Vietnamese Communists decided in 1959 to resume their 
efforts to unify Vietnam under communist rule. Meanwhile, the MAAG advisors 
continued trying to improve the performance of a South Vietnamese army characterized 
by apathy, poor leadership, and favoritism, but found themselves caught between 
President Ngo Dinh Diem and his ineffective, coup-plotting generals. Diem, always quick 
to request more aid and a larger army, ignored nearly all the substantive 
recommendations that the MAAG proposed to improve his security forces. Furthermore, 
he had his own ideas on how to defeat the Communists.  
Unable to solve the underlying problems of the Republic of Vietnam Armed 
Forces (RVNAF), the MAAG, under a new but ineffectual commander, supported an 
increase in the regular army’s (ARVN) size and instituted U.S.-devised campaign plans 
and vague anti-guerrilla tactics in a vain attempt to compensate for RVNAF weaknesses.1 
Ultimately, however, the limits of the advisory program were laid bare when faced with 
training an army whose motivation and leadership, as a whole, were far below those of 
the enemy it faced. 
The limited progress of the RVNAF also created unnecessary internal strife 
between the MAAG and the ambassador when the real problems were outside of the 
MAAG’s control. Aided by a long, porous border, the Communists infiltrated unimpeded 
and enjoyed increasing support from the South’s population. The new administration of 
President John F. Kennedy increasingly saw the situation in Vietnam as one for 
Washington to solve rather than Saigon, thus straying from the spirit of advice and 
support as a limited foreign policy tool. This shift in mindset resulted in the U.S.-
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supported coup against the Diem regime and the transfer of power to the same ARVN 
leaders that had proven incapable of defeating the Communists.  
A. VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST RESURGENCE 
Following the Geneva Accords, the number of Vietnamese Communists 
remaining in the South was probably between 10,000 and 15,000.2 While Ho Chi Minh 
and the northern communist leaders held out hope for a reunification through elections, 
they nevertheless decided in 1955 to implement a five-year plan that focused on 
consolidating power in the North, recovering economically, and expanding the People’s 
Army of Vietnam (PAVN).3 Communists in the South focused on laying the groundwork 
politically for renewing the struggle to unite all of Vietnam but refrained from fully 
committing to revolutionary warfare.4 By early 1959 there were fewer than 5,000 party 
members due to Diem’s 1958 anti-communist offensive.5 Diem’s government was 
winning the near-term battle. Who would win the long-term war depended on the North’s 
willingness to expand the struggle. 
In what would become a historical milestone, the Communists met in 1959 in 
Hanoi and decided to liberate South Vietnam.6 To support this goal, they also decided to 
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1956, http://vi.uh.edu/pages/buzzmat/southrevo.htm. 
5 MHIV, Victory in Vietnam, 44; Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 81. 
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expand the overland infiltration and supply route through Laos and Cambodia that would 
become known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Over the course of the next 16 years, the North 
Vietnamese transformed what began as a crude set of hunting and smuggling paths into 
an extensive network of tunnels, defenses, bridges, and roads measuring as many as 
13,000 kilometers, much of which was invisible from the air. Maintained by an army of 
workers numbering as many as 50,000, the Ho Chi Minh Trail withstood more air 
ordnance dropped on it than the United States dropped during the entire Second World 
War with no serious impact on the North’s ability to infiltrate men and supplies into the 
South.7 This engineering marvel was made possible by the same fervent dedication 
displayed by the troops who would travel its length over the next 14 years to fight the 
increasingly formidable RVNAF and its American backers.  
In May 1959 the CIA reported that the Communists numbered only 2,000 active 
guerrillas in the South, yet it warned that the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps, who 
bore the brunt of anti-guerrilla activities, were “inadequately trained and equipped for the 
job, and units from the armed forces have continued to be called in to meet special 
situations.”8 For a combined RVN security force of nearly 250,000 personnel, this 
assessment spelled serious trouble for South Vietnam. Additionally, MAAG personnel 
were then in the Viet Cong crosshairs. As early as 1957, MAAG personnel found 
themselves targets of VC bomb attacks.9 
By January 1960 the VC was capable of attacking heavily fortified ARVN camps 
like the 32nd Infantry Regiment’s at Trang Sup. In the early morning hours of 26 
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January, approximately 400 VC attacked the 32nd’s camp housing 547 soldiers. The 
well-planned and coordinated attack may have had support from inside agents and 
resulted in 34 ARVN killed, 46 wounded, and 12 missing for a loss of 5 VC killed. More 
importantly, the ARVN lost nearly 700 individual weapons and over 60 machine guns 
and mortars.10 In addition to the base buildings and infrastructure destroyed, this 
operation was extremely cost effective for the VC and was indicative of ARVN weakness 
in simple base defense tactics.  
B. THE ADVISORY EFFORT ROLLS ON  
Meanwhile, General Samuel Williams’s MAAG continued to assist the ARVN in 
training and organizing itself to be able to fight effectively. Never satisfied with the light 
and field division model he inherited from his predecessor General John O’Daniel in 
1955, Williams reorganized the ARVN into seven standard divisions of 10,450 men each 
that were suited to “combat on any type of terrain found in Vietnam.”11 Williams did not 
make this decision unilaterally. President Diem had called for a reorganization of the 
army into heavier divisions and corps as early as January 1957, mentioning “that all of 
his officers complained about this light division concept” due to their insufficient 
firepower and logistics.12 The elimination of the light and territorial units would become 
controversial, however, as security in the rural areas worsened. The MAAG also 
reorganized the RVNAF’s higher command structure, but this change did little to 
improve ARVN leadership.  
By the end of 1959, the ARVN consisted of the seven new standardized divisions, 
an airborne brigade, four armored battalions, a marine group, a helicopter squadron, three 
                                                 
10 Combat Arms Training and Organization Division, “Final Report, 32d Infantry Regiment Incident, 
26 January 1960,” n.d., Entry 12, Box 21, MAAG-V/AGD, SCGR: 1950-1961, 250/6 Military Assistance 
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Special Report of TERM 1958, RG 472, NACP. 
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corps headquarters, a Joint General Staff (JGS), and a field command that ostensibly 
directed the three corps to free up the JGS from warfighting.13 These elements were 
layered on top of as many as six military region headquarters, including the capital 
region, and a system of province chiefs that all wielded or attempted to wield control over 
the forces assigned to them or that operated in their area. The Civil Guard (CG) and Self 
Defense Corps (SDC) forces typically fell directly under the province chiefs, who 
reported to the Ministry of the Interior. This reporting structure handicapped the 
paramilitary CG and SDC interoperability with ARVN units. The RVNAF had recreated 
virtually the same divided chain of command that failed in the Philippines. With a 
professional senior officer corps, this convoluted chain of command would have been 
less of a problem, but the steps that Diem had taken since 1954 cemented dysfunction 
into the very core of the RVNAF leadership. 
Having faced down General Hinh’s prospective coup in the latter half of 1954, 
Diem favored loyalty over military ability in selecting his highest ranking officers.14 As 
Thomas Cantwell writes, the result of these early decisions was that “factionalism, 
mistrust and envy, not unity, soon became a permanent part of the army at its highest 
levels and represented a fundamental problem which [the] ARVN never solved.”15 The 
problem was that the Vietnamese leadership did not always recognize its shortcomings 
                                                 
13 The JGS was the Vietnamese equivalent of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Spector, Advice and 
Support, 299; Willard J. Webb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Prelude to the War in Vietnam, 1954-
1959, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007), 144–45. 
14 Colonel J. E. Robb, interview by Ronald Spector, June 17, 1980, Entry 1089, Box 2, Spector Files, 
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of ARVN senior leadership. Lieutenant General Samuel C. Myers interview, February 8, 1980, ibid., 3. The 
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pastoral and non mechanical, and living at little more than a bare existence level.” The North’s leaders were 
nevertheless able to motivate their people who came from the same stock. United States Army Command 
and General Staff College, Study on Army Aspects of the Military Assistance Program in Vietnam (Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, 1960), C19–C20. 
15 Thomas R. Cantwell, “The Army of South Vietnam: A Military and Political History, 1955-75” 
(PhD diss., University of New South Wales, 1989), 37–38.  
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and maintained a dismissive attitude toward some of the MAAG’s most important 
recommendations.16 As General Williams continually pointed out even at the end of his 
tenure, there was a general attitude that training was secondary to virtually anything 
else.17 Diluting control over the armed forces by anyone but Diem contributed to the 
regime’s stability, but resulted in paralysis, miscommunication, increased possibility of 
fratricide, and loss of situational awareness during military operations.18 It also further 
contributed to commanders ignoring orders, because a conflicting order might soon 
follow from some other source. As a 1960 U.S. Army study illustrated, “an example of 
conflicting and duplicating channels of command is where a division commander 
receives orders from both the corps commander . . . and the region commander in whose 
region his division is stationed. Another example is where the President, by means of his 
SCR-399 radio net (NCS in a radio van in the garden of the presidential palace) sends 
operational orders to a regiment direct[ly], bypassing the Department of National 
Defense, the general staff, the field command, the corps and the division.”19 This tangled 
web resulted in poorly coordinated operations and multiple battlefield seams that the 
Communists could use to their advantage.20  
                                                 
16 One advisor recounted a story in which a Vietnamese corps commander returned from visiting the 
ROKA in Korea. Asked about what he had learned from the Koreans, the Vietnamese major general replied 
that he learned that he should visit his troops in the field. General Williams was upset that the U.S. advisor 
had not passed this basic leadership point on to his counterpart. The general’s U.S. advisor had 
recommended that action on numerous occasions, but the Vietnamese general simply ignored the advice. 
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17 Samuel T. Williams, “Memorandum from General Williams to President Diem, Subject: 
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19 Ibid. 
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Unlike in Korea, or even Greece, where a greater state of emergency existed, the 
communist threat grew slowly in Vietnam. Thus, even though the chain of command was 
functioning poorly, there was less pressure on the senior U.S. advisor to insist on the 
removal of weak officers at the highest levels as Van Fleet had in Greece and Korea. For 
example, General Ty, who the MAAG identified early as a poor choice for Chief of the 
JGS, served in that role until his health forced him to retire in 1963.  
As communist pressure increased in 1959, Williams sought a way to provide 
greater assistance to the ARVN that struggled against the VC as a result of “inadequate 
planning, logistical snarls, lack of aggressive execution of plans, failure to use proper 
chain of command, [and] lack of aggressive leadership.”21 The ARVN seemed to be 
holding its own only a year earlier but was suddenly having problems combatting a rather 
weak enemy. Citing common practices in the Greek Civil War, Williams requested 
permission to send U.S. advisors on ARVN operations to assist in mission planning and 
to provide better combat reports to assess ARVN effectiveness and the communist threat 
more effectively.22 Williams’s superiors initially balked at the idea of U.S. forces directly 
participating in ARVN combat operations, arguing that in 1947 conditions in Greece had 
deteriorated to the point where U.S. advisors were required to be “the behind-the-scenes 
director of the operation[s].”23 Nevertheless, Williams received permission in May 1959 
for advisors to accompany ARVN regiments and battalions, but they were restricted from 
participating in combat.24 Later operations would show that advisors in the field were no 
panacea since they still relied on persuasion rather than true authority to correct 
deficiencies they might encounter in combat.  
                                                 
21 “61. Letter from the Chief of the Military Advisory Group in Vietnam (Williams) to the 
Commander in Chief, Pacific’s Chief of Staff (Riley),” March 31, 1959, FRUS 1958-1960, 1:630. 
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As VC attacks increased, Diem searched for innovative ideas that would halt the 
deteriorating situation with the least possible effort.25 Against MAAG advice, he directed 
the creation of an elite force of 10,000 commandos (later Rangers) and requested that the 
MAAG provide anti-guerrilla training for the rest of the ARVN. Diem communicated 
these thoughts to Durbrow in February 1960.26 They caused significant anxiety within an 
already divisive civil-military relationship in Saigon. Ambassador Durbrow, who had 
long resisted the arming and training of the Civil Guard to the standards that General 
Williams desired, then championed anti-guerrilla training. He used the ARVN’s poor 
performance to criticize Williams’s insistence on withholding the ARVN from internal 
security operations and training and organizing it primarily for defense against a northern 
invasion. Williams argued against the commando units since he felt it was either a veiled 
request for more forces when the United States was already footing most of the 
RVNAF’s bill or an ill-conceived plan that would absorb many of the best soldiers from 
an already underperforming army and complicate operations that were already being 
executed poorly.27 Ultimately, the commandos were an elite unit of sorts, and were 
probably the best fighters in the ARVN, but their creation was a distraction from more 
fundamental problems. 
Diem’s request launched what has become a perennial debate over the type of 
army that the United States built, which continues today. For example, historian Max 
Boot argues that in Vietnam, U.S. advisors failed to create a constabulary force as in 
previous advisory efforts, instead organizing “a miniature version of their own armed 
forces, complete with heavy armor, artillery, air force, navy, marines, [and] rangers,” 
because the advisors believed that “ the most likely threat would come from a Korean 
                                                 
25 See Spector for a narrative and map of major VC actions between 1957 and 1959. Spector, Advice 
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War-style invasion.”28 Boot’s argument ignores a number of facts. First, constabulary 
forces alone were insufficient for defeating guerrillas in Greece, Korea, and the 
Philippines. Second, the biggest proponent of the Civil Guard—the RVNAF’s 
constabulary force—was General Williams. The problem was not a failure to create the 
constabulary force. The problem was overcoming South Vietnam’s shortcomings to make 
it effective against the Viet Cong. In Korea the United States decided what kind of army 
the South Koreans would have, since the U.S. military government ran the country. In 
contrast, South Vietnam was a sovereign nation, whose leaders were in a position to 
decide what kind of army they wanted, as evidenced by Diem’s decision to form the 
ARVN Rangers despite Williams’s objections. Boot also states that guerrillas presented 
the greatest threat to the South, but that the “American advisers did not prepare the South 
Vietnamese soldiers for this challenge.”29 In this argument, Boot shared Ambassador 
Durbrow’s sentiments in early 1960. 
In April 1960 after realizing that the ARVN was in worse shape than he originally 
thought, Durbrow requested that Williams answer a series of questions concerning the 
ARVN’s ability to conduct the type of warfare that it was becoming increasingly obvious 
needed to be waged. Broadly-speaking, Durbrow accused Williams of resisting anti-
guerrilla training for the ARVN, of misleading him as to the amount of training being 
completed overall, and of making the ARVN less capable of fighting guerrilla forces due 
to his elimination of the light divisions.30 Williams, in a clear sign of frustration with 
Durbrow, and perhaps with the ARVN’s poor performance as well, responded with a 
vehement defense of his plan and his organization’s accomplishments. He noted that the 
division reorganization followed a period of intense study and testing and resulted in 
divisions suited to fight either internal or external aggression. He argued that the ARVN 
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weapons were superior to those of the Viet Cong. Most importantly, Williams insisted 
that it was up to the ARVN commanders to determine how to train and employ their units 
most effectively.31  
On this latter point, Williams found himself facing the same problem as Van Fleet 
in Greece: how to provide weapons, equipment, and transportation to an ally without 
making him entirely dependent on it in all situations. The answer was solid leadership, 
but the ARVN continued to fall short in that domain. This aspect was not true in all cases, 
but it was often the case that the ARVN remained a road-bound force that could not and 
would not fight the Communists on their terrain. Williams was not entirely blameless, 
however. Like General Roberts in Korea before him, he had misled U.S. and Vietnamese 
officials with his words of praise for the ARVN. He referred often to the impressive 
accomplishments that the ARVN had made in training and organization. While he 
routinely pointed out the grave errors the ARVN faced in leadership, chain of command, 
poor training consistency, and lack of aggressiveness, he never applied the weight of his 
position and relationship with President Diem to effect drastic changes. No leaders of 
consequence were relieved as a result of his actions, and the chain of command was never 
fixed. Based on Williams’s remarks and reports, it appeared that, while the ARVN had 
persistent problems, they were being addressed and would eventually be corrected since 
the ARVN was progressing.32 The truth was that the ARVN did not fight well in a whole 
host of scenarios, whether on defense or offense. Williams had supplied the ARVN with 
anti-guerrilla manuals in 1958, along with guidance to his advisors that anti-guerrilla 
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training be emphasized.33 The problem was not a lack of anti-guerrilla training as such. It 
was the army’s lack of emphasis on conducting any training at all.34  
In his final report to President Diem before departing in August 1960, Williams 
congratulated Diem on all that the RVNAF had accomplished since 1954, and listed a 
number of recommendations for the future. He recommended that officer and non-
commissioned officer promotions be based on merit, loyalty, and ability, rather than on 
“personal friendship or other affiliations.”35 Such practices, amounting to a kind of 
institutional nepotism, compounded many other problems, including the ongoing 
weakness of the ARVN chain of command. Williams expressed concern over the 
continuing problem of individuals circumventing the chain of command in both 
directions and the problem of the dual military and provincial chain.36  
In addition, Williams addressed other systemic problems including a lack of 
emphasis on training, little or no leadership follow-up on orders to subordinates, no 
centralized intelligence agency, multiple conflicting orders issued to units from different 
sources, and piecemeal assignment of forces, rather than maintaining unit integrity.37 All 
of these problems were contrary to the advice that U.S. advisors had given their 
counterparts over the preceding five years. Much of the failure to heed the advice could 
be laid at Diem’s feet. He was responsible for the dilution of power that prevented any 
one person besides himself from possessing too much control over the security forces. 
The cost was poor coordination and reduced effectiveness against what was still a small 
communist insurgency. What was needed was a single commander with the authority to 
direct the counterinsurgency effort as in Greece and the Philippines, but this sort of 
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authority was not forthcoming. It would be up to Williams’s replacement to change the 
course of the war, but the events of the second half of 1960 would further cement Diem’s 
obstinacy with respect to personal loyalty and centralizing power.  
In August 1960 Williams’s long tenure in Vietnam came to an end, and 
Lieutenant General Lionel McGarr replaced him. MAAG records from McGarr’s tenure 
are sparse, although he authored a number of insightful reports emphasizing the need to 
refocus the ARVN and the MAAG away from defending against a conventional invasion 
toward addressing the growing insurgency threat. From a strictly resume-based 
assessment, McGarr seemed a particularly good fit for the position of MAAG Chief. He 
had been an infantry regiment commander in the Second World War, an assistant division 
commander in the Korean War, and commandant of the Army Command and General 
Staff College (CGSC). During his latter assignment, the CGSC prepared a staff study that 
analyzed the Vietnam problem and counterinsurgency and made recommendations that 
would inform the MAAG’s shift in focus during McGarr’s time as MAAG Chief. 
Although General Williams had already begun working on a re-examination of the 
strategy in Vietnam, the MAAG’s Counterinsurgency Plan (CIP) would be implemented 
on McGarr’s watch, and it corresponded with President John F. Kennedy’s thoughts on 
combating communism. True to his ideals about an independent Vietnam, however, 
President Diem continued to implement his own reforms. 
C. DIEM’S EFFORTS TO STABILIZE THE SOUTH 
Ngo Dinh Diem may forever remain an enigmatic figure, at least in Western eyes. 
Never married, monastic in his personal habits, Catholic in a sea of Buddhists, and 
devoted to Vietnam, he has been judged an effective ruler by historians such as Mark 
Moyar, and by others as having maintained his power due only to American support.38 
Having solidified his power, Diem set about transforming his country. One of his most 
serious challenges was his lack of competent officials since the French had dominated the 
government administration. Unlike in Korea where the U.S. occupation force gradually 
turned over government administration to trained Korean replacements, the sullen French 
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left the Vietnamese wholly incapable of running their own country.39 Thus, Diem had 
little choice but to rely on those he knew and trusted, an action toward which he was 
already inclined. A lack of other competent Vietnamese gave him an excuse to maintain 
this attitude or rely on Americans or holdovers from the French regime, which made him 
look less connected to the Vietnamese he supposedly served.40 Diem’s concern was to 
reform South Vietnamese society into a modern, independent country while 
simultaneously warding off communist influence and infiltration. His policy combined 
classic counterinsurgency techniques of economic reform and population control with a 
military response to attempt to separate the peasants from VC elements trying to recruit 
them.  
To address peasant grievances and compare favorably to what was happening in 
the North under Ho, Diem initiated land reform in the South. He lowered rent payments 
in 1955, and in 1956 he limited landowners to owning no more than 300 acres, and 
allowed peasants to buy land on credit.41 The effect of this reform was minimal. After six 
months, only 2,000 peasant families had availed themselves of 12,000 acres total.42 
Furthermore, in many areas, the Viet Minh had seized land during the French War and 
signed it over to the local southern peasants who now considered it theirs. In many cases, 
the Government of Vietnam (GVN) simply reclaimed such land and offered it for sale to 
the same peasants.43 From the peasants’ perspective, such treatment was not land reform, 
merely corruption in a new form. Diem’s sincerity toward real land reform as a means of 
countering the communists is a matter of debate. Edward Miller has argued that Diem 
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was more interested in moving people to otherwise unused land, rather than redistributing 
the land in the areas where they already lived.44 In this fashion, Diem drew on his own 
extensive knowledge of Ramon Magsaysay’s EDCOR program in the Philippines, which 
used unoccupied land to control population density and build a spirit of accomplishment 
among the population. By relocating loyal South Vietnamese and giving them land, Diem 
hoped to create a “human wall in the depopulated area near the three frontiers 
[Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam].”45 Much of Diem’s attitude toward his people 
revolved around a philosophy of Personalism that Diem and his brother bent to their 
needs. In short, Personalism was a mix between benevolent dictatorship and limited 
democracy that respected the rights of the individual while still expecting certain 
sacrifices on behalf of the community as the government saw fit. It was meant to be 
Diem’s counter to North Vietnamese communism, but, like the implementation of land 
reform and relocation efforts, it does not appear that Diem’s government was ever able to 
convince the peasant masses of the benefits of his many ideas.46 
French precedents at land reclamation and relocation prior to and during the 
Second World War and Diem’s own small-scale relocation efforts led to Diem’s idea for 
“agrovilles.” These were basically miniature cities in the Mekong Delta with urban 
amenities and strong defenses but required the free labor of villagers and forced 
relocation that resulted in long transits between field and home for the peasants living 
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there.47 These factors resulted in peasant hostility to the point that the program was 
finally abandoned, but it was not the end of Diem’s resettlement plan. Informed by 
British experiences in Malaya and those of the French in Algeria, Diem and his brother 
Nhu conceived of the Strategic Hamlet Program.48 Less ambitious in its local impact—it 
focused more on improving the defensive measures of existing hamlets rather than 
relocating large populations into miniature cities—it nevertheless aimed to transform 
most of South Vietnam’s 16,000 hamlets in a two-year period, a herculean task.49 In 
September 1961 the British established the British Advisory Mission to Vietnam 
(BRIAM), which brought Robert Thompson and a group of counterinsurgency experts 
with experience in the Malayan Emergency to advise Diem. During this time of mounting 
guerrilla activity in South Vietnam, which American-trained ARVN forces seemed 
incapable of quelling, the introduction of proven ideas seemed reasonable.50  
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The number of hamlets increased rapidly, from 2,559 in July 1962 to 8,095 in 
August 1963.51 This number compares to the 500 hamlets created over three years to 
control the Malayan situation.52 As Robert Thompson describes with respect to 
Vietnam’s strategic hamlets, “no attention was paid to their purpose; their creation 
became the purpose in itself.”53 The strategic hamlets suffered from many of the same 
problems as the agrovilles, including poor planning, rapid expansion, poor site selection, 
corruption among government officials, and a failure to adequately prepare and explain 
their purpose to the population.54 Yet it still proved successful in certain areas of the 
country.55 The Strategic Hamlet Program was initially problematic for the Communists 
since it limited their access to the population.56 In the end, however, the speed and 
disorganization of the program meant that the RVNAF could not establish control over 
hamlets established in the VC-controlled areas, nor adequately defend those on the 
fringes.57 
These relocation and defensive efforts, while positively affecting the economy, 
peasant livelihood, and security in some areas, appeared to have an overall short-term 
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negative impact on the average peasant’s view of the Saigon government. Combined with 
charges of corruption, the imprisonment of political dissenters, and the centralization of 
power among a small group of cronies, Diem’s government was alienating the very 
people upon whom he depended for support. This sentiment passed to the RVNAF, 
whose leaders were pushed aside if they lacked the required political connections or were 
ignored as Diem conducted his anti-communist campaign through multiple channels to 
bypass their authority. This autocratic personality trait did not sit well with many 
Americans either, particularly Ambassador Durbrow, who, while continuing to work with 
Diem, was nevertheless critical of his regime and methods.58 A group of Vietnamese 
political opponents summed up these complaints in the Caravelle Manifesto in April 
1960. Along with addressing Diem’s policies and administration, it rebuked him for his 
politicization of the military leadership and urged its complete reorganization to eliminate 
“clannishness and party obedience.”59 Diem, as might be expected, dismissed the 
substance of the manifesto, although he did retaliate later against its authors.60 This was 
the environment in which General McGarr entered and tried a revised advisory hand to 
repair South Vietnam’s military and security situation. 
D. CONVENTIONAL COUNTERINSURGENCY  
General Lionel C. McGarr assumed command as MAAG Chief on 1 September 
1960 and lost no time addressing the security threat that the CIA had just described in 
August as deteriorating and if not reversed would “almost certainly in time cause the 
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collapse of Diem’s regime.”61 On 4 September, McGarr presented his initial plan to 
improve the ARVN’s ability to address the threat. He rightly noted the importance of 
“military, political, economic, psychological and sociological matters” to the country’s 
stability and echoed Williams’s long-standing critiques of the RVNAF’s weaknesses.62 
These weaknesses were the Civil Guard’s and ARVN’s ineffectiveness, the latter of 
which McGarr attributed to its failure to train adequately. Like Williams, he 
recommended equipping the CG similarly to the ARVN, training it in anti-guerrilla 
techniques, and placing it under the Vietnamese Department of Defense. Unlike 
Williams, McGarr supported the Ranger force, seeing it as a deep reconnaissance asset. 
Finally, he called for an overall ARVN increase from the current 150,000 to 170,000 
troops and additional helicopter assets. McGarr saved the most substantive comments for 
recommendations on actions that President Diem should take at the behest of the U.S. 
Secretary of State, which were larger government reforms similar to those laid out by the 
Caravelle Group in April.63 
Even though the August 1960 CIA report had predicted that Diem’s government 
was in no immediate danger, on 11 November 1960, ARVN paratroopers surrounded his 
palace and called on him to reform his government.64 The coup leaders’ demands were 
essentially the same as those laid down in the Caravelle Manifesto seven months earlier. 
In a disingenuous maneuver to buy time, the Ngo brothers agreed to the rebels’ demands 
while they coordinated with nearby loyal units to move to the capital. These units 
included armor, and within 36 hours, the coup was over. The Ngos were still in charge, 
and Diem wasted no time rescinding any agreement to reform.65 Throughout the affair, 
both Durbrow and McGarr worked with the coup plotters to calm the situation and 
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express their support for Diem and an anti-communist South Vietnam. Despite their 
efforts, Diem did not feel he received adequate U.S. support during the coup hours, 
particularly from Ambassador Durbrow.66 As a result, Durbrow’s last months in Vietnam 
were ineffectual. 
Unlike Williams, McGarr was more sympathetic to the idea that guerrilla warfare 
was a separate and distinct type of warfare that required a different approach than what 
had been the focus to that point. McGarr’s change of direction coincided with a renewed 
look in Washington at ways to combat the Vietnamese insurgency that resulted in a joint 
State-Department of Defense cable to Ambassador Durbrow in October 1960 directing 
him to draft a comprehensive plan to assist the GVN to defeat the insurgency.67 For his 
part, McGarr had already formulated many of his thoughts on what the MAAG needed to 
accomplish for success in Vietnam. He delivered these thoughts to his advisors in a 
missive titled “Implementing Actions for Anti-Guerrilla Operations.” Its goals were 
genuine, but as a reflection of the Vietnam situation, it was inadequate in its prescription. 
It begins with a list of limitations that, by themselves, would spell defeat. For example, 
“you can assume that political and economic reforms presently getting under way will not 
move rapidly enough to be felt for some time. . . . the population will continue to be 
terrorized, converted, or cajoled into assisting the VC.”68 His plan depended almost 
entirely on unifying the chain of command and eliminating leadership redundancy, goals 
that Williams had sought in vain for his five years as MAAG chief.69 It was becoming 
more and more clear that drastic measures were necessary, such as a U.S.-led combined 
staff with operational control of forces and the authority to remove incompetent or 
corrupt officers. Unlike the situation in Korea in 1950, Vietnam was a slow-building fire 
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that did not lend itself to emergency measures. Even at its height, the Americans would 
not have the authority to make the drastic changes the ARVN required to win. 
McGarr then lists the strengths and weaknesses of guerrillas, in terms generally 
favorable to the Viet Cong. For example, he notes “lack of coordinated firepower” as a 
weakness for the VC, but dismisses it since ambush and withdrawal tactics do not require 
additional firepower.70 McGarr’s plan involved a number of fanciful and mutually 
contradictory concepts, such as populating the entire length of the border with loyal 
Vietnamese, or conversely, removing the entire population along the border to create a 
five-to-ten mile wide free fire zone in which anyone wandering through could be targeted 
and killed. He does go on to prescribe some important tactical improvements that the 
MAAG could reasonably affect, such as improving tactical air control and pushing 
counterparts to conduct more night operations. About the only thing he really gets right is 
his assessment of the guerrilla when he writes, “to understand the success of Partisan-
Guerrilla Warfare, we must go to the very basis—the wellspring of its power. This is 
MOTIVATION—the imbuing of a people and a cause with a sense of PURPOSE!”71 
January 1961 brought Edward Lansdale back to Vietnam to assess the situation at 
the same time that the Saigon Embassy’s Counterinsurgency Plan (CIP) arrived for 
Washington’s review. Drafted apparently without any GVN involvement, the majority of 
its most critical recommendations depended on the GVN to perform them. These 
recommendations meant significant changes in current GVN organizations and processes. 
In summary, the recommendations were largely the same as those made many times 
before to strengthen popular support.72 In the military realm, it concurred with McGarr’s 
20,000-man increase in the ARVN and prescribed vague measures like “take 
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extraordinary action starting at [the] highest levels of government and extending to the 
lowest political subdivision (the village) to establish and maintain internal security.”73 
Thus, absent any influence on the real problems plaguing the ARVN, the plan offered no 
innovative solutions.  
As Eisenhower turned over the presidency to John F. Kennedy, he emphasized the 
deteriorating situation in Laos and did not mention the events in Vietnam.74 Kennedy, 
who had made lofty promises to support allies in his inaugural address, nevertheless 
reviewed the situation in Vietnam, with Lansdale in attendance, in January 1961. Asked 
for his opinion following his recent visit, Lansdale pointed out three criteria for success: 
First, the Americans in Viet-Nam must themselves be infused with high 
morale and a will to win, and they must get close to the Vietnamese; 
secondly, the Vietnamese must, in this setting, be moved to act with vigor 
and confidence; third, Diem must be persuaded to let the opposition 
coalesce in some legitimate form rather than concentrate on the task of 
killing him.75 
Lansdale did not elaborate on the feasibility of the second and third criteria, which were 
clearly the most important and were issues that Lansdale himself had proven unable to 
affect. The question was not what needed to happen but rather how to make it happen. 
This critical point was either ignored or simply not considered by the others in the room. 
In the ensuing weeks, Kennedy considered replacing Durbrow with Lansdale but was 
ultimately dissuaded.76 Anxious to attack the problem despite a lack of GVN support and 
his own concerns about “whether the situation [in Vietnam] was not basically one of 
politics and morale,” Kennedy approved the CIP in February 1961.77 An early champion 
for all things special, including Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs, Kennedy would 
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use Vietnam as the testing ground for a revamped strategy of containing communism 
through surreptitious and inexpensive means.78 When presented with the CIP, Diem was 
hesitant to commit, which was likely due to the actions the plan required him to take. 
What followed was a weeks-long disagreement between McGarr and Durbrow over the 
preferred method to persuade Diem to support the CIP, with Durbrow supporting 
coercion and McGarr recommending persuasion.79 At about this time, the CIA estimated 
that Viet Cong strength in the South had reached 8,000–10,000 and that the Communists 
controlled “one-half of the entire rural region south and southwest of Saigon.” Over 
2,600 civilians and government officials were assassinated in 1960.80 The McGarr-
Durbrow disagreement—never truly resolved—coincided with the approval of Durbrow’s 
replacement, Ambassador Frederick Nolting, who assumed his post on 10 May 1961. 
While the administration was contemplating action in Vietnam, it was 
simultaneously coping with the Bay of Pigs disaster and the crisis in Laos that 
Eisenhower had warned about. These events, along with the increasingly dire intelligence 
reports, likely contributed to a growing sense of urgency within the Kennedy 
administration, which formed a Presidential Task Force on Vietnam and began 
considering the introduction of U.S. combat forces.81 The U.S. takeover of the Vietnam 
problem had begun in earnest. As a result of this renewed emphasis on Vietnam, in April 
1961 Kennedy approved a 100-man increase in the MAAG to 785, an ARVN increase to 
170,000, and a Civil Guard increase to 68,000.82 He took these steps despite his special 
counsel’s, Ted Sorensen, noting the day before in reference to South Vietnam, that “there 
is no clearer example of a country that cannot be saved unless it saves itself-through 
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increased popular support; governmental, economic and military reforms and 
reorganizations; and the encouragement of new political leaders.”83  
Kennedy reinforced his decision by sending Vice President Johnson to Vietnam in 
May 1961, to personally deliver Kennedy’s promise of support against the Communists. 
Kennedy further considered the deployment of 400 Special Forces soldiers to train their 
counterparts and an additional ARVN expansion to 200,000.84 While these latter moves 
were linked to the ongoing problems in Laos, Kennedy was nevertheless committing to 
greater support without any indication from Diem that he would take the necessary steps 
in the CIP, which Kennedy himself had raised in January. Furthermore, in May 1961 
McGarr reported that Diem continued to balk at “a single chain of command, a central 
intelligence organization, and economic and political reforms,” all critical elements for 
military success.85 
Despite McGarr’s initial appearance as the perfect man to assist South Vietnam in 
its counterinsurgency effort, he was not measuring up to the demands of the job and 
seemed more suited to drafting his various missives, rather than leading the advisory 
effort. As his deputy recounts, McGarr began traveling around the country shortly after 
his arrival to visit all the units that the MAAG was advising, but he never completed the 
tour. He gradually became reclusive and was absent from the headquarters for days at a 
time. Instead, he sent his staff command guidance in the form of often unintelligible 
tapes, recorded in his quarters.86 He further neglected his duties with the country team, 
often sending his deputy to their meetings, instead of going himself even when he was in 
Saigon.87 Although there are no specific instances of drastic errors as a result of his 
detached command presence, if the remarks of one of his subordinates is remotely true, 
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the efficacy of the MAAG was surely reduced during his time in command.88 Either way, 
it appears that at least as early as November 1961, Washington had caught on to his 
weakness as a commander and began searching for a replacement.89  
As Washington debated its way forward, the MAAG advisors continued their 
work against a steadily increasing VC force. In August the CIA estimated that the VC 
had “increased their hard-core strength from an estimated 4,000 in April 1960 to more 
than 12,000 by mid-1961.”90 They reflected this strength in September when a 1,000-man 
regular VC force, well equipped and in uniforms, attacked two ARVN outposts 50 
kilometers north of Kontum in the Central Highlands. The ARVN reported 100 VC dead 
versus 19 ARVN.91 Later reports from the advisors conflicted with the ARVN numbers, 
noting 92 dead and 77 missing.92 The VC followed this operation with the seizure of the 
provincial capital of Phuoc Thanh and the public execution of the province chief and his 
assistant.93 The cynic might argue that the MAAG advisors had not properly trained their 
counterparts according to McGarr’s anti-guerrilla concepts, but perhaps there was a more 
fundamental problem that had not been addressed. 
McGarr’s “First Twelve Month Report” reflected his optimism about what the 
MAAG had been able to accomplish. It had taken over six months for his recommended 
20,000-man increase of the RVNAF to be approved, but that was quickly followed by an 
additional 30,000 in conjunction with Johnson’s visit. Meanwhile, the November 1960 
coup, the situation in Laos, and the new administration served to delay attention on other 
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necessary changes. He claimed to have streamlined the chain of command and ensured 
that Field Command, the position between the Joint General Staff and the army corps, 
“became the overall tactical headquarters . . . charged with the coordination and direction 
of all, countrywide, counter-insurgency operations.”94 Field Command, created in 1959 
before McGarr arrived, ended up being a largely ceremonial post to appease U.S. 
demands rather than the type of counterinsurgency czar position that Magsaysay had held 
in the Philippines, and General Alexander Papagos in Greece. Other successes included 
better coordination between different military branches during operations, improved 
intelligence capability, and a successful national presidential election that saw Diem 
reelected without significant communist interference.95 Regardless, the Kennedy 
administration had other plans for providing support to South Vietnam. The MAAG’s 
days as an independent, limited support element to Diem’s regime were soon coming to 
an end. 
In October 1961 President Kennedy sent General Maxwell Taylor to Vietnam to 
assess the Viet Cong threat and the current U.S. and GVN efforts to combat it. In his 
report from the mission, General Taylor proposed “a shift in the American relation to the 
Vietnamese effort from advice to limited partnership.”96 Taylor explained that the limited 
partnership “requires change in the charter, the spirit, and the organization of the MAAG 
in South Vietnam. It must be shifted from an advisory group to something nearer—but 
not quite—an operational headquarters in a theater of war. The objective of this shift is 
clear. The U.S. should become a limited partner in the war, avoiding formalized advice 
on the one hand, trying to run the war, on the other.”97 Taylor proposed this nebulous 
relationship alongside a menu of recommendations including sending 8,000 combat 
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troops as a symbol of U.S. commitment, increasing the MAAG to 2,400 personnel, and 
sending combat support assets like helicopters and light aviation assets.98 
Taylor’s mission report tacitly admitted that all attempts to advise the highest 
echelons of Diem’s government had failed. It proposed a new relationship that was 
poorly defined, not agreed upon by the host nation, and emphasized a bottom-up 
approach to advising that presumably would affect the fighting more directly by placing 
advisors with battalions and province chiefs. The mindset was that the advisors would 
succeed at the lower levels and that this success would bubble up to the higher levels to 
solve the RVNAF’s fundamental problems. This thought process was contrary to the 
experiences of the MAAG’s predecessors in Greece, Korea, and the Philippines. Van 
Fleet’s forceful personality in Greece and Korea, in addition to the operational control the 
U.S. enjoyed over Korean forces in the latter case, permeated the highest levels of the 
military organizations in those countries. Important tactical events and training 
accomplishments depended on advisors at the lowest levels only after the approval and 
important changes came at the top. Lansdale’s experience with Magsaysay in the 
Philippines was merely one of massaging ideas or acting as an objective sounding board 
for relatively minor decisions that Magsaysay was considering. At no time did Lansdale 
have to coerce Magsaysay to make drastic reforms in how he prosecuted the war. A 
solution to this problem eluded those in Washington who debated what to implement 
from Taylor’s mission report. 
Lansdale, as a member of the mission, recommended a radical shift in U.S. 
practices. He proposed for example, declaring sub-limited war, employing mobile U.S. 
civilian-military teams to pacify the villages, and embedding U.S. counterparts in the 
GVN who “would give the firm guidance of a friend to the Vietnamese official in that 
position,” yet remain “very much in the background and encouraging Vietnamese 
initiative.”99 These ideas did not receive much follow-on discussion, perhaps because 
they were so fanciful. Lansdale, having been considered on numerous occasions as a 
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special envoy and even ambassador to Vietnam, was again bandied about for a similar 
position, but remained at the Pentagon.100 It is difficult to imagine him changing Diem’s 
mind on the issues Diem felt most strongly about. During his time in Vietnam in the mid-
1950s, Lansdale supported Diem’s efforts and provided advice on directions Diem had 
already decided to go. By Lansdale’s own admission, Diem had not heeded his advice to 
win the 1955 election by a solid majority, rather than the 98 percent that Diem 
manufactured, which was a strictly prestige-based decision.101 There is no reason to 
believe that Diem would have listened to Lansdale on matters that threatened his survival. 
Nevertheless, with little precedent or reflection on how to accomplish objectives 
so far unrealized with similar methods, the president signed National Security Action 
Memorandum 111, which offered additional helicopters and airplanes, intelligence assets, 
patrol boats, advisors, and economic aid—but no U.S. combat formations—to South 
Vietnam. In exchange, it called on Diem again to broaden his government’s base of 
support and reform the military. Most significantly for the MAAG, it authorized a new 
organization tasked with the vague mission, “to carry out the other increased 
responsibilities which accrue to the U.S. military authorities under these 
recommendations.”102 With the Communists claiming 100,000 village-level guerrillas, 
24,500 regional-level troops, and approximately 5,000 main force troops at the end of 
1961, the new command would need to innovate to regain the initiative.103 During this 
period of debate, Ambassador Nolting noted in a telegram that the French had 3,500 
trainers in place during their war in Vietnam. Nolting made this note in anticipation of 
having to justify an increase in troops to the ICC, presumably without considering that, 
ten years earlier, the French had 3,500 trainers, led most of the Vietnamese units, and still 
lost to the Communists. The winners of the debate in Washington seemed to believe that 
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more advisors would produce a groundswell of success that would overcome the 
RVNAF’s inherent weaknesses. 
Kennedy himself seemed uneasy about the commitment that he was making to 
South Vietnam. Even though his advisors would now be at greater risk due to their closer 
proximity to danger at the battalion level, he made sure to emphasize, during final 
discussions on MACV’s establishment, “the importance of playing down the number of 
U.S. military personnel involved in Vietnam and that the U.S. military role there was for 
advice, training and support of the Vietnamese Armed Forces and not combat.”104 This 
attitude continued in the administration’s failure to authorize combat awards for advisors 
until 1963, despite the increasing number of U.S. deaths: 16 in 1961 and 53 in 1962.105 
Furthermore, once large U.S. forces arrived in 1965, the advisor positions fell behind 
combat units for priority and prestige, and promotions were affected accordingly.106 
Implying that advisors in Vietnam were not in combat was a stain on Kennedy’s 
integrity, and a politically expedient, veiled falsehood of a kind that continues to this day. 
To oversee the expanded U.S. mission in Vietnam, Defense Secretary Robert 
McNamara directed the creation of a new command, Military Assistance Command, 
Vietnam (MACV), under General Paul Harkins. The MAAG continued to exist as a 
separate command under MACV and received a new commander in March 1961, Major 
General Charles Timmes, who was an enthusiastic and engaged commander compared to 
McGarr.107 The two commands overlapped for the next two years since MACV’s mission 
focused on what the MAAG was already doing—advising—and coordinating support 
from an increasing number of airlift and intelligence platforms. This situation was new 
ground for advice and support. In Greece, the Greeks employed the majority of the 
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aircraft and other equipment sent to assist them, which kept the advisory mission small. 
In Korea, the massive U.S. infusion of men and materiel created a natural separation that 
allowed the MAAG to continue its separate duties. In Vietnam, the support assets were 
relatively minor—two companies of helicopters, intelligence assets, and light aircraft. 
With a four-star general in charge, at least four other generals on the staff, and an implied 
mandate not to copy McGarr’s wait-and-see approach to the South Vietnamese 
insurgency MACV had to at least appear very busy and make progress.108 It found itself 
almost immediately supporting President Diem’s Strategic Hamlet Program, which was 
already in motion as it worked on a Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam. This plan, 
issued on 19 January 1963, called for an even larger expansion of the ARVN, CG, and 
SDC forces to 231,000, 101,000, and 122,000, respectively. In addition, the plan 
prescribed an expansion of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group Program—U.S. Special 
Forces-trained security elements consisting of disenfranchised Vietnamese minority 
groups—to 116,000.109  
The new plan also readdressed the ARVN chain of command problem, but it 
proved to be a final effort in futility. ARVN Field Command, established ostensibly to 
centralize the war-making effort, never actually wielded that authority. MACV’s 
recommended reorganization in November 1962 eliminated Field Command and 
established four corps zones as the primary organizations responsible for security in their 
zones.110 The reorganization did little to address any of the ARVN’s fundamental 
problems such as favoritism, nor did it result in the removal of the recalcitrant generals 
known to be plotting to launch a coup. Conventional advice had met its limit in South 
Vietnam, and it is doubtful that a more intrusive method would have had better results.  
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In an attempt to better prepare its advisors for the expanded mission in Vietnam, 
the U.S. Army established the Military Assistance Training Advisor (MATA) Course in 
1962. The intensive six-week course taught language, culture, tactics, and weapons to 
prepare better the deploying advisors. It was the first standardized course of its kind—
thus providing far more training than advisors prior to Vietnam—but it could not teach its 
students how to change the culture of the force they were going to advise. As one advisor 
notes, “When I left Fort Bragg, I thought I had received a tutorial covering all I would 
need to know about the Vietnamese culture. I was wrong. Soon after beginning my 
assignment, I realized that I had received only an introduction, and a lot of what I was 
taught was incorrect or mythical.”111 Although the army made great efforts to improve 
advisor training during Vietnam, the end result of the advisory effort when compared to 
those in Greece, Korea, and the Philippines, where advisors had no training, show it to 
have had a negligible impact on the outcome in South Vietnam.112 
Critics of the advisory effort, such as Andrew Krepinevich, note that in 1963 only 
3,000 of the 16,000 U.S. personnel in Vietnam had received the MATA course training, 
implying that the advisory effort suffered from personnel who were not adequately 
trained.113 Viewed in isolation, Krepinevich’s observation has merit and would normally 
provide a starting point for assessing the roots of advisors’ difficulty in aiding the ARVN 
to fight and win. What Krepinevich fails to note, however, is that by 1963, the U.S. forces 
in Vietnam supporting the ARVN had moved far beyond just advising. They were 
providing combat support functions like helicopter insertion, intelligence assessment, and 
aerial observation, which were inherently more force-heavy than advisors, who only 
numbered a few, at most three, per battalion.114 The number of support personnel would 
balloon in the coming years to far outnumber the advisors. In response to Krepinevich’s 
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argument, the majority of the actual advisors in Vietnam had attended some sort of 
advisor training prior to their arrival.  
The influx of advisors to battalions and provinces had mixed results, which 
seemed to be far more dependent on the Vietnamese unit commander than the limited 
partnership model under which the advisor was supposedly operating.115 Two general 
themes were apparent: advice at the lower levels was always acknowledged but accepted 
or ignored seemingly at random; and the higher the rank of the counterpart, the more he 
was concerned with the political impact of his decision. Robert Bayless, assigned to the 
ARVN 7th Regiment, describes his counterpart, Major Vu Ngoc Tuan, as a “fearless 
commander,” “ferocious during battle,” “friendly and considerate when working with the 
peasants” and states that he had “never met a finer soldier.”116 His unit was brave and 
accomplished in battle despite operating in the Iron Triangle, the VC infested area north 
of Saigon. The 7th Regiment was nevertheless one of the units that helped overthrow 
President Diem in November 1963. 
In contrast, Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann’s experience with his counterpart, 
General Huynh Van Cao, was characterized by extreme frustration and lost opportunities 
that culminated in the war’s first large-scale military debacle (at least by the standards of 
the time). A fiery officer, Vann joined Cao’s 7th Division as its senior advisor in March 
1962 as a true believer that firepower and helicopter mobility, well-applied, could destroy 
the communist hold over the countryside to the benefit of South Vietnam’s government 
and its American backers.117 Over the next six months, Vann coached Cao and his 
division in the coordination of the new capabilities that came with MACV’s 
establishment (e.g., helicopters and developing intelligence for missions). On numerous 
occasions, Vann and his staff developed good plans that caught the VC off guard and 
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placed sizeable units in the position to be destroyed by Cao’s forces. Cao used subterfuge 
to avoid giving the orders necessary to close-out the mission, thus achieving a number of 
half-victories, which infuriated Vann and allowed the Communists to adapt and fight 
another day.118 Vann’s effectiveness came to a halt in September 1962 when Cao’s 
forces were caught in an ambush shortly after a helicopter insertion and suffered 18 
personnel killed. The result was President Diem’s personal admonishment of Cao for the 
casualties and an end to the productive operations. Vann surmised that Cao’s caution 
during the earlier operations stemmed, indirectly, from Diem’s fear of another coup. 
Diem was willing to entertain U.S.-initiated operations as long as they did not result in 
too many ARVN casualties; otherwise, Diem was confident in his counterinsurgency 
strategy. He had built his own De Lattre Line of strategic hamlets. With American 
artillery and airpower, perhaps he thought he could sit back and destroy the Communists 
as they threw themselves against it.119 
Cao was promoted to corps command at the end of 1962, resulting in his chief of 
staff, the even less impressive Colonel Bui Dinh Dam, becoming the new division 
commander when it received intelligence of a VC concentration near the village of Ap 
Bac, west of Saigon. Approximately 300 VC were entrenched in a north-south line in a 
plain of rice paddies. The division’s plan, as drawn up by its American advisors, was an 
infantry attack on the north and south flanks with a frontal assault by armored personnel 
carriers from the west to crush the communist position. The battle began in the early 
morning hours of 3 January 1963 with an uncoordinated attack on the south flank across 
the rice paddies by poorly trained Civil Guard companies that quickly stalled under heavy 
fire. Vann, circling overhead as the senior officer on scene since no Vietnamese 
commander above the rank of captain was within five kilometers of the battlefield, 
guided a helicopter insertion of the division’s reserve company to support the stalled CG 
troops. The helicopters landed too close to the VC position, which resulted in the 
immediate loss of three aircraft. Meanwhile, the armored company that was to attack 
from the west became uncharacteristically timid and took three hours to move to the 
                                                 
118 Sheehan, Bright Shining Lie, 79–96. 
119 Ibid., 73–96, 118–122. 
 231
helicopter crash site. Finally, the force that was to attack from the north also met heavy 
resistance and failed to advance.120  
With forces stalled or rescuing the downed helicopter crews and their passengers, 
Colonel Dam in a last gasp of desperation to salvage a victory, requested an airborne 
battalion be dropped near the northern flank for a final dusk assault. A poorly sighted line 
by the aircrews resulted in the battalion—whose commander also did not jump with his 
unit—being dropped too close to the VC line, and many of them were shot while under 
parachute. With the attackers in disarray, the VC used the cover of darkness to withdraw 
virtually unscathed.121 The United States lost three soldiers, and the RVNAF lost 
between 25 and 63 killed, 100 wounded, and five helicopters.122 What was envisioned to 
be a coordinated infantry attack on two flanks with an attack by the armored company to 
drive the VC out of their entrenchments and out into the open had devolved into a set of 
poorly coordinated, piecemeal attacks made worse by ill-fated decisions to try to remedy 
the situation. Throughout the engagement, Vann played the unenviable role of battlefield 
manager with no command authority. He vainly relayed information to Dam and Dam’s 
orders to his unit commanders who executed them apathetically since they were not 
getting them directly from the ARVN division commander and because the CG units and 
the armored company actually reported to the province chief.123  
The media fallout from Ap Bac was significant, due primarily to Vann’s temper 
following the battle’s conclusion. As an assessment of the limited partnership that 
Taylor’s mission recommended, it was telling in its portents. Cao, now one of only four 
ARVN corps commanders, had been replaced by Dam, an officer unwilling to place 
himself where he needed to be to properly command his forces. Vann had played an 
important role, but he erred in recommending a landing zone so close to the enemy’s 
position and perhaps for not insisting that Dam accompany him in the observation 
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plane.124 Unity of command failed since the CG forces and the armored company fell 
under the province chief’s, not Dam’s, command. Once the CG companies came under 
fire and lost a few soldiers, their commander refused to resume the assault to take 
pressure off of the other forces when they got into trouble. No Vietnamese commander 
was present on the battlefield to get them moving again. General Harkins downplayed the 
overall significance of the battle, which seemed out of touch with the participants.125 His 
reaction was a constant theme during his tenure of deliberately inflating or emphasizing 
measures of South Vietnam success while suppressing bad news, which gave Washington 
decision makers the impression that the war was going well.126 
Despite the setback at Ap Bac, the introduction of these new forces and methods, 
if combined with a program, like the strategic hamlets, that separated the population from 
the Communists, might eventually have turned the tide in the South. In August 1963 
MACV produced a report on the ARVN’s status that was at the same time a symbol of 
hope and frustration at what had been accomplished and what remained to be 
accomplished with South Vietnam’s security situation. General Harkins noted the poorly 
coordinated group of units that were unable to affect VC border infiltration in any 
meaningful way. Only the assignment of all of the units in a given region to a single 
commander, preferably the corps commander, would allow for the type of coordination 
necessary to greatly affect the enemy’s freedom of maneuver. The report also noted the 
“laudable” number of security patrols (4475) that the RVN forces conducted weekly but 
lamented the paltry number (175) that actually made contact with the enemy.127 After 
nine years of advice and training, 39 of 90 ARVN battalions had still not been fully 
trained in the eight-week battalion training program that the MAAG had developed 
during Williams’s time as chief.128 The delays in training and poor performance in using 
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the training to establish security, as evidenced by the minimal patrolling numbers, should 
have given pause to any notion that victory was at hand. In contrast, the report’s 
assessment of the Strategic Hamlet program was a reason for optimism. It recognized the 
reckless overzealousness of the program’s construction schedule but nevertheless 
credited it with shifting 160 villages and over a million South Vietnamese from VC 
control to RVN control.129 On the surface, it appeared that U.S. and RVN leaders had 
found a formula that had some prospect for eventual success despite the increased 
pressure that North Vietnam had been placing on the South. Unfortunately, the events of 
the second half of 1963 left the question unanswered as to whether the advisory effort 
had turned a corner in Vietnam. 
E. THE OVERTHROW OF DIEM 
Despite the administration’s frustration with Diem and his refusal to make any of 
the reforms suggested in the military or civil domain, the Kennedy administration stood 
by him as the best hope for a non-communist South Vietnam even as it had considered 
removing him on many occasions. That support evaporated in the summer of 1963 when 
highly visible Buddhist demonstrations created an outsized press stir. Diem’s crackdown 
on the protestors culminated in August 1963 in a raid on Buddhist pagodas by Ngo Dinh 
Nhu’s special forces, which he subsequently tried to blame on the ARVN.130 This event 
turned out to be the last straw. An ill-advised State Department cable sent on a Saturday 
evening, when many decision makers were away from Washington—including President 
Kennedy—gave Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. the authority to begin examining 
“all possible alternative leadership and make detailed plans as to how we might bring 
about Diem’s replacement if this should become necessary.”131 Lodge and CIA agent 
Lucien Conein began coordinating with three ARVN generals who were disenchanted 
with Diem and promised many reforms in the wake of his removal from office. Nobody 
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seemed to notice that these generals had failed to show much success against the 
Communists themselves. After much political maneuvering, the generals launched their 
coup on 1 November 1963. Diem’s vision for a staunchly independent, anti-communist 
South Vietnam died with him.132 Throughout Diem’s time in power, the senior U.S. 
military advisors in Vietnam remained among his staunchest supporters, so much so that 
in the months leading up to the coup Lodge shut Harkins completely out of the coup 
discussions.133 
F. DIEM: CAN’T WIN WITH HIM, CAN’T WIN WITHOUT HIM 
Any hope that replacing Diem would result in a significant improvement in the 
security environment in South Vietnam was overly optimistic. Foreign Service Officer 
Frank Scotton recounts: 
We installed and collaborated with a family dictatorship and later 
embraced a cabal of generals who were previously French sergeants. 
Finally, the Washington perspective seemed, even then (to me), clouded 
with doubt, second guessing, scarcely any knowledge of the Vietnamese 
we supported, and no understanding at all of the national communist party. 
Almost every American falsely thought of the communists as an intrusion 
by North Viet Nam into South Viet Nam. Failure to recognize that the 
party was national in character and generally central Vietnamese in 
leadership, with grim commitment to unification, was (looking back) 
inexcusable. I was thinking, at the beginning of January 1964, that if our 
policy was to consolidate and preserve an independent South Viet Nam, 
that mountain was a lot higher and steeper than it had seemed in 1962.134 
The official U.S. Army history notes that following the coup, ARVN “morale 
dropped to a new low by mid-1964,” and “two successive coups created numerous 
changes in the command structure and seriously impaired the administrative and military 
efficiency of the Army.”135 Its fighting performance also decreased. From August 1962 
to December 1963—17 months—the ARVN lost 10,500 weapons.136 From January to 
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December 1964, it lost 14,037, and the losses continued to increase.137 Lost weapons 
meant ARVN killed or captured, or weapons dropped as soldiers fled battles. Either way, 
those weapons went to the enemy. Furthermore, as Howard Simpson writes, “national 
unity remained a major problem in South Vietnam” with all of the religious sects and 
ARVN units that had been loyal to Diem threatening the new government’s stability.138 
Furthermore, the instability emboldened North Vietnam’s leadership to apply more 
pressure on the South and send more troops down the Ho Chi Minh trail—10,000 in 
1964.139 This number grew to 90,000 in 1966.140  
In 1965 the Johnson administration decided to begin a massive buildup of forces 
that was intended to make North Vietnam realize that conquering the South simply was 
not worth the investment. With this buildup came a massive shakeup of the South 
Vietnamese social structure. The older, more conservative elements adhered to tradition 
and lamented the infusion of morally corrupt American culture that seemed to take over 
the young Vietnamese.141 Furthermore, the infusion of U.S. personnel created upward 
pressure on inflation such that ARVN soldiers’ pay could not keep up. From 1964 to 
1972, an ARVN colonel’s pay fell in purchasing power from $400 to $82, and a private 
made 50 percent of a minimum-wage worker’s pay.142 The inflation placed the ARVN 
personnel in a desperate position, but since they held the power, they could make up the 
difference off the backs of the peasants or through black marketeering, which did nothing 
to improve the ARVN’s standing in the eyes of its fellow citizens. 
The only real chance that the United States had to put itself in a position to 
influence the replacement of ARVN leadership and its overall command organization 
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was when MACV considered the idea of creating a combined command. General 
William Westmoreland ultimately rejected the idea due to concerns over security of 
sensitive intelligence, the political requirements associated with managing the national 
requests for specific positions on the staff, and possible communist accusations of 
imperialism.143 Although the complications would have been significant and the 
likelihood of communist infiltration increased, it was probably the only way for the 
United States to have a chance to have a positive impact on the ARVN’s most obvious 
weakness.144 An unimpressive ARVN incursion into Laos in 1971, and the North’s 1972 
Easter Offensive led to some notable leadership changes, but often those replaced simply 
moved to higher positions where they wielded even more influence.145 By then, of 
course, it was far too late for such changes to matter. As the official MACV history 
concludes, in 1975 “Saigon’s forces still were plagued at the end by the same problems of 
weak and corrupt leadership, high desertion rates, and uneven tactical performance that 
had afflicted them at the beginning.”146 These were aspects that advisors had addressed 
for 18 years and had proven unable to fix.147 In contrast, the North’s ineffective generals 
were dead or had been replaced by a regime of iron ideological determination, which 
feared defeat more than it feared its own soldiers.  
When the final hammer blow came in 1975, South Vietnam fielded an ARVN of 
450,000 soldiers, 325,000 Regional Forces (previously the Civil Guard), and 206,000 
Popular forces (previously the Self Defense Corps).148 These ground forces were backed 
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up by a modern air force of 65,000 that included jet fighters.149 In contrast, the NVA 
fielded somewhere between 336,000 and 436,000 men.150 The NVA initiated its attack 
on northern South Vietnam around Hue and in the Central Highlands. The decisive thrust 
came directly at Saigon, like the Easter Offensive three years earlier, which the ARVN 
had only stopped with the help of massive airpower and advisor support. With these two 
assets no longer available due to Washington’s decision to reduce support for Vietnam, 
the Vietnamese could not hold. Throughout this final campaign, the South Vietnamese 
resistance was wholly unimpressive.151 The 18th Division at Xuan Loc east of Saigon 
stood apart as a unit that put up fierce resistance, and there were many acts of small unit 
and individual suffering and bravery.152 There simply was not enough of it. Had the 
South Vietnamese truly been a unified body desperate to resist communism, as one 
general wrote, one would have seen the mass of paramilitary and local forces resisting the 
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North Vietnamese at every opportunity.153 This resistance did not happen, either out of 
fear, apathy, or outright support for the Communists. These were characteristics that the 
advisory effort as envisioned by Eisenhower, Kennedy, Taylor, McNamara, Lansdale, 
and their successors were supposed to fix through advice and close personal 
relationships. In Vietnam, the desired results always remained well out of reach.  
G. CONCLUSION 
The United States’ twenty-five year relationship with Vietnam’s anticommunist 
struggle began and ended with military advisors. Generally impotent during the French 
Indochina War, the advisors shouldered the heavy responsibility of creating a South 
Vietnamese army that could withstand the larger, better-led People’s Army of Vietnam, 
and a Northern strategy that featured internal subversion instead of overt invasion as the 
primary means to undermine South Vietnam’s government.154 The RVNAF’s effort to 
combat this threat saw peaks of apparent success as in the late 1950s and valleys of abject 
failure in the early 1960s, which finally led to the introduction of U.S. troops and 
unprecedented airpower in an attempt to save the situation.155 Even this relief did little to 
solve the South’s critical shortfalls. In response to diminishing U.S. public support and 
general war weariness, President Richard Nixon’s administration carried out 
Vietnamization, a euphemism for a complete turnover of the war effort to the South 
Vietnamese and the departure of all U.S. forces. The war’s waning days saw advisors and 
air support play critical roles in support of the ARVN’s attempt to fight off the NVA’s 
Easter Offensive in 1972. When the advisors departed in 1973, there was nothing left, 
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tactically or organizationally, on which the RVNAF could have claimed to lack 
instruction. The reduction in U.S. support had minor short-term effects that could have 
become serious problems if the ARVN resistance had been prolonged, but the RVNAF 
fell so quickly that this situation did not occur. The RVNAF was simply outgeneraled and 
outfought. Nearly twenty years of direct U.S. advice and support had been unable to 
instill the leadership and motivation that were necessary to win. 
There are many reasons why the advisors could not achieve their goal of a South 
Vietnamese Army that could adequately defend South Vietnam from internal and 
external threat. The two reasons at which the advisors worked on a daily basis were 
devotion to country and leadership. As Vice-President Nixon had suggested in 1954 
while the anti-communist Vietnamese were fighting for the French, the Vietnamese 
lacked a cause around which they could rally. In his way, Diem tried to unite his country, 
but neither he nor the military junta that followed was able to develop the level of 
nationalistic fervor that the North did. It would be a mistake, however, to adopt the point 
of view of Paul Kattenburg, an East Asian specialist in the State Department, who wrote 
years later, “The real weakness was the Vietnamese didn’t want to fight. I mean they 
never did, at any time. They had chosen comfort and easy living over the miserable 
existence of the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong.”156 The RVNAF suffered 110,000 killed 
and 500,000 wounded.157 It did not throw up its hands at the first sign of the enemy. But 
a willingness to suffer does not, in itself, guarantee success in war.  
The most tangible reason for failure was the senior military leadership. For a 
country ruled by combat-hardened generals who had sneered at young U.S. military 
advisors’ efforts to offer suggestions, their performance in strategic decision making, 
operational planning and execution, and tactical leadership was dismal. If the South’s 
leaders could have mobilized the southern population around a cause like their northern 
counterparts, they might well have won.158 Both Williams and McGarr seemed to have 
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earned President Diem’s trust, but neither one ever forcefully argued for Diem to relieve 
his cronies and replace them with proven fighters. Once the generals took over, they 
continued the practice such that in December 1974, on the eve of the North’s final 
offensive, the CIA was still disparaging the poor quality of RVNAF commanders.159  
From the beginning, internal security was the besetting problem in Vietnam, by 
which both popular apathy and official incompetence were piteously exposed. The 
guerrilla forces in the South were only estimated at 7,000 in 1960.160 The Greeks, 
Koreans, and Filipinos had all dealt with internal security problems of greater or equal 
magnitude with far fewer problems. Meanwhile, the RVNAF numbered approximately 
250,000 personnel, and Diem would soon try to herd his entire population into fortified 
villages to protect them from this underwhelming horde of Communists. Unlike the other 
three cases, however, the Vietnamese Communists had three key advantages: a long, 
porous border; a devoted following; and significant outside support. Furthermore, they 
made few mistakes. A Korea-like offensive in the early 1960s would have surely drawn 
in overwhelming U.S. combat power and probable large-scale defeat for the communist 
forces. Thus, the Communists slowly built support for themselves, undermined GVN 
efforts to secure the countryside, and took advantage of weak points in the RVNAF 
defenses to score victories. Once the infrastructure was in place, it was up to the United 
States to pledge indefinite support to an RVN that proved itself to be beyond reform. In 
1975 Washington had spent more blood and treasure than anyone could have foreseen in 
1963 and was not willing to spend any more.161 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
The end of the Second World War ushered in dramatically new international 
conditions, characterized by U.S. leadership of what became known as the Free World, 
confronting a bloc of communist powers led by the Soviet Union. Faced with the 
challenge of managing a global reorganization fueled by a combination of communism 
and anti-colonialism, the United States sent military advisors to assist other nations in 
developing their capacity to resist internal subversion and external aggression. The efforts 
in the Philippines and Greece were largely successful, while the mission in Korea built an 
army that was adequate for internal defense, but found itself outmatched by a more 
heavily armed North Korea. In Vietnam, the advisors entered a military and political 
labyrinth in which both subversion and aggression fueled and reinforced each other in 
ways that proved impossible to disentangle. In the end they were unable to build a South 
Vietnamese Army sufficiently effective to sustain an anti-communist regime in Saigon. 
Despite signs that advisors there were not achieving U.S. goals, successive 
administrations stuck with them until the conflict reached a point at which the United 
States had to commit its own combat forces if it was not to suffer outright political defeat. 
In advance and in practice, it is not easy to recognize the conditions under which 
an advising effort is likely to succeed, though there is obviously value in trying to do so 
to the greatest extent possible. There are many cautionary statements about advisory 
efforts, particularly those concerning the U.S. experience in Vietnam. A postwar study 
concluded that “aid and advice, especially when based on misconceptions, cannot provide 
a client state with the requisite leadership, determination, and cohesion to defeat a 
pervasive and sophisticated insurgency.”1 More recently, in reflecting on the recent U.S. 
effort in Iraq, Walter Pincus wrote, “Vietnam should have taught the U.S. that as an 
outside power—with no common language, culture or history—Americans cannot bring 
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about national unity in other countries.”2 If examined in isolation, these observations 
seem accurate enough, and certainly proved true in Vietnam, which is offered as the 
exemplary case. Korea, however, presented a different, more successful scenario that 
somewhat belies Pincus’s conclusion. The Americans in Korea faced all of the same 
challenges in language, culture, and history as those in Vietnam but still created an 
effective force relative to its original mission, which was to provide internal security. The 
same can be said for the Philippines and Greece. In Korea, in contrast to Vietnam, it was 
the success of counterinsurgency in the South, rather than the failure, that induced the 
North to choose general war.  
It would be irresponsible and historically ignorant to discount advisors altogether 
based on their achievements in these cases and others. The challenge is recognizing 
where advisors might be effective, and, once committed, whether they are actually 
achieving U.S. objectives. It would also be irresponsible to suggest a strictly formulaic 
approach to advising; that is, if conditions a, b, and c are met, then advisors will succeed. 
Peter Murphy suggests this approach in his article on the success of Chinese assistance to 
North Vietnam while simultaneously pointing out that “the U.S. continues to have 
difficulty finding similar success” in its assistance efforts.3 Murphy argues that even 
though the “Vietnamese Communists consistently demonstrated more motivation to fight 
. . . the Chinese must have done something right in their military assistance efforts.”4 He 
then discusses three reasons why the Chinese were successful: they had a shared 
historical relationship with the Vietnamese, their support was appropriate for the North’s 
infantry-centric army, and the Vietnamese Communists did not become dependent on 
Chinese assistance.5  
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Presumably, the United States failed in Vietnam because it got these three things 
wrong, but this argument implies that if it had gotten them right, the outcome would have 
been drastically different. Furthermore, while America could choose where it intervened, 
it could not choose the circumstances of the political and military environment prior to its 
intervention. Although many Americans disdained their Vietnamese counterparts and the 
equipment provided to the South created a dependence on continued American support, 
Murphy’s factors were far less important than the much larger shortcomings of poor 
leadership and will to fight in the RVNAF, whose inclination and ability to accept the 
assistance being offered was a crucial requirement of success. Without Chinese aid, the 
North would have continued fighting with whatever it had, but without U.S. aid, the 
South would have collapsed much earlier than it did. Furthermore, in Greece, Korea, and 
the Philippines, the United States did not meet all of Murphy’s criteria either, yet it still 
met with varying levels of success.  
A comparable parallel to Murphy’s scenario was the support that the United 
States provided to the Afghan mujahedeen in their war against the Soviets in the 1980s. 
There, the United States found itself in something like China’s role in Vietnam, 
supporting an ideologically committed, independent ally of sorts who, like the North 
Vietnamese, would have fought the Soviet occupation with whatever it had. Thus, 
successful Chinese advising in Vietnam was far more dependent on the North’s devotion 
to its own cause than on any secret advising formula that the Chinese implemented. 
Northern leaders developed this cause, and it resulted in superior leadership and national 
will in the North versus the South. These two elements were clearly the most important in 
all four cases.  
A. FACTORS AFFECTING ADVISING 
Other factors do matter, however, and to the extent that they can be identified or 
understood at an early stage, will go a long way in contributing to the success or failure 
of an advising mission. The following elements are by no means prescriptive, but they do 
represent some of the most observable and influential factors that advisors face. They are 
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presented in logical order, conceptually speaking, but their relative significance in 
practice will obviously shift depending on the given situation.  
1. Will 
The most decisive trait for a host nation force is its willingness to fight and die for 
its cause. For advisors, this trait is also the most difficult to influence, and a lack of it 
may be a major reason why an advisory mission was formed to begin with. Furthermore, 
the friendly side’s motivation must be judged relative to that of its enemy. It is not 
enough to be somewhat motivated if the enemy is passionately committed. In the four 
cases here, the Communists’ willingness to fight was well established and allowed them 
to hang on for as long as they did, or win in Vietnam’s case. In the Philippines and 
Korea, U.S. advice and assistance provided the small push needed to overcome internal 
conflicts within those governments and armed forces. The Koreans, with the habits they 
had learned from the Japanese, had to be restrained, if anything. The Filipinos, at a 
stalemate when Ramon Magsaysay took over, were plenty willing to fight Huks, but 
lacked the organization and leadership to do so effectively. Greece and Vietnam saw the 
greatest disparity of will between the host nation force and their communist enemies. In 
the former, the advisors overcame the difference through changes in leadership, increased 
materiel, and poor decisions made on the communist side. In the latter, the advisors had 
little influence over any aspect of the environment—besides delivering military 
equipment—that would have contributed to an improvement in South Vietnam’s will. 
U.S. support raised morale, especially in the short term, but in none of the cases did the 
U.S. support diminish the requirement for the host nation force to prove it could 
ultimately fight and win on its own.  
2. Leadership 
Where advisors have the greatest potential for exercising a positive influence on 
the host nation force is in the development of its leadership. In Greece and Korea, 
General James Van Fleet played a key role in pressing for the relief of weak leaders. The 
advisors in Korea had an even greater influence since they were present from the birth of 
the ROKA and helped select its initial leadership. Ramon Magsaysay filled this role in 
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the Philippines with American backing, ridding the army of political generals and 
promoting fighters like Napoleon Valeriano. In Vietnam, a succession of senior U.S. 
military advisors recommended organizational changes to the army but placed little 
emphasis on finding higher level commanders whom Diem trusted and who were 
competent. The pressure to solve this problem fell ultimately on State Department 
civilians, who opted for Diem’s removal, rather than continue to urge reforms that failed 
to result in substantive change.  
The transformation evident in the Greek Army following General Papagos’s 
appointment to head the anti-communist campaign shows the potential for influence on 
this factor, but U.S. selection of allied leadership has great potential for unforeseen 
problems. If Washington gets in the habit of selecting other countries’ leadership, 
advisory efforts will lose their veil of providing assistance to allies and assume the role of 
puppeteer that communist and Islamic militant propaganda labels the United States.6 
Furthermore, the U.S. eye for foreign talent is dubious. Even General Papagos initially 
proved to be problematic as he demanded a huge increase in the army as the price for an 
offensive. In Vietnam, the United States identified the generals who replaced Diem as 
worthy successors, but they proved to be just as susceptible to cronyism. The most that 
could be reasonably expected is to push for the replacement of political generals with 
proven combat leaders and to recognize when the leadership problem is beyond repair. 
The mistake in Vietnam was doubling down on an advisory mission with some additional 
military technology that would not solve the military’s fundamental problems of poor 
leadership and mediocre will. In Greece, Korea, and the Philippines, the advisors were 
able to effect meaningful change at the highest levels, which then improved the entire 
advisory effort.  
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3. Actions and Influence of the Senior Advisor  
From the standpoint of what Washington can influence directly, the selection of 
the senior military advisor is the single most important decision to get right, assuming a 
decision to intervene in the first place. Since big decisions matter most, the higher the 
level of real influence, the greater the impact of that advice. It is equally true that the 
wrong person will have less influence than the right one. For example, in Greece the 
queen personally requested General Van Fleet, and his influence there was significant. 
Likewise in Vietnam, President Diem repeatedly requested Edward Lansdale’s return, but 
internal U.S. politics precluded this. Whether it would have had the results desired will 
never be known. Instead, Washington depended on Generals Lionel McGarr and Paul 
Harkins, neither of whom possessed Lansdale’s track record and personal credibility.  
Van Fleet’s outsized influence in Greece helped save that nation from whatever 
the communist insurgency might have won, but it also nearly derailed the political 
process and stunted the necessary military leadership when he supported General 
Papagos as emergency dictator, in contrast to the recommendations of Ambassador Henry 
F. Grady. In Korea, the advisory effort received short shrift until it finally came under the 
command of a general officer in 1948, which placed it almost three years behind its 
northern adversary. General Roberts’s overly optimistic reports might have given the 
impression that the South was in no danger. When war came, Roberts’ absence from the 
country, as he was on his way to retirement, placed the advisory effort and its advisees in 
an even worse position than the neglected one they were already in. In the Philippines, 
the role of the senior advisor was relatively insignificant since Magsaysay was such a 
forceful personality and enacted all of the significant changes necessary to turn the 
situation in the government’s favor. In Vietnam, the succession of questionable 
commanders invites the question of how they were selected or left to remain for so long. 
4. Physical Terrain and Political Geography 
Of the factors affecting advisory operations, terrain and geography seem almost 
too banal to consider. Yet they are also the easiest to appreciate, even with only a 
rudimentary knowledge of the host nation’s people or politics. A simple glance at a map 
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gives a feel for the challenges that could be faced prior to committing any forces. In 
Greece and Vietnam, the long, shared borders with neighboring countries, which either 
sheltered known communist supporters or were incapable of serving as a barrier to 
infiltration (e.g. Laos), frustrated efforts to rid the country of communist insurgents. In 
contrast, Korea and the Philippines benefitted from easily isolated terrain that allowed 
their forces to choke off the guerrillas effectively. Although U.S. leaders recognized the 
challenges in Greece and Vietnam, there was little they could do about them. The 
neutralization of Greece’s borders depended almost exclusively on internal bickering 
within the communist bloc, while the mountainous inland terrain in Vietnam was a 
recognized communist refuge that was never effectively neutralized. 
5. External Support 
External support, or the absence thereof, played an important role in all four 
cases. The U.S. ability to affect it was largely a function of geography. In Greece, the 
United States was fortunate to step into an inter-communist political rivalry between 
Premiers Josip Tito and Josef Stalin that resulted in minimal external support for the 
Greek Communists. The Communists nevertheless used the long, porous border to evade 
Greek forces, but the lack of weaponry that could challenge the Greek National Army left 
them in a disadvantageous position that, when combined with other factors, left them 
unable to win. Despite this advantage, U.S. leaders were convinced that the Greeks 
received more support than they actually did. In contrast, the Huks received no external 
support, by virtue of being on an island. Even so, government ineptitude and Huk 
perseverance allowed them to survive longer than they reasonably should have. With 
Magsaysay’s arrival and the reorganization of the military structure, the government’s 
performance drastically improved, and it rapidly reversed the stalemated military 
situation. 
External support played a far larger, quite possibly decisive, role in Korea and 
Vietnam. Without Soviet aid, specifically offensive armor and artillery, the North 
Koreans would have fielded an army similar to that of the South Koreans. With the aid, 
the North came very close to pushing the South’s forces and the frantically arriving U.S. 
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forces into the sea. Likewise, U.S. command of the sea allowed for a reversal of the 
situation with the landing at Inchon. Pressing the realized gains too far led to the most 
decisive external support—the Chinese intervention—which again gave the advantage to 
the North. As Chinese supply lines extended, the United States again brought its 
advantages to bear. Combined with an enormous recruitment drive of South Koreans, the 
UN forces stabilized the front once again. Had the United States made a reasonable 
investment in the South Korean forces earlier, the geography could have neutralized the 
North’s superiority, perhaps for an even smaller investment than what the Soviets and 
Chinese had made in the North.  
In Vietnam, Chinese weaponry allowed the Communists to defeat the French in 
1954, with Chinese-supplied artillery and even gunners providing the margin of victory at 
Dien Bien Phu.7 This support continued throughout the U.S. experience and was 
compounded by the Communists’ ability to infiltrate men and supplies down the Ho Chi 
Minh Trail into the South and, to a lesser extent, by sea. Those routes allowed the 
Communists to threaten the South everywhere continuously. In the early years, with the 
ARVN focused on defending against a conventional invasion, this advantage allowed the 
Communists to foment political dissatisfaction that served as the basis for support when 
the North decided in 1959 to escalate its efforts. If Vietnamese geography had mirrored 
that of Korea, it is entirely possible that an advisory effort could have built a force 
capable of defending the South with a far smaller commitment than Washington made 
from 1965–1973. 
6. Host Nation Government 
The four cases here generally saw a good working relationship with the host 
nation government, although Vietnam saw an increasingly strained partnership in the year 
preceding the coup against Diem. Rather, the critical factor is whether the host nation 
government has the support of the people through whatever means necessary. As such, a 
cult of personality can supersede actual government effectiveness. In Greece, the king 
and queen actively sought public venues and opportunities to visit the troops to build 
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support for the Nationalist cause. Likewise in the Philippines, Ramon Magsaysay 
tirelessly moved around the countryside to engage with the population as a benevolent, 
concerned member of the government. In both cases, the actual reforms that the Greek 
and Filipino governments were able to make in the short time span of their respective 
wars was relatively minor.  
In contrast, President Diem was more reclusive but enacted more reforms during 
his time as president. If he had coupled these programs with greater efforts to reach out 
and secure public affection and confidence for himself, perhaps he would have 
maintained greater support for his government. Although he had a deep concern for the 
peasantry, he never seemed to appreciate the value of establishing himself as a 
charismatic figure. It is obviously wrong to imagine that the solution to all political 
problems resides with a man on horseback, but in circumstances in which a country 
becomes visibly dependent upon powerful outsiders, it is especially important that it 
possess leadership capable of embodying the nation’s hopes and symbolizing its identity. 
Exactly how this can be done must vary with individual cases. But it will always be 
important. 
7. U.S. Domestic Politics: Advice Is Free. Advisory Missions Are Not. 
Throughout the period addressed in this study, U.S. domestic politics played 
either a supportive or limiting role in the execution of military advising. The separation 
of powers in the U.S. government means that, while the president and cabinet may decide 
to employ military advising to advance American policy, they are dependent on Congress 
to fund it. In all four of the cases studied here, the annual appropriations cycle injected 
uncertainty into the amount of money that would be available for assistance, which meant 
ambassadors and senior advisors would submit requests in December for the next fiscal 
year, which began the following October.8 Furthermore, there was almost always 
downward pressure from Congress on the amount of military aid that it was willing to 
fund. This pressure was particularly intense during non-crisis periods, which suggests 
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that, at least on the margins, Congress may be inclined to view military advising as a 
form of crisis management, rather than of long-term capacity-building. It is fact when 
immediate tactical pressure recedes that conditions are best suited to establish credible 
forces through advising. The result in Korea, and perhaps Vietnam before the U.S. 
buildup, was an insufficient army vis-à-vis its opponent. This failure to invest resulted in 
far greater expenditures than might have been required if made earlier. The notion that 
advisory efforts are cost-effective does not mean that they will feel cheap at the time. 
Often they will feel like the sort of long-term investments that are all-too-easily short-
changed. 
8. Civil-Military Teamwork 
Dysfunctional civil-military relationships among the senior Americans assigned to 
a host country pose a risk to the advisory effort and require constant review by 
Washington leadership to ensure that U.S. objectives are not undermined by personality 
conflicts that are directly under U.S. control. In Greece and Vietnam there were serious 
disagreements between senior civilian and military representation. In Greece, 
Ambassador Grady and General Van Fleet disagreed on General Papagos’s possible 
appointment as emergency dictator and on Van Fleet’s proposal for another GNA 
manning increase following the inconclusive 1948 campaign. In both cases, Grady won 
out, which probably turned out to be better than the alternative.  
In Vietnam, the poor relationship between Ambassador Durbrow and General 
Williams could hardly have benefitted the advisory effort. With Durbrow taking a much 
stronger position toward Diem than Williams, the two were never able to apply adequate 
pressure for the most critical changes that the South needed. Civil-military disagreement 
within a country team is not a bad thing in itself and is no doubt inevitable to some 
extent, but if it creates deep chasms of lasting discord, then it is detrimental to the 
mission and should be addressed by replacing one or more of the individuals involved. 
9. Host Nation Organization 
The way the host nation organizes its forces is one of the key issues on which 
advisors should provide insight for their counterparts. The natural tendency for U.S. 
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advisors was to build institutions similar to those in the United States and provide 
instruction based on U.S. Army tactics. Critics like Andrew Krepinevich and others have 
criticized this mirror-imaging approach, but the recipients of this advice showed 
themselves capable of adapting it to the environments in which they operated. In Greece, 
for example, U.S.-supplied equipment such as artillery and aircraft was relatively 
plentiful, even though the United States would only support a 145,000-man Greek 
National Army (GNA). Also, since the Greek Communists decided to directly confront 
government forces, the GNA did not require much in the way of special formations to 
defeat the communist Democratic Army. The Greeks did develop small numbers of 
commandos for special missions and the National Defense Corps to garrison cleared 
areas, but they fell under a unified chain of command and had clear responsibilities.9 The 
advisory efforts in Korea and the Philippines were likewise streamlined, with the 
Filipinos specifically adapting their battalion combat teams to the requirements needed in 
the jungles and hills of Luzon. 
In contrast, the Vietnamese approach to defeating the Viet Cong was the 
establishment of a disorganized conglomeration of units and commanders with 
overlapping missions, disjointed chains of command, and random training standards 
depending on whether the MAAG or State Department officials were responsible for 
training. Sir Robert Thompson counts at least eight different Vietnamese organizations 
that were responsible in some way for prosecuting a piece of the anti-communist fight, 
while Andrew Birtle more recently counts fifteen by 1965.10 This dispersed military 
effort and Diem’s increasing coup concerns resulted in some units answering to province 
chiefs, some to unit commanders, and still others to the Joint General Staff. Any of these 
units could also receive direction directly from President Diem. If the enemy had been 
equally disorganized, then this construct might not have been as problematic. As it was, 
the fights between Ambassador Durbrow, Diem, General Williams, and the Michigan 
                                                 
9 Cable, Conflict of Myths, 18–19. 
10 At various points, there were the ARVN, the Civil Guard, the Self Defense Corps, the Gendarmerie, 
the National Police, the special forces, the Republican Youth, and the Hamlet Militia. Robert G. Thompson, 
Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 
1966), 103; Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 320. 
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State University Group did little to prevent this structure from being cemented as the 
South Vietnamese security construct, although it was primarily driven by the country’s 
internal dynamics.  
Much was made of the U.S. failure to properly organize the ARVN to conduct 
counterinsurgency—that it was organized to conduct conventional combat against an 
invasion from the north, which rendered it incapable of defending against VC attacks. 
This argument is overly simplistic, and worse, implies that there is a magical organization 
that will ensure success against an insurgency. U.S. advisors regularly used standard U.S. 
infantry doctrine to instruct their counterparts, which had been sufficient for previous 
advisory efforts. The Greeks, Koreans, and Filipinos showed that they were not hindered 
by following U.S. organizational advice as they successfully defeated their internal 
threats. Likewise in Vietnam, the ARVN’s formal organization was less important than 
its operational employment. General Williams constantly pushed for the ARVN to stay 
out of the counter-guerrilla fight and leave it to the paramilitary and police forces on the 
notion that this was a lesson learned from Korea. Had the Koreans followed the same 
advice and concentrated uniquely on maintaining border security, the communist-inspired 
internal unrest likely would have grown and might have even made the North’s 1950 
invasion unnecessary. Advisors need to ensure their advice emphasizes the immediate 
threat, especially when, as was the case in Vietnam, the United States is willing to defend 
an ally with combat forces.  
10. Advisor Selection and Training 
When it comes to advising, few subjects receive as much attention as advisor 
selection and training. Proponents like John Nagl argue for a permanently established 
advisory capacity, with Nagl himself proposing a dedicated advisory command of 20,000 
personnel under a lieutenant general.11 The reasoning is that advisory efforts frequently 
receive poor support, especially when they share the same battlespace with combat 
forces, or when the advisor role is filled by ad hoc units comprised of National Guard and 
                                                 
11 John A. Nagl, “Institutionalizing Adaptation: It’s Time for an Army Advisor Command,” Military 
Review 88, no. 5 (October 2008): 21. 
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reservist personnel, who are liable to be relatively underprepared for the unique 
challenges advisors face. Setting aside the possibility that citizen soldiers may well bring 
mission-enhancing skills to complex advisory efforts—like experience working outside 
of a military-centric structure—Nagl criticizes the U.S. Army’s failure to adapt its tactics 
and organization in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan to better address the needs of 
counterinsurgency.12 His solution, ironically, is a rigid advisory command structure that 
prescribes down to the individual position the exact size of battalion, brigade, and 
division level advisor teams, which of course cuts against the idea that advisory efforts 
must be specifically adapted to the situation’s needs.13 Nagl’s idea would also eliminate 
four Brigade Combat Teams from American operating forces and might have other 
unintended consequences if the advisory command ended up absorbing more senior 
personnel, as top-heavy advisor teams are likely to do.14 
This proposal is neither unique nor new, although Nagl’s solution is particularly 
manpower intensive and appears to be based mostly on the American experiences in 
Afghanistan, where minimal conventional forces generally left advisors with an 
insufficient organic security capability.15 Typical after-action criticism of advisors 
identifies short tour length, failure to understand the culture, lack of language skills, poor 
selection process for advisors, and the negative career impact to advisors as problems that 
should be addressed to improve future advisory efforts. In this vein, the BDM study 
following Vietnam recommended that “future advisory efforts should rely on a cadre of 
highly trained specialists rather than a massive effort by amateurs; those specialists 
should be familiar with the history, culture, and government of the country in which they 
serve and they should be fluent in the indigenous language and well trained in advisory 
                                                 
12 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam, Paperback ed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 120. 
13 Nagl, “Institutionalizing Adaptation,” 25–26. 
14 Ibid., 26. 
15 Nagl wrote his article in 2008 when there were few conventional forces in country; thus, he likely 
determined that a 25-man advisory element be the standard battalion-level advising. Ibid. 
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techniques. Further, the tour of duty for advisors should be of sufficient duration to be 
effective and to assure continuity.”16  
While these recommendations seem like common sense, they imply that the 
advisors’ shortcomings were mostly to blame for the failure to build an effective 
RVNAF, rather than the RVNAF’s own impossible-to-overcome weaknesses. Of course, 
testing the BDM proposal will likely never happen since highly trained specialists take 
years to create and require either knowing in advance where they will be needed or 
creating them for every country. Moreover, by the 1970s, there were many U.S. 
personnel with years of experience in Vietnam, including John Paul Vann, Edward 
Lansdale, and Rufus Phillips, but they did not seem to make any difference. Considering 
Lansdale and Phillips had been involved in Vietnam from the beginning of U.S. 
intervention, there is little reason to believe that a more highly trained group of advisors 
would have been any more effective at overcoming the South’s internal politics. Also, the 
other three conflicts resulted in effective armies with what the BDM study would 
consider to be a group of amateurs. A conflict that hinged on the cultural sensitivity and 
language skills of the advisors versus the quality of the advice and whether it was 
adopted by the leadership and aggressively acted on, would be an extreme statistical 
anomaly. Surely better training is always preferred, but a highly trained group of advisors 
is just as dependent on the host nation for success as a group of amateurs. Better training 
is not a substitute for bad decisions made elsewhere. These recommendations also imply 
that better tactical-level results can somehow make up for poor strategic decisions. 
Advisory efforts are no different from regular warfare in that respect. Expecting a 
bottom-up approach to revolutionize an army is wishful thinking.  
B. THE FUTURE OF ADVISING  
Scholars and practitioners point to current advisory efforts in Colombia and the 
Philippines as successful models for limited U.S. intervention in another country’s 
internal conflict where a larger U.S. presence might be detrimental or prohibitively 
                                                 
16 BDM Corporation, Strategic Lessons Learned, VI–31. 
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expensive.17 Counterbalancing these relatively successful advisory efforts are the 
disappointing results in Afghanistan and Iraq and the outright failures in Yemen and 
Syria. Despite eight years of advising and training, and continued support even after the 
departure of U.S. forces, the Iraqi Army proved itself incapable of stopping an Islamic 
State militia force of lesser size, but with greater will. As one report observed during the 
fall of Ramadi in May 2015, “even Iraq’s Golden Division—a U.S.-trained special-forces 
unit considered the most capable in the country—suddenly deserted its positions.”18 The 
U.S. effort in Syria is far worse, with $42 million spent having resulted in “four or five” 
trained individuals actually fighting and 54 others having been captured by Al Qaeda 
upon returning to Syria.19 
U.S. national strategy and recent history show, however, that advisory efforts are 
likely to remain as Washington’s first response to helping its allies.20 The return to Iraq 
to “degrade, and ultimately destroy” the Islamic State, the continuing advice and 
assistance mission in Afghanistan, and the attempt to buttress Ukrainian forces against 
Russian subversion are contemporary examples of what promises to be U.S. military self-
                                                 
17 Fernando M. Lujan, “Light Footprints: The Future of American Military Intervention,” Center for a 
New American Security (March 2013), http://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/light-footprints-the-
future-of-american-military-intervention; Linda Robinson, “The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces, 
CSR 66,” Council on Foreign Relations (April 2013), http://www.cfr.org/special-operations/future-us-
special-operations-forces/p30323. 
18 Loveday Morris and Mustafa Salim, “Chaos in Iraqi Forces Contributed to Islamic State’s Biggest 
Win This Year,” Washington Post, May 23, 2015, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/chaos-in-iraqi-forces-contributed-to-islamic-states-
biggest-win-this-year/2015/05/22/cf4e000e-ffd4-11e4-8c77-bf274685e1df_story.html. 
19 Luis Martinez, “Only ‘4 or 5’ US-Trained Syrian Rebels Fighting ISIS, General Says,” ABC News, 
September 16, 2015, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/general-austin-us-trained-syrian-rebels-fighting-
isis/story?id=33802596; Helene Cooper, "Few Trained Syrians Still Fight ISIS, Senators are Told," New 
York Times, September 16, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/17/world/middleeast/isis-isil-syrians-
senate-armed-services-committee.html?_r=0. 
20 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, “The 2013 Long-Term Budget Outlook” (Washington, DC: 
GPO, September 2013), 2, http://www.cbo.gov/publication/44521; The White House, “National Security 
Strategy 2015,” The White House, February 2015, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf; U.S. Department 
of Defense, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense” (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012), http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf; 
U.S. Department of Defense, “2014 Quadrennial Defense Review” (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, March 4, 2014), http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf; . 
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help programs for the near future.21 These same efforts show the difficulty in building a 
national army in countries awash in regional, religious, or ethnic factionalism. As in the 
four cases studies here, good decisions and progress at the highest levels of the host 
nation government and armed forces will matter more than thousands of hours spent on 
the shooting range instructing apathetic recruits. Whether the United States is able to 
affect this high-level change through political pressure, the assignment of an able senior 
advisor, or some other means will increase the chances for success, but should not imply 
that a problem like Afghanistan is necessarily within the ability of a U.S. advisory effort 
to solve. Advisors are a means to an end, with great usefulness under certain conditions. 
An honest, continual reassessment of these conditions is necessary to ensure that the 
desired results are within the advisors’ capacity to achieve.  
 
  
                                                 
21 Barack Obama, "Statement by the President on ISIL," The White House, September 10, 2014, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/statement-president-isil-1. 
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